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Abstract 
This thesis examines the notion of experience in the philosophy of Walter Benjamin. It 
focuses on the relationship between its constructive and disruptive features in four 
facets of Benjamin’s work, starting with the early writings dedicated to history and 
tradition and then moving towards different analyses of the reception of the work of art 
in modernity. Chapter I examines Benjamin’s early characterisation of experience on 
the basis of the transmissibility of tradition and suggests that the constructive character 
of experience manifests in the historical development of knowledge and truth in 
language. Chapter II is dedicated to The Origin of the German Mourning-Play and the 
shift towards an examination of the development of language from the perspective of 
the moments of rupture, forgetting and those deviations inherent in the transmissibility 
of tradition. I argue that experience appears immanently in the momentary suspension 
or interruption of the transmissibility of tradition: origin and allegory serve to 
characterise the double movement of concentrating the totality of tradition and 
suspending its objectivity. The ‘shattering of tradition’ that Benjamin regards to be the 
hallmark of modernity in his later writings is located within this dynamics. This 
shattering undermines the conditions for understanding the conflict out of which the 
present emerges, thereby producing a historiographic crisis which unsettles experience. 
Chapter III examines modern epic narration and the resources it develops to contests the 
forgetting which informs late capitalism. I specifically discuss the method of montage 
and the fragmentary memory associated with it to suggest that Benjamin looks at history 
from the standpoint of memory rather than from the perspective of tradition. Chapter IV 
discuses the radicalisation of the forgetting informing modernity and the possibility of 
developing, though momentarily, an equilibrium or interplay between technology and 
sensibility by means of long-term practice formed according to technical reproducibility 
and the principle of montage. It is finally argued that despite Benjamin’s constant 
emphasis on its destructive character, experience necessarily entails a cumulative or 
constructive dimension which Benjamin reformulates throughout his authorship in 
terms of tradition, memory and practice. 
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Preface  
 
The Destructive and Cumulative Character of Experience 
 
I 
 
This thesis is dedicated to examine four different yet interrelated presentations of the 
notion of experience in the work of Walter Benjamin. In these facets of the philosophy 
of Benjamin both experience and the concrete forms through which it is secured change 
according to the specificities of the present in which it is attained. Benjamin frames his 
investigation into the notion of experience within the context of the effects that 
modernity at large has on our ability to recognise the marks of the totality of history in 
our concrete relation to the present. However, the characterisation of modernity and the 
way in which the relation to the present is enacted is recast in different formulations. 
This thesis aims then to explore the historicity of experience as a problem that is in itself 
open to change in Benjamin’s works. 
In distinguishing between the German terms Erfahrung and Erlebnis to refer to two 
different forms of experience, Benjamin contests vitalists and phenomenological 
formulations of Erlebnis or the lived moment as an immanently meaningful form of 
perception or intuition opposed to the conceptual or scientific articulation of Erfahrung. 
Benjamin rather conceives of Erlebnis as the ephemeral moment which bears no 
meaning by its own unless it is associated or related to a ‘cumulative’ articulation of 
knowledge.
1
 He thus refers to the latter as Erfahrung, which includes yet also exceeds 
scientific knowledge. In referring to Erfahrung as spiritual, absolute or higher 
experience in different writings and unfinished fragments, Benjamin also distinguishes 
                                                            
1 Martin Jay, ‘Experience Without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel’, in Actuality of Walter 
Benjamin, ed. by Marcus, Laura and Nead, Lynda (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1999), pp. 194–211 (p. 
195). 
 
 
10 
experience from the concrete realms of knowledge pertaining to specific sciences and 
from the general concept of scientific knowledge encompassing those specific sciences.
2
  
Erfahrung has its roots in the verb fahren or travelling and in the prefix Er- which 
might mark the beginning of a process, its repetition or its conclusion. The prefix Er- 
thus associates the meaning of a long-term process or its repetition and conclusion with 
the developmental character inherent in fahren. Erfahrung acquires, therefore, the 
inflection of a temporally extended form of sensibility that relates the lived, ephemeral 
moment of the present to a ‘cumulative’ configuration of knowledge. The questions that 
Benjamin addresses with regard to the notion of experience (Erfahrung) concern the 
ways in which its ‘cumulative’ character is constructed and the multiple ways in which 
it manifests itself in concrete, lived moments (Erlebnis). Regarding the lived moment as 
lacking in proper meaning, Benjamin understands the continuous repetition of lived 
moments as bearing no further significance, acquiring in most contexts a negative 
connotation diversely associated to alienation,
3
 the interrelated process of innervation 
and enervation of the anaesthetised body,4 and to what Beatrice Hanssen calls an 
‘irrationalist ‘‘experience of cult’’’.5 These expressions of the sensibility are marked by 
an amnestic relation to the present which in turn must be suspended to attain experience. 
In this context, an alternative basis to sustain experience is needed beyond the 
continuous influx of sensory impulses or stimuli.
6
  
The distinction between experience and the lived moment rises questions on how the 
lived moment came to be the dominant form of sensibility in modernity and how 
                                                            
2 Benjamin refers to spiritual, absolute and higher experience respectively in ‘Experience‘ (1913), ’On 
Perception’ (1917) and  ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ (1917-8). See respectively: Early 
Writings  1910-1917, ed. by Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011): 116; 
hereafter EW; and Selected Writings 1, 1913-1926 ed. by Marcus Bullock, Howard Eiland and Michael 
W. Jennings, (Cambridge, MA., & London, Harvard University Press, 1996): 94; and 102. Hereafter SW 
followed by volume and page. 
3 Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, (New Edition), ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Bostock, Ana 
(London: Verso, 2003), p. 1. See also: Ernst Bloch , “‘Entfremdung, Verfremdung’:  Alienation, 
Estrangement”, TDR, 15 (1970), 120-125. Hereafter UB. 
4 Buck Morss, Susan, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered’, 
October, 62 (Autumn 1992), 3–41.   
5 Beatrice Hanssen, ‘Language and Mimesis in Walter Benjamin’s Work’, The Cambridge Companion to 
Walter Benjamin, ed. by Ferris, David S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 77 (fn 2).  
6 Referring to Benjamin’s interest in Brecht’s Verfremdungseffeckt, for instance, Jürgen Habermas 
suggests that Brecht operated as a ‘kind of reality principle’, showing that the estrangement produced by 
epic drama suspends the alienated form of sensibility. Although Habermas’ reference to reality is 
problematic it serves to emphasise that experience counteracts the logic of the lived moment. Jürgen 
Habermas, “Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism:  The Contemporaneity of Walter 
Benjamin,” New German Critique, 17 (1979), 31.  
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experience might be secured in this situation. It is within this context that Benjamin 
formulates different answers that vary according to his characterisation of the present in 
which experience is attained. If the mark of substantive experience is its cumulative 
character (i.e. its capacity to concentrate history in itself) Benjamin offers different 
characterisations of the ways through which history can be gathered in the double 
process of interrupting the lived moment and relating the present to the past. 
Throughout his authorship Benjamin reformulated the relation between the ephemeral 
and transient character of experience and the traces of a totality that remains open to 
further transformation. Whether as spiritual, absolute, or higher experience, the notion 
of experience carries an emphatic meaning which gives weight to the concrete relation 
to the present in ways which turns the present into a substantive relation to history. For 
Benjamin, experience brings forth the totality of history in concrete spatio-temporal 
moments.  
Critical to Benjamin’s notion of experience are two features. Experience is secured 
firstly through the interruption or suspension of the current relation to everyday life. It 
is, first, a form of suspension or interruption. In a unpublished fragment from 1931 
Benjamin calls this the ‘destructive character’.7 Experience is thus produced, as Howard 
Caygill suggests, through ‘indirectly, tortuous and even violent forms’ of interrupting or 
suspending the cumulus of lived moments.
8
 On the other hand, if experience is secured 
through the interruption of the current relation to the present, the concrete forms in 
which it manifests itself change according to the present which it suspends. The 
meaning of this hypothesis is twofold. First, if each generation gathers the totality of 
history in different moments of history, both the concrete moment in which experience 
appears and the totality of history are subject to change historically. Then, both the 
notion of experience and the task of giving a systematic account of the indirectly, 
tortuous and violent forms in which it is produced are, therefore, historicised. Second, 
although Benjamin addresses the notion of experience in the context of his broader 
analysis of modernity, he also discusses the notion of experience in the specific contexts 
of the baroque period and early modernity in The Origin of the German Mourning-Play 
(1916- 1928)
9
 and late capitalism in his essays on film, photography, radio and artistic 
                                                            
7 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Destructive Character’, SW 2: 441-2. 
8 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 2.  
9 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, (London, Verso, 1998). 
Hereafter OGT. 
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production in the age of technical reproducibility and in the unfinished Arcades Project 
(a period which is normally considered to begin in 1924 and which extends to the end of 
Benjamin’s authorship).10 To some extent, this thesis addresses the multiple presents in 
Benjamin’s authorship in which the destructive character suspends the lived moment 
and opens the possibility to produce the cumulative dimension that is necessary to attain 
experience. 
This thesis is divided in two main parts respectively divided in two chapters. While the 
first part addresses the notion of experience in Benjamin’s early writings and the book 
on the baroque, the second part is dedicated to the analysis of experience in the context 
of the technical reproducibility of the work of art. I suggest that while the early writings 
and the book on the baroque look at the cumulative character of experience in terms of 
the totality of history concentrated in tradition, the latter works look at the totality of 
history from the standpoint of divergent notions of memory. Tradition and memory are 
then different media to construe or concentrate the totality of history. They are also 
different forms of giving the conditions to contest the amnestic present of modernity. 
Tradition and memory are, therefore, different forms of naming the totality of history 
which substantiates experience. 
The preliminary distinction between the destructive and cumulative character of 
experience may help to motivate the approach to Benjamin’s writings sketched above. 
As most interpreters, Martin Jay explains the cumulative character of experience from 
the perspective of Benjamin’s more emphatic presentation of the distinction between 
Erfahrung and Erlebnis, namely, the twofold characterisation of the loss of the tradition 
of storytelling that affects both the communicability and transmissibility of experience 
(as it is presented in ‘Experience and Poverty’ and ‘The Storyteller’),11 and the 
‘shattering’ or annihilation of tradition produced by the emergence of technical 
reproducibility  (as it is formulated more strongly in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technical Reproducibility’ and other essays on photography, film and epic drama).12 
The cumulative character of experience is thereby associated with the work of tradition, 
language and memory on the one hand, and with the historical process of cultural 
transmissibility of the work of art on the other. In both cases, the cumulative character 
                                                            
10 The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge, MA. & London, The 
Belknap Pres of Harvard University Press, 1999). Hereafter AP. 
11 See respectively: SW 2: 731-6; SW 3: 143-65. 
12 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility’, SW 3: 101-133.  
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of experience is negatively presented from the perspective of the loss of the conditions 
that make it possible in the first place. It is in this context that the loss of tradition 
means the loss of the medium through which experience is produced and transmitted, or 
the loss of the medium through which experience accumulates its own history.  
From the perspective of its loss, the cumulative character of experience is explained 
negatively: Benjamin offers an account of the conditions that are necessary to produce 
substantive experience within a context in which those conditions are no longer 
operative (i.e. modernity). By contrast, the early writings on Kant and language and the 
book on the baroque offer an alternative account of the transmissibility of experience by 
means of tradition. This account may be interpreted as a positive account: it explains the 
transmissibility of experience by means of tradition less from the perspective of its loss 
or absence than from the perspective of the intrinsic tension informing the 
transmissibility of experience by means of tradition (and language). The early works on 
Kant, language and the baroque still assume the existence of the conditions for the 
transmissibility of experience by means of tradition —although the transmissibility of 
experience is marked by the presence of an internal conflict that threatens the very 
process of transmission, as I will discuss later. 
This contrast does not suggest that the earlier writings deny the crisis of tradition and 
experience. Rather, in bringing these discussions together it can be appreciated that the 
crisis of experience is continuously reformulated throughout Benjamin’s writings. If the 
earlier writings and the book on the baroque stage the crisis of experience in terms of 
the internal tension of cultural transmissibility in modernity at large, the later writings 
provide an account of the further radicalisation of the crisis of tradition in industrial 
capitalism. It may be suggested that Benjamin traces the historical origins of the crisis 
of tradition back to the philosophical and theological conflicts (or contradictions) of the 
baroque period —and in the philosophical solution which appears latter in Kant’s 
distinction between what is cognisable (and attainable) and what is an object of faith (an 
only partially and obliquely conceivable). The relevance of reading these two general 
characterisations of experience together lies in the fact that the early writings and the 
book on the baroque provide the elements for a more complete characterisation of what 
Benjamin means by experience based or grounded in the transmissibility of tradition 
and the conditions for the gathering of the totality of history which are ultimately 
shattered in late capitalism.  
 
 
14 
From this perspective, the effects that the shattering of tradition has on experience may 
be understood in a more complete way: not only the medium for the transmission of 
experience is brought into crisis in late capitalism but also the possibility of 
comprehending the conflict from which the present emerges. This thesis examines the 
transition from Benjamin’s analysis of experience in a context where tradition maintains 
its living efficacy to an analysis of experience in which its operative character is brought 
into crisis.
13
 It is against the background of the former that the transformation which 
experience undergoes in the latter context is better explained. Critical to this transition is 
the problem of what the cumulative character of experience consists of in light of the 
‘shattering’ of tradition; or how experience gathers its own history when the medium 
through which it is articulated is unsettled. In this perspective, the loss or annihilation of 
tradition does not imply the impossibility of attaining experience as Benjamin shows 
through his analysis of different notions of memory. Memory is in turn seen as an 
alternative medium to ground or sustain experience in late capitalism.  
 
II 
 
One way of thinking of the relationship between the cumulative character of experience 
and its destructive character consists of the distinction between the cosmological and 
phenomenological notions of experience that Susan Buck-Morss introduces in her 
presentation of the ‘revolutionary time’ of the artistic avant-gardes of the twentieth 
century, specifically, of the Russian avant-gardes of the time of the Bolshevik 
revolution in October 1917.
14
 Her distinction between cosmological and 
phenomenological experience partially maps the distinction between the ‘cumulative’ 
and the ‘destructive character’ of experience. She associates the avant-gardes with 
cosmological experience and brings into question what she understands to be a reduced 
conception of the temporality of the avant-gardes: the temporality which, according to 
                                                            
13 Benjamin refers to the living efficacy of the storyteller to concentrate the conditions that make possible 
the transmissibility of experience by means of tradition in ‘‘The Storyteller’’ (SW 3: 143). These 
formulation is further discussed in Chapter III. 
14 Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time: The Vanguard and the Avant-Garde’, in Perception and 
Experience in Modernity, ed. by Helga Geyer-Ryan, Paul Koopman, and Klaas Yntema, Benjamin 
Studies / Studien 1 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 209–25 (p. 220). Also: Buck-Morss, Dreamworld 
and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp 
49-50. 
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her, Peter Osborne attributes to them in terms of a ‘Benjaminian temporality of 
interruption, estrangement and arrest’ (i.e., a phenomenological experience).15 At stake 
here is not only the temporality of the avant-gardes, but also Benjamin’s notion of 
experience and the interrelated work of its destructive and cumulative dimensions.  
Although Buck-Morss agrees on that Benjamin’s concept of revolutionary time consists 
of a ‘phenomenally lived rupture’ or an ‘interruption of daily life’ which we can now 
associate to the destructive character,
16
 she contests the possibility of identifying this 
moment of rupture with experience in particular and with the project of the historical 
avant-gardes in general. She therefore suggests that Benjamin’s concept of experience 
cannot be related to the latter without undergoing a further reformulation. 
What is left aside from the phenomenological understanding of experience as mere 
interruption is, according to Buck-Morss, the cosmological dimension of experience. 
This manifests in the project pursued by those avant-gardes which aimed not only at 
interrupting specific forms or configurations of everyday life but which also sought to 
contribute towards the progress of history, thereby endorsing ’the idea of history as 
progress’. By cosmological experience Buck-Morss refers then to an understanding of 
the avant-gardes and political revolutions as world-historical events, i.e. the culmination 
of a process of transformation which (albeit discontinuous) claims to be a sort of 
’historical destination’.17 The opposition staged by Buck-Morss introduces the question 
of whether the destructive character of Benjamin’s notion of experience provides the 
conditions for securing an alternative, constructive dimension which may contribute 
towards an understanding of those radical practices which aimed to exceed the 
phenomenological moment of interruption. For Buck-Morss, despite its own radicalism, 
the phenomenological experience of breaking through everyday life is ultimately an 
ephemeral moment that might remain congealed in the now of its occurrence. This 
suggests that in spite of its force the destructive character may be just an ecstatic 
affirmation of the lived moment. In spite of being an ‘enlightened’, disruptive and 
                                                            
15 Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time...’: 221; Cf. Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and 
Avant-Garde (London and NY: Verso, 2011), pp. 50–52. 
16 Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time...’: 219. 
17 Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time...’:  220. Buck-Morss continues by identifying the idea of history as 
progress with cosmological experience and the historical project of the avant-gardes. She writes that the 
idea of history as progress ‘led radical cultural producers to assume that political revolution and cultural 
revolution must be two sides of the same coin’. (‘Revolutionary Time...’, p. 219). 
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critical gesture, this affirmation may nonetheless remain as a ‘barbarism’ which 
embodies a merely negative form of nihilism.
18
 
The positions of Buck-Morss and Osborne are not antithetical. Not least because both of 
them seek for an alternative, secured long-term experience beyond the ‘ecstatic’ 
moment of interruption. The problem is that Buck-Morss’ account of the twofold notion 
of political and cultural progress conflates different meanings and becomes too broad, 
including both the avant-garde movements which by the mid 1920’s followed the Party 
politics in the Soviet Union and those which came to be condemned as ‘counter-
revolutionary’ (despite having being initially regarded to be part of the revolutionary 
movement of progress). This general notion of progress identifies the avant-gardes with 
those artists who made the ‘fateful decision, in facing forward rather than backward, of 
moving triumphantly into the future alongside of political power’. To maintain that the 
avant-gardes abandoned the Benjaminian temporality of interruption while moving 
forward (alongside historical progress and political power) undoes the differences 
between specific avant-gardes and, furthermore, between revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary practices. Not only may this argument attribute a progressivistic inflection 
to Benjamin’s work. With this, both cultural expressions are collapsed under the 
cosmological notion of experience according to which the avant-garde would be that 
which (reversing Osborne’s formulation) ‘is historically more advanced’, or that which 
‘has the most history behind it’: in sum, the movement which has made the major 
progress in history in terms of a linear accumulation of events.
19
  
Within this context, both the cosmological and phenomenological notions of experience 
become problematic. The former becomes a name for the prejudice of history-as-
progress. The latter is rendered irrelevant insofar as it confronts or contests the course of 
history without providing any alternative to it (being romantically stripped of any 
political efficacy). It is, however, within the context of the radicalisation of the 
                                                            
18 ‘The Destructive Character’, SW 2: 441-2. On Benjamin’s affirmation of a positive nihilism, see also 
‘Theological-Political Fragment’, SW 3: 305. For a discussion of this method see: Astrid Deuber-
Mankowsky, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment as a Response to Ernst Bloch’s Spirit of 
Utopia’, The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, Volume 47, Issue 1, 1 January 2002, pages 3–19; and Eric 
Jacobson, ‘Understanding Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment’ Jewish Studies Quarterly 
Vol. 8, No. 3 (2001), pp. 205-247. Also, Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 29-33, and Andrew 
Benjamin, Working with Walter Benjamin: Recovering a Political Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2013), specially Chapter 4, pp. 144-160. James McFarland offers some insights into the 
nihilistic basis of Benjamin’s thought in Chapter 5 of Constellation: Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter 
Benjamin in the Now-Time of History (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 208-248. 
19 Osborne, The Politics of Time, p. 150. Cf: Buck-Morss, ‘Revolutionary Time’, p. 220. 
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cosmological notion of experience (informed by an unorthodox, critical or inverted idea 
of history-as-progress) that Benjamin turned his attention to those specific movements 
that aimed to contest the Party politics of the Soviet Union from the mid 1920s 
(radicalised latter in the 1934 congress of Soviet writers and the adoption of Social 
Realism as official line). In this context, the concept of experience associated with 
rupture, interruption or suspension, turned to be critical for his approach to the debates 
on the avant-gardes both in the East and the West.  
This does not mean, however, that —in Buck-Morss’ vocabulary— Benjamin did not 
formulate his own particular conception of cosmological experience. On the contrary, 
he did intend to articulate the constructive dimension of the totality of history with the 
destructive character of interruption. It is the relation between these two different 
features what Benjamin brings together in divergent formulations of the notion of 
experience throughout his authorship —and what ultimately brings Buck-Morss’ 
position closer to Osborne’s. In his writings dedicated to the avant-gardes, Benjamin 
formulates a cosmological form of experience which manifests immanently in the 
moment of interruption that Buck-Morss identifies with phenomenological experience. 
In other words, the cosmological dimension of experience is articulated by means of the 
phenomenological interruption of everyday life. Cosmological experience is 
immanently developed in the phenomenological interruption of given configurations of 
social life. In this perspective, to stage the opposition between the cosmological and 
phenomenological as adjectives supplementing two differentiated forms of experience  
is possible only on the basis of reducing the latter to its ‘ecstatic’, nihilistic character. 
The cosmological and the phenomenological refer, rather, to elements or features of one 
single notion of experience, one in which its cosmological (constructive/cumulative) 
dimension is immanently construed by means of the phenomenological 
(destructive/nihilistic) interruption of the lived moment. Then, more than referring to 
two different forms of experience, the cosmological and the phenomenological are 
better understood as features or hallmarks of one single form of experience (i.e. no 
experience is attained in the absence of one of these features).  
One Way Street (1928), Benjamin’s most experimental piece of writing, concludes 
precisely with an intimation of a cosmological experience. This is formulated negatively 
by means of the interruption of the current relation to technology in daily life. The 
negative presentation of experience is critical to Benjamin’s critique and inversion of 
 
 
18 
the idea of history-as-progress. According to Benjamin, in order to respond to the 
extreme situation of technological warfare which emerged with World War I a radical 
gesture of interruption is needed. This gesture is formulated in terms of an ecstatic 
process of innervation or ‘ecstatic trance’ which suspends the distorted relation between 
sensibility and technology, which thereby opens the opportunity for a substantive, long-
term form of perception, subsequently identified with experience: an equilibrium 
between humanity and technology in a ‘cosmic experience’.20 It is in this context that 
Benjamin equates the measure of humanity’s ability to attain such a ‘cosmic experience’ 
with the ‘proletarian’s capacity’ to intervene in the real world in order to suspend the 
destructive effects of the technological organisation of sensibility.
21
 The constructive 
(cosmological) character of experience is then a discrete outcome of the destructive 
(phenomenological) interruption of the lived moment.  
The ‘Theses on the Concept of History’ (1939) reveal one of the central features of this 
form of substantive experience, namely, its relation to the totality of history. According 
to this fragment, experience is to some extent that which has the most history behind it. 
In describing the potential that each generation has to suspend the destructive social 
relations that make of history a history of catastrophes, Benjamin writes in thesis II: 
‘our coming was expected on the earth. Then, like every generation that preceded us, we 
have been endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which the past has a 
claim’.22 As Howard Caygill comments on this fragment, ‘as the Messiah of past 
generations, it is we who are expected to redeem the past and to avenge their 
suffering’.23 Here, the gesture of gathering the past is understood as a condition of 
possibility for producing or attaining substantive experience.
24
 Experience is thus the 
result of a twofold process in which the moment of interruption concentrates the history 
behind it, albeit in order to open history to unknown futures rather than to claim (or 
predict) the arrival to an alleged destination. Looking at the past while searching for 
alternative futures renders this conception of experience into a form of historical 
experience, one which bears the marks of a weak Messianism rather than structure of 
utopian visions anticipating historical destinations. Experience is thus produced by the 
                                                            
20 One Way Street, SW 1: 486. 
21 SW 1: 486-7. 
22 SW 4: 390. 
23 Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (London: Boomsbury, 2013), p. 144. 
24 Howard Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition’, in Walter Benjamin’s 
Philosophy. Destruction and Experience, ed. by Andrew Benjamin, and Peter Osborne (Manchester: 
Clinamen, 2000). 
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totality of history concentrated in the moment of interrupting the lived moment. It 
gathers the past in a concrete moment in the present and opens it up to discrete, 
divergent possibilities to come in the future. It consists therefore in the recognition of 
history as open to change with the present being embedded with multiple futurities.  
 
III 
 
This thesis is divided in two main parts which address different presentations of the 
gathering of history by means of the interruption of the lived moment. The first part 
addresses the notion of experience in Benjamin’s early writings and the book on the 
baroque. It examines the relationship between experience and tradition and considers 
the latter to be the medium through which the former attains its constructive or 
cumulative character. It pays particular attention to Benjamin’s identification of the 
transmissibility of tradition with the unfolding or development of language, for which 
the constructive dimension of experience is consequently identified with the 
eschatological conception of language. For this, language is moving towards its own 
completion. The second part of this thesis is dedicated to the analysis of experience in 
the age of the technical reproducibility of the work of art and the shattering of tradition 
it produces. It argues that Benjamin entertains divergent notions of memory as 
alternative media for the articulation of the constructive character of experience, making 
the gathering of the totality of history possible in light of the crisis of tradition. 
In this general scheme Chapter I examines the notion of experience in three main 
moments. Firstly, it offers an account of the notion experience in Benjamin’s early 
writings (1913-1917), according to which experience consists in recognising history as 
open to change and transformation. Secondly, it relates the transformability of history to 
Benjamin’s attempt to formulate a doctrinal philosophy of history, one which must be 
able to give a systematic account of experience as a unity that remains open to change. 
This serves to explain Benjamin’s understanding of doctrine (Lehre) in its double 
meaning of teachings and religious doctrine transmitted on the basis of tradition, and 
Benjamin’s attempt to capture the technical sense that Doktrin has in the Kantian 
system (as that part of philosophy which catalyses the critical method and drives it 
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towards the unattainable completion of a productive metaphysics). Thus, Chapter I 
shows that Benjamin offers a double account of the nature of experience and the 
conditions for giving a systematic explanation of it: if experience is open to 
transmission and transformation, (doctrinal) philosophy must consists also of an open 
system able to present experience as subject to change.
25
  
The final section of Chapter I is dedicated to the relationship between tradition, 
experience and language. Although Benjamin argues for an examination of this 
relationship in the concluding sections of  ‘On Perception’ (1917) and ‘On the Program 
of the Coming Philosophy’ (1917-8), this problem is developed in the essays on 
language (1916) and translation (1921). In the section on language I emphasise the 
limits that the essay on translation sets upon his eschatological conception of language 
and meaning introduced in the earlier essay on language.
26
 Although Benjamin argues 
that language develops towards the full completion of meaning in the process of 
translation between languages, he also maintains that such a completion is unattainable, 
leaving open a space of indeterminacy which is indeed critical to support the thesis of 
the eschatological unfolding or growing of language. As Beatrice Hanssen argues, 
Benjamin understands the transformability of experience within the context of a general 
understanding of history as ‘history of language’ and, furthermore, of ‘history as 
language’.27 This view locates the cumulative character of experience in the historical 
development of knowledge and truth in language. As Hanssen also notes, there is a 
specific shift in the essay on translation which allows for a closer examination of the 
‘growth of language’.28 I suggest, however, that it is The Origin of the German 
Mourning-Play (1928) which offers the conditions for a proper understanding of the 
                                                            
25 Although most interpreters recognise the centrality that the double meaning of Lehre has for 
Benjamin’s reading of Kant, less attention has been given to his emphatic reading of Doktrin and the role 
that the ideas of reason play in the configuration of a philosophical account of the unity of experience. 
See: Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 5-13, 23-29; Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter 
Benjamin and the Shape of Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 153–55; Eli Friedlander, 
Walter Benjamin. A Philosophical Portrait (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 131–
36; Beatrice Hanssen Walter Benjamin’s Other History. Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings and Angels 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 28–30. Bram Mertens, Dark Images, Secret Hints: 
Benjamin, Scholem, Molitor and the Jewish Tradition (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007): Chapters 4-5. 
26 Friedlander, A Philosophical Portrait: 15. Also: Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34-5. 
27 Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34. On the ‘abstract’ tendency of the essay on 
language see: Ilit Ferber, ‘Lament and Pure Language: Scholem, Benjamin and Kant’, Jewish Studies 
Quarterly, 21.1 (2014), 42–54 (pp. 47–49). Ferber also reads the essay on translation as marking a shift 
towards the ‘historical dimension’ of language. However, she explores the continuity towards a pure,  
abstract language rather than the historical movement or transformation of language: Ilit Ferber, 
Philosophy and Melancholy: Benjamin’s Early Reflections on Theater and Language (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 154–55. I will return to this point in Chapter I. 
28 Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34. Cf: ‘The Task of the Translator’, SW 1: 255-6. 
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growth of language and its relation to tradition. This allows for an analysis of the 
moments of rupture and oblivion informing (and conditioning) the eschatological 
aspiration to completion in language and meaning upon which the essays on language 
and translation elaborate. 
Chapter II examines The Origin of the German Mourning-Play. The book on the 
baroque is not explicitly concerned with the notion of experience in general but with the 
experience associated with reception of the literary work. In this context, the book on 
the baroque provides a more detailed account of two central elements of the notion of 
experience developed in the earlier writings. Firstly, its ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ 
explains the gathering of the totality of history and its opening up to alternative futures 
in the reception of literary works by means of the concept of immanent critique, a form 
of criticism which operates through an immersion or digression in history. I argue that 
the ‘historical configuration’ on which doctrinal philosophy must be based is better 
understood as tradition.
29
 Secondly, the book on the baroque develops the thesis of the 
historical growing or unfolding of language yet advances an important shift. Rather than 
looking at the historical development of language from the perspective of its movement 
towards completion, immanent critique is orientated towards the past in order to pattern 
the irregular rhythm informing the development of those concepts which have been 
utilised to characterise the literary work which is criticised (i.e. the baroque mourning-
play or Trauerspiel). The unfolding or growing of language is understood, therefore, as 
an irregular movement marked by cycles of memory and forgetting, interruptions and 
deviations. To grasp the totality of history in the reception of the work means to pattern 
or determine the irregular rhythm informing the history of those concepts which have 
been used to grasp, for example, the ‘essence’ of the baroque Trauerspiel. The 
peculiarity of the baroque Trauerspiel —its exceptionality as literary genre and its 
resistance to be subordinated to literary and aesthetic theories and methodologies for 
genre-definition— serves to reveal that this irregular process is ultimately shaped by the 
conflict of multiple interpretations of the work, marked by what I refer to as the violence 
of critique. The history of those concepts construes a tradition which violently 
negotiates the essence of the literary work. 
                                                            
29 OGT: 37. 
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Immanent critique juxtaposes contrasting interpretations of the baroque Trauerspiel, 
gathering its total history yet also revealing the conflict which informs its development. 
To some extent, immanent critique makes recognisable both the history concentrated in 
the work’s afterlife and alternative interpretations of it that never came into being. It 
liberates meanings which are concealed in the history of the reception of the work, 
opening then the opportunity to recover its total yet incomplete history. The 
constructive character of experience is then situated in the possibility of grasping the 
total yet incomplete history of the work of art delivered by multiple chains of tradition 
in conflict. The transmission of the work by means of tradition is thus understood in 
terms of the conflict between different positions negotiating the work’s essence.30 
The second part of this dissertation examines the crisis of tradition and the problem of 
confronting the work of art by means of immanent critique in this new context. If the 
shattering of tradition produces a ‘historiographic crisis’, as Osborne suggests, this 
crisis is double.
31
 It is not only the transmissibility of experience what is unsettled but, 
also, the possibility of grasping the conflict which is inherent in the process of 
transmission. The present is deprived of its own past and of the conflict out of which it 
emerges. Chapter III examines the transition from immanent to materialist critique as a 
means of confronting the crisis of tradition in the age of technical reproducibility. 
Materialist critique specifically points out the mnemonic character of modern epic 
narration by focusing on two main problems. Firstly, it examines the relationship 
between modern epic and film on the basis of the principle of montage which the former 
takes from the latter. Secondly, it examines the possibility of securing an alternative 
form of experience by means of the technique of montage. Montage operates then as the 
medium through which modern epic narration suspends the historiographic crisis of 
modernity and relates the present to the past. In the light of the crisis of tradition, 
modern epic narration suspends the reduced relation to the present lived moment by 
bringing it together with memories coming from the narrator’s past. This transition is 
also formulated in the unfinished project on the Arcades and the demand for a 
‘Copernican revolution of remembrance’ on which a new historiography must be 
                                                            
30 Uwe Steiner, Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to His Work and Thought (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), p. 130. 
31 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time, p. 136-7. 
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based.
32
 I suggest that the mnemonic character that Benjamin attributes to the technique 
of montage in the essays on epic narration offers an alternative medium for the 
configuration of the cumulative character and the suspension of the lived moment.  
Critical to modern epic narration is the distinction between divergent notions of memory 
which in turn differentiate between i) totalising and fragmentary forms of memory and 
between their ii) individual and collective foundations. With these distinctions, 
Benjamin associates modern epic narration to a fragmentary memory bearing a 
collective dimension. In opposition to the totalising remembrance (Erinnerung) based 
on the individual, subjective closure embodied by the novel, modern epic narration 
grounds experience by suspending the cumulus of lived moments and relating the 
present to a collective past that emerges as fragmentary reminiscence (Gedächtnis). 
Chapter III examines the concept of reminiscence which Benjamin intimates in the 
essays on Gottfried Keller (1927-9) and Alfred Döblin (1931), and which he develops in 
‘The Storyteller’ (1936) and ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939). The constructive 
character of experience is thus explained in terms of the interruption of the lived 
moment by means of the work of fragmentary memory and its capacity to relate the 
collective past to the present. It will be argued that, by means of the mnemonic 
character attributed to the method of montage, modern epic narration counteracts both 
the historiographic crisis produced by the shattering of tradition and the illusory 
response given to this by means of different narrative forms (the totalising closure of the 
novel and the amnestic repetition of information).  
By emphasising the turn towards memory this thesis avoids the antinomic readings of 
Benjamin’s work, according to which the essays on epic narration and other writings 
mourn the loss of tradition and aim at its recovery, while the essays on the new 
technologies (mainly the essay on reproducibility) affirm the annihilation of tradition or 
any remnant of it as a condition of possibility for new forms of experience, mainly 
associated with the lived moment and the shock of modern, urban experience.
33
 This 
thesis argues that by means of different concepts of memory Benjamin explains a new 
                                                            
32 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Belknap Press, 2002): [K 1,1] - [K 1,2]. Hereafter AP. 
33 John Joseph McCole, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), pp. 3, 18, 21–30; Steiner, Walter Benjamin, p. 119. Also: Howard Eiland and Michael 
Jennings, Walter Benjamin. A Critical Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 531, 
643; and Miriam Bratu Hansen, Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and 
Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 80–83, 103, 116–7. 
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realm of experience which does not depend on the recovery of tradition nor on the 
ecstatic affirmation of the lived moment. Memory, it will be argued, configures the 
cumulative character of experience in light of the absence of tradition. In this reading, 
the transition from the early writings and the book on the baroque to the essays on 
modern epic narration and technical reproducibility is presented in terms of different 
configurations of the constructive character of experience by means of tradition and 
memory.  
Finally, Chapter IV explains the constructive character of experience by distinguishing 
two uses of the notion of montage. If the essays on epic narration introduce montage as 
the technique or method of composition of the literary work, the third version of the 
essay on technical reproducibility understands montage as the principle or law (Gesetz) 
configuring film and, more broadly, the work of art in the age of technical 
reproducibility. With this generalisation of the method of montage as a principle or law, 
Benjamin characterises any form of visual and literary presentation (such as epic drama, 
for example) as a construction that precludes the totalising closure associated with the 
novel and with subject-centred cinematographic and photographic narratives. Critical to 
the principle or law of montage is therefore its openness and fragmentariness. It is the 
recognition of these elements what sustains the possibility of reaching an equilibrium 
between sensibility and technology, one which, however, remains suspended in the 
subordination of technical reproducibility to the logic of capitalism.  
The distorted form which reproducibility has in capitalism produces, therefore, a double 
effect: it brings the transmissibility of tradition into crisis and precludes the realisation 
of the equilibrium between sensibility and technology on the basis of which a new form 
of experience had emerged. This thesis examines the conditions on which the principle 
of montage both inaugurates a new realm of experience (which remains suspended) and 
the conditions for its fragmentary or momentary actualisation. It will be argued that this 
fragmentary actualisation depends on a suspension or interruption of second order or, as 
Irving Wohlfarth has argued, a ‘distortion of a distortion’.34 Having the potential of 
technical reproducibility been suspended or distorted in capitalism, its further 
actualisation can only be attained through the subsequent interruption or annihilation of 
capitalism.  
                                                            
34 Irving Wohlfarth, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Image of Interpretation’, New German Critique, 1979, 70–98 (p. 
80). 
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This thesis finally emphasises the relationship between montage and repetition in the 
essay on reproducibility and other writings on photography and epic theatre. The 
phenomenological character of experience is framed within its cosmological character: 
the destructive character of montage gains meaning within the possibilities it offers for a 
constructive configuration of experience by means of practice or training, consequently 
regarding film as the Übungsinstrument of modern experience. If montage interrupts the 
lived moment by means of a juxtaposition of divergent elements, a continuous repetition 
of this process of interruption is required in order to train human sensibility in the 
equilibrium or interplay with the new technologies. The disruptive character of montage 
is therefore framed in the process of training human sensibility in a long-term process of 
habit-formation in which technology becomes second nature. It is finally argued that 
despite Benjamin’s constant emphasis on it destructive character, experience necessarily 
entails a cumulative or constructive dimension, one which is reformulated throughout 
his own authorship in terms of tradition, memory and practice. 
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Chapter I  
 
 
To Make Room for History 
 
 
On October 22
nd
 1917, Walter Benjamin wrote to Gershom Scholem about his plan to  
work on Kant and his philosophy of history during the coming winter. He explained the 
reasons behind this project in the following words: 
 
I recognise that the ultimate reason that led me to this topic, as well as much as 
that is apropos and interesting: the ultimate metaphysical dignity of a 
philosophical view that truly intends to be canonical will always manifest itself 
most clearly in its confrontation with history; in other words, the specific 
relationship of a philosophy with the true doctrine [Lehre] will appear most 
clearly in the philosophy of history; for this is where the subject of the 
historical transformation of knowledge that doctrine reveals will have to 
appear.1  
 
In this fragment, Benjamin delineates the series of relations that informed his approach 
to Kant in a group of writings dating from this period. In this letter Benjamin 
understands history as grounding the dignity of ‘canonical’ philosophy. Furthermore, it 
is in its confrontation with history that philosophy enters into an ‘specific relation’ with 
the ‘true doctrine’. Two elements are critical for this relation. The first one concerns the 
content of philosophy in its canonical or doctrinal form: ‘the historical transformation of 
knowledge’. The second one is the structure of the canonical or doctrinal philosophy: 
this is no longer a philosophy but a ‘philosophy of history’. To some extent, Benjamin 
aims to explain the mediating role that history plays in the ‘specific relation’ between 
the transformation of knowledge and doctrine. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
                                                            
1 The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
98-99. Hereafter CBW. Briefe, eds. Gershom Scholem & Theodor Adorno, (Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp Verlag 1978), pp. 151-2. 
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role that Benjamin ascribes to history in his interpretation of Kant and in the further 
reorientation of the Kantian system. 
It is not my intention to affirm that the aim of such a reorientation is to produce the 
doctrinal philosophy of history which Benjamin anticipated in the work of Kant. I rather 
suggest that the unfinished project of developing this doctrinal philosophy of history 
offers a point of entry to Benjamin’s reformulation of the Kantian system delineated in 
‘On Perception’ (1917) and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ (1917-8), in 
which Benjamin respectively argues for ‘absolute’ and ‘higher’ notions of experience 
that were latent yet undeveloped in Kant.
2
 This reformulation of the Kantian system is 
further developed in the writings that followed Benjamin’s own ‘disappointment’ with 
Kant’s writings on history, which he confirmed to Scholem in January 1918.3 It is 
critical to mention, however, that ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’ do not explicitly refer to the problem of history as it is formulated in the 
passage quoted from Benjamin’s correspondence. They do refer to doctrine (Lehre) in 
order to explain the systematic unity that philosophy can attain on the basis of the 
‘absolute’ or ‘higher’ notions of experience they argue for. From this perspective, the 
doctrinal philosophy of history that Benjamin entertains in his correspondence with 
Scholem offers the possibility to think of the systematic unity of philosophy delineated 
in the fragments of the same epoch as a philosophy of history which remains only 
partially sketched out.  
This chapter is divided in two main parts. The first one offers an introduction to the 
relation between history and experience in Benjamin’s early writings, specifically, in 
‘Experience’  and ‘Thoughts on Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festival’ —written in 1913.4 This 
analysis will serve to examine the context in which Benjamin approaches the 
relationship between history and experience when he turns his attention towards Kant’s 
philosophy of history. This section indicates some of the problems which Benjamin first 
formulated in his earlier writings and then aimed to systematise in his more 
programmatic texts on Kant. The first section of this chapter concludes with an 
examination of the correspondence with Scholem and the relationship between 
                                                            
2 ‘On Perception’, SW 1: 93-97. Also: ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’, SW1: 100-110. 
3 CWB: 103-5; Briefe: 156-9, 161. Scholem recollects this debate in Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: 
The Story of a Friendship, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: New York Review Books, 1981), pp. 73–75. 
Scholem’s letters to Benjamin from these months are lost. 
4 ‘Experience’, in EW: 116-119. Also, ‘Thoughts on Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festival’, EW: 120-125; GS II: 
56-60. 
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philosophy and doctrine that Benjamin had anticipated yet ultimately failed to find in 
Kant. As he reported to Scholem in December of the same year, his expectations for 
Kant’s writings on history ‘met with disappointment’ given the scientific form of 
observation posited in Ideas for a Universal History. Despite this disappointment 
Benjamin nevertheless maintains that an alternative philosophy of history might be 
developed out of Kant’s ‘ethics’ and the Critique of Pure Reason.5  
The second section of this chapter examines Benjamin’s reformulation of the Kantian 
system in ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’, arguing 
that the philosophy of history that he anticipated yet failed to find in Kant offers a 
broader context for the discussion of the ‘absolute’ or ‘higher’ notion of experience. It is 
particularly Benjamin’s use of the notion of doctrine and the centrality that he attributes 
to the ideas of reason for the systematic completion of philosophy and the unity of 
experience what illuminate the productive elements which he thought were latent yet 
undeveloped in Kant’s work. It is critical to stress that Benjamin’s essays on Kant do 
not examine the role that history plays for the systematic completion of philosophy or 
the development of a doctrinal philosophy (which in principle was identified with a 
philosophy of history in the correspondence from October 1917). The closest 
approximation to the historical character of experience consists of the final remarks in 
the two essays, where Benjamin affirms that experience and knowledge must be 
considered with reference to their linguistic dimension. In quoting Johan Georg 
Hamman’s Metacritique (1780) Benjamin suggests that this linguistic dimension must 
be disclosed in terms of its historical transformation. The second part of this chapter 
thus presents the central arguments of the essays on Kant through an examination of the 
Kantian concept of doctrine to finally turn towards the linguistic character of language. 
The main goal of that section is to identify the affinities between Benjamin’s 
interpretation of doctrine and the historical transformation of the linguistic character of 
experience and knowledge.  
Critical to this argument is the notion of doctrine. In the second part of this chapter I  
argue that while Benjamin refers to doctrine as Lehre in its double meaning of religious 
doctrine and teachings (as most commentators have underlined), his use of the term also 
                                                            
5 CWB: 103–5; Briefe: 156-9, 161. Scholem’s letters to Benjamin from these months have not survived. 
He recollects this debate in: Scholem, Gershom, Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship, trans. by 
Harry Zohn (New York: New York Review Books, 1981), pp. 73–75.  
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captures the meaning that Kant ascribed to the technical concept of Doktrin. Doctrine 
(Lehre) then serves to link Benjamin’s initial interest in Kant’s philosophy of history 
(which Benjamin understands as a doctrinal philosophy) and the reorientation of the 
Kantian system (which must be supplemented with such a doctrinal element). In this 
sense, the doctrinal philosophy of history that Benjamin develops brings together the 
double meaning of Lehre and the technical use of Doktrin. This chapter concludes with 
an examination of the linguistic character of experience and knowledge in light of 
Benjamin’s interpretation of doctrine. I suggest that his notion of doctrine concentrates 
both the systematic drive for completion and unity in philosophy and the always 
hypothetical, open character of such completion. This will be more evident in 
Benjamin’s understanding of the nature of meaning as a process of completion 
subjected to historical transformation, as Benjamin argues in ‘On Language as Such and 
on Language of Man’ (1916) and ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1921). I will conclude, 
however, that this tendency towards completion, which Eli Friedlander calls the 
‘eschatological’ conception of meaning, is more fully developed in the doctrine of ideas 
(Ideenlehre) of the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to the Origin of the German Mourning 
Play.
6
  
While the essays on language and translation focus on the unfolding of language 
towards the expression of its full meaning, the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ focuses on 
the moments of rupture and interruption informing the same process of unfolding. Thus, 
although the essays on language and translation already argue that the unfolding of 
language towards its own completion remains necessarily open, the ‘Prologue’ to the 
book on the baroque emphasises the breaks and ruptures in this process, consequently 
paying close attention to the elements which maintain the process of completion open to 
further transformation and, specially, to multiple, unknown futures which history does 
not necessarily follow. The ‘Prologue’ conceives of these elements as moments of 
emergence and disappearance, or cycles of memory and oblivion in the history of 
language which reveal alternative historical paths that were partially lost. From this 
perspective, the first chapter of this thesis examines the conception of history operating 
                                                            
6 ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, in The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, tr. by John Osborne 
(London-New York: Verso, 1998), p. 27. Hereafter OGT followed by page number. Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels, in Gesammelte Schriften. Werkausgabe Vol. I (Frankfurt am Main: Surkhamp, 
1980), p. 226. Hereafter GS1. Rendering Trauerspiel as Tragic Drama, the English translation misses 
Benjamin’s critical distinction between Trauerspiel and Tragödie. Mourning-Play is the most accepted 
rendering of Trauerspiel. In this thesis I will translate Trauerspiel as Mourning-Play both in the main text 
and in the amended references to the title of Benjamin’s 1928 book. 
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in Benjamin’s reorientation of Kant, while the second chapter discusses the further 
radicalisation of this project in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ and the effects this has 
on the notion of experience.
7
  
 
 
1. The Struggle to Conceive Doctrine 
 
The philosophy of Walter Benjamin is marked by the continuous attempt to formulate a 
notion of experience capable of securing the conditions for knowledge and the 
conceivability of the transformation of history. One of the earliest formulations of this 
problem appears in the brief review ‘Thoughts on Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festival’, 
published under the pseudonym of ‘Ardor’ in the student-run journal Der Anfang in 
1913.
8
 The review introduces some of the central concepts of Benjamin’s authorship 
and serves to establish the relationship between history, experience and philosophy 
which this chapter discusses. Influenced by the ideas of the ‘Free Students Association’ 
of the German Youth Movement, the opening of the review confronts a series of 
concepts which, albeit transformed, mark Benjamin’s entire authorship: ‘[h]umanity has 
not yet awakened to a steady consciousness of its historical existence. Only from time to 
time has it dawned on individuals and peoples that they were in the service of an 
unknown future, and such illumination [Erleuchtung] could be thought of as a historical 
sense [historisches Sinn]’.9 The review aims to delineate what Benjamin refers to as 
historical sense and the conditions under which the consciousness of an unknown future 
can be attained. This is explored by means of a brief discussion on the presentation of 
Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festspiel in Deutschen Reimen (1913) in Breslau for the 
commemoration of Germany’s War of Liberation in 1813. 
 
                                                            
7 The radicalisation of this project is also related to Benjamin’s reformulation of the doctrine of ideas in 
Platonic rather than Kantian terms, shifting from the problem of knowledge to the problem of truth. When 
Benjamin writes that ‘truth provokes pursuit of the intellect’ he also recognises that truth permanently 
eludes the intellect and the specific realms of knowledge, therefore exceeding the limits of the intellect 
and knowledge. See OGT: 30-31; GS I: 210-211.  
8 ‘Thoughts on Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festival’, in Walter Benjamin, Early Writings, 1910-1917 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 120–25. Hereafter EW;  Gesammelte Schriften II, 
pp. 56-60. Hereafter GS. Gesammelte Schriften II, pp. 56-60. 
9 EW: 120; GS II: 56. Also:  CWB: 32, 37–38.  
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Hauptmann’s Festspiel was a polemical play that looked at the German past without 
triumphalism or sentimentalism, for which it was regarded as an unpatriotic work. Its 
exclusion from the official celebrations of the 1813 War was symptomatic of the rise in 
nationalism which ultimately contributed to the explosion of the First War.
10
 The review 
introduces Hauptmann’s presentation of historical events from different yet interrelated 
perspectives which ultimately serve to characterise two contrasting forms of 
understanding history and historical change. These perspectives are distinguished along 
three main axes: the first one differentiates between the presence or absence of the 
‘consciousness’ of humanity’s ‘historical existence’; the second one distinguishes the 
continuity and discontinuity in the sequence of time; and the third one discerns the 
generational dispositions towards history and time held by ‘mature citizens’ and youth, 
which are either timeless or bear actuality.  
 
While ‘consciousness’ of the ‘historical sense’ is enacted through the interruption of the 
sequence of events in the play, in a disposition associated with the youth represented by 
the character of Philistiades, the disposition of the adult expresses itself through their 
‘indifference’ towards history and the acceptance of a future already determined. These 
oppositions are not presented as clear-cut delimitations. Indeed, the youth’s disposition 
towards history can be mastered by the adult and, more specifically, by the educational 
system and the age’s ‘lack of historical sense’.11 It is against the background of the 
latter, which had become the norm for the educational systems of Benjamin’s 
generation, that the review regards Hauptmann’s work as a ‘liberator’ for the young 
who felt themselves ‘alienated and powerless’. Benjamin then develops the oppositions 
concentrated in the opening lines of the review by contrasting the potential age marked 
by the consciousness of its own historical sense and his own present —a time that he 
describes as particularly ‘poor in ‘‘historical ideals’’’, dominated by ‘utopias’ founded 
on ‘eternal laws of nature’.12 Two years later, in ‘The Life of Students’ (1915) Benjamin 
presents this conception of history as ‘the infinite extent of time’ which concerns ‘itself 
only with the speed, or lack of it, with which ‘‘progress’’ is reached’.13 In the context of 
the review the consciousness of an unknown future is presented as a form of 
                                                            
10 EW: 120; GS II: 56. See: The Dramatic Works of Gerhart Hauptmann, ed. by Ludwig Lewisohn (New 
York: Huebsch, 1917). Also: Warren R. Maurer, Understanding Gerhart Hauptmann (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 116–21. 
11 EW: 120; GS II: 56-7. 
12 EW: 120; GS II: 56-7.    
13 ‘The Life of Students’, SW 1: 37. 
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understanding or cognition which will only ‘succeed’ by ‘liberating the future from its 
deformed existence in the womb of the present’,14 thereby turning the task of 
philosophy towards the opening of alternative futures embedded in the present and in 
the past. 
 
The scheme sketched out in the Hauptman review juxtaposes the humanity which has 
not yet awakened to its unknown future and Benjamin’s own present, dominated by 
naturalised conceptions of history. The opposition is staged in terms of 1) the 
conditioned and the unconditioned, 2) the given and the projected and 3) the future 
ideals contained in the laws of nature and the unknown, open future that grounds the 
possibility for action. The review maps these distinctions throughout different moments 
of Hauptmann’s Festspiel, staging the oppositions presented above in the interruption of 
a sequence of events enacted by the young Philistiades: ‘Philistiades comes forward and 
interrupts history. What does this mean? Is it a ‘‘clever idea’’?’.15 In the confrontation 
of the younger generation (regarded as ‘immature schoolboys’ by the more ‘mature 
citizens’) with the adults and schoolteachers (‘inert, insensible’ ‘without any fire’ from 
the schoolboys’ perspective), Benjamin extrapolates two conceptions of historical time:  
 
School makes us indifferent; it would have us believe that history is the struggle 
[Kampf] between good and evil, and that sooner or later the good prevails. So one 
need be in no hurry to act. The present moment itself, so to speak, has no actuality 
—time is infinite [Die Gegenwart, sozusagen, ist nicht aktuell —die Zeit is 
unendlich]. To us, however, history seems a sterner and crueler struggle. Not for 
the sake of values already established [... but] for the very possibility of values [...] 
constantly threatened, and for culture, which lives in perpetual crisis.16 
 
 
This passage introduces some of the central concepts that will resound throughout the 
rest of Benjamin’s authorship. It also establishes the dynamics of his own philosophy of 
history in terms of the opposition between two different forms of understanding history: 
one which leaves no room for action and is based on a progressivistic conception of 
historical change for which the future is determined by utopian visions; and other which 
seeks for the actuality of the ephemeral moment concentrated in the possibilities 
embedded in the conflict of the present. For the latter, the future is latent in the present 
yet remains unknown and open to infinite, discrete possibilities that can be illuminated if 
                                                            
14 SW1: 46. 
15 EW: 121; GS II: 57.   
16 EW: 123; GS II: 59-60.    
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the present is understood or presented as a crisis. In this scheme, Benjamin’s emphasis 
on interruption turns action into a moment which suspends the current relation to history 
in order to open an opportunity to transform it. The consciousness of the unknown 
futures embedded in the present, their illumination, is the hallmark of what Benjamin 
calls historical sense in the opening of the review: the suspension of the distorted 
relation to history as progress on the one hand, and to the future as the natural 
overcoming of the crisis of the present, on the other. As Irving Wohlfarth has noted, 
Benjamin’s call for breaking with the progressivistic conception of history can therefore 
be understood as a ‘distortion of a distortion’.17 The consciousness of the historical 
sense consists then of an interruption of second order which, in the Hauptman review, 
suspends the lack of historical sense and the dominance of utopian visions that already 
had suspended the possibility for action.  
 
The historical sense is then situated in the space delimited by three main axes: i) the 
opposition between timelessness and actuality, ii) the generational conflict between 
inherited ideals and opportunities to act in order to transform the course of history and 
iii) the continuous sequence of events and their interruption or suspension. The 
interruption of the timeless image of history inaugurates opportunities to act which were 
originally suppressed by the distorted image of history-as-progress. In an ecstatic 
presentation of these dichotomies, Benjamin finally affirms that history is the struggle 
between ‘the spirited [Geistiges] and the inert, between those oriented towards the 
future and those oriented toward the past, between the free and the unfree’, in order to 
affirm that freedom is not a programme but ‘the will to such a disposition’ enacted by 
interruption —even if the ‘actions’ motivated by such a will appear in forms that others 
might call ‘confused’.18  
 
If in the Hauptmann review youth concentrates the force of humanity that is yet to be 
awakened, in a future-oriented conception of history that resists inherited views of 
culture and education, the brief paper ‘Experience’ problematises different forms of 
cultural transmission which reveal divergent forms of experience associated with the 
relation to the future. Benjamin begins by defining the awakening of youth as the 
                                                            
17 Irving Wohlfarth, ‘Walter Benjamin’s Image of Interpretation’, New German Critique, 1979, 70–98 (p. 
80). See also: Wohlfarth, ‘No-Man’s Land: On Walter Benjamin’s ‘‘Destructive Character’’’, Diacritics, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1978), pp. 47-65.  
18 EW: 123-4; GS II: 59-60. 
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‘struggle’ or ‘battle’ with ‘someone who is masked’.19 This mask is the mask of 
‘experience’ (Erfahrung) that adults use to devalue the ideas and dispositions of the 
young. This is, however, an experience which is ‘expressionless, impenetrable, ever the 
same’.20 Thus, the ‘well-meaning, enlightened adult’ devalues the ‘years that [the youth] 
will live’ by reducing them to episodes which the adult has already lived (erlebt), 
thereby pushing the youth into the ‘drudgery’ of adult life.21 Benjamin regards this form 
of experience ‘meaningless and devoid of spirit’ (Geist); yet it is only thus for those 
who are ‘spiritless’ (geistlos). He thus opposes this experience to that of those with 
spirit, the youth: the most ‘beautiful, untouchable and immediate’ experience as long as 
the young remain young.
22
 Those adults who are marked by the presence of the spirit of 
the young are ‘compassionate’, while the spiritless adult will by contrast remain 
‘intolerant’.23 With this attitude towards the notion of spirit (Geist) it is clear that 
spiritual experience is not associated with a specificity in age but with a disposition 
towards history which aims to act in history. Benjamin’s subsequent investigations into 
the concepts of experience and history aim to bring together an alternative form of 
experience which opposes the timeless present and the notion of history based on the 
transmissibility of tradition, thereby directing his attention not to the ecstatic future 
determined by the will to affirmation but to the transformation of history in the moment 
of its transmission in each concrete moment of the present. 
 
Benjamin thus aims to give the conditions for the cognisability and transformability of 
history, which he encompassed under the notion of illumination. The concepts provided 
in the early writings (such as the awakening of humanity and the drudgery of life) and 
the images of multiple, discrete futurities embedded in the present and the confrontation 
of generations or historical epochs in terms of interruptions or moments of rupture in the 
continuity of historical change, will be reoriented however. At the same time as 
Benjamin aims to make room for action, actuality and the transformability of history by 
means of an interruption of the distorted experience of history, he also constrains the 
imprints of any future-oriented philosophy by means of divergent characterisations of 
history and the way it is grasped or presented in the present. In his subsequent writings, 
                                                            
19 ‘Experience’, EW: 116-9; GS II: 54-56. 
20 EW: 116; GS II: 54.  
21 EW: 116; GS II: 54.  
22 EW: 116; GS II: 54. 
23 EW: 119; GS II: 56.  
 
 
38 
Benjamin reformulates the dynamics under which the notions of illumination, present 
and the unknown future stand, in order to read historical change through the problem of 
tradition and divergent conceptualisations of history and memory. The future is 
illuminated in the present and traced back to the past in opportunities to act which went 
lost or in alternative unknown futures which never came into being 
 
 
 
1.1 The Structure of Tradition: Lehre and Doktrin 
 
In his correspondence with Gershom Scholem from early September to October 1917, 
Benjamin elaborates upon the relation between experience, education and history as 
intimated in his earlier writings, yet now in terms of the role that Tradition and Doctrine 
(Lehre) play in the double relationship between experience and education on the one 
hand, and experience and history on the other. Critical to this analysis is the notion of 
Doctrine or Lehre in its double meaning of religious teachings and doctrine in a more 
philosophical sense (referring to the systematic completion of a philosophical corpus of 
knowledge that exceeds specific realms of knowledge). The double meaning of Lehre, 
rendered by the English translator mainly just as teachings, mediates between the 
notions of experience and education based on the oral transmission of tradition (the 
model of religious teachings in the Jewish tradition): experience is grounded in the 
transmissibility of the totality of a tradition which surpasses the individual or the 
specific generation in which the tradition is taught.  To experience means here to gather 
in the concrete, specific and ephemeral moment which the present is, the totality of 
history concentrated in the tradition that one generation hands down to the other. In this 
way experience is tantamount to historical experience, or the possibility of experiencing 
the totality of history in the ephemeral moment of the present. However, like any living 
tradition, this totality remains open to change and further transformation. This meaning 
is supplemented by the philosophical concept of doctrine which Benjamin finds in 
Kant’s view on the systematic unity of philosophy and its account of the unity of 
experience and knowledge. From the standpoint of Benjamin’s philosophy, tradition 
becomes doctrine. This means that tradition exceeds a collection of religious ideas and 
teachings, and stands as a form of doctrinal knowledge which exceeds specific realms of 
knowledge (particularly the modern regime of philosophical disciplines and sciences).  
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In his letter to Scholem from early September 1917 Benjamin characterises the place 
which Tradition occupies in education by means of the distinction between the example 
and Lehre (teachings or instruction). He develops this thought in his letter from 22nd 
October, where he maintains that Kant’s Lehre (doctrine) has to be seen as a tradendum: 
the content delivered to others in the process of ‘transmission’ or ‘handing down’ to 
which Tradition refers in its Latin roots of traditio and tradere. In both discussions, 
Benjamin maintains that the task of both teaching and doctrine is to preserve the 
‘integrity’ of their contents, emphasizing the medium by which this integrity is secured: 
tradition. With this emphasis on the medium of transmission, Benjamin understands 
experience from the perspective of the relation of the present ephemeral moment to the 
past which is delivered as Lehre by means of tradition (regardless of whether Lehre 
refers to instruction or teachings in the discussion on education or to doctrine in the 
discussion on Kant). Lehre, therefore, points less towards the contents it transmits in its 
double meaning of teachings and doctrine than to the medium of transmission in which 
its contents are delivered and preserved: tradition. As I will comment upon, the process 
of transmissibility is also marked by the transformability of the content transmitted.
24
  
 
In his discussion on education, Benjamin writes to Scholem in early September on the 
‘learning that has evolved into teaching’ (Lehre) which he sees as a particular relation 
which undoes the hierarchies criticised in his earlier writings yet without ecstatically 
                                                            
24 In a different context of Benjamin’s authorship, Andrew Benjamin has emphasised the transformation 
inherent in the process of transmissibility in tradition. Transmissibility involves a process of ‘retaining 
and repeating’. Nevertheless, the latter is ‘not simply the repetition of the same’ but a repetition in which 
‘the same is never the same’ since it is ‘supplemented by its own repetition’. Howard Caygill radicalises 
the process of transformation inherent in tradition and discloses other meanings of tradition which 
coexists with ‘delivery’ and ‘handing  down’, namely, ‘betrayal’ and ‘surrender’: ‘‘‘Tradition’’ was 
further defined as the ecclesiastical crime of surrendering sacred texts in a time of persecution —
delivering them over to destruction by unbelievers. One guilty of the crime of ‘‘tradition’’ was a 
‘‘traditor’’ or, in later usage, a ‘‘traitor’’’. I will later return to the different emphasises on the changes 
that tradition brings about along with transmission and continuity. See respectively Andrew Benjamin, 
‘Tradition and Experience: Walter Benjamin’s “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”’, The Problems of 
Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 124–25, 
127, 130; and Howard Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition’, in A. Benjamin 
and P. Osborne, Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy. Destruction and Experience (Manchester: Clinamen, 
2000)  pp. 12–15, 20–21. Philip Simay elaborates upon the risks of forgetting that discontinuity is critical 
to tradition in his analysis of the tradition of the oppressed, which always may be absorbed by those who 
conceive of themselves as the oppressed of the present and therefore assume the right to speak on behalf 
of such a tradition as if it were made of pure continuity. This is the risk of reincorporating the historicist 
views which are aimed to be rejected by Benjamin. See: Simay, ‘Tradition as Injuction: Benjamin and the 
Critique of Historicism’, in Andrew Benjamin, Walter Benjamin and History, (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2005).  
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affirming the will to action: ‘I am convinced that tradition [Tradition] is the medium in 
which the person who is learning continually transforms himself into the person who is 
teaching, and that this applies to the entire range of education. In the tradition everyone 
is an educator and everyone needs to be educated’.25 In relation to Kant’s doctrine, 
Benjamin writes on October 22
nd
 of the same year that ‘anyone who does not sense in 
Kant the struggle to conceive doctrine [Lehre] itself and who therefore does not 
comprehend him with the uttermost reverence, looking on even the least letter as a 
tradendum to be transmitted (however much it is necessary to recast him afterwards) 
knows nothing of philosophy’.26 In both cases Tradition maintains Lehre alive and open 
to multiple configurations. Tradition, therefore, is conceived as the medium which 
preserves the integrity of the contents which it delivers by opening them up to further 
transformations in the same process of transmission.   
 
Although the arguments in both letters unfold in parallel ways with respect to the 
relation of tradition to Lehre, each discussion adds important remarks on the notions of 
experience and history which Benjamin aims to bring together. The first letter regards 
tradition as the medium by which students become educators and educators become 
students. In latter writings —such as ‘Experience and Poverty’ (1933), ‘The Storyteller’ 
(1936) and the essays on Kafka (1934-8)— the collective character of tradition appears 
as a necessary condition for experience and its transmissibility, illustrated in the 
tradition of telling stories from one generation to the next. The letter discussed above 
already understands tradition as the medium through which a community of students 
and educators is built by blurring the distinctions which originally organised the 
hierarchies criticized in the Hauptman review, ‘Experience’ and ‘The Life of Students’. 
Rather than staging the process of education in terms of the confrontation between 
generations which embody divergent forms of understanding historical change, this 
letter points towards a model of education in which collective activity gives the 
conditions for substantive experience and blurs the distinction between generations 
(students became educators and educators students).  
 
This model of education also relates the ephemeral present to the totality of history, 
concentrated and delivered by means tradition. The letter also stresses the openness of 
                                                            
25 CWB: 94; Briefe: 145-6. 
26 CWB: 98; Briefe: 150. 
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history which Benjamin understands to be the hallmark of tradition: the process of 
teaching points towards the possibility of students becoming educators for future 
generations. But, more importantly, this process reveals the opening up of the very 
moment of transmission to further revision and transformation of the contents 
transmitted, a moment in which educators become students in order to find anew the 
teachings (Lehre) delivered by tradition. In securing the openness or transformability of 
Lehre, tradition is the medium through which Lehre unfolds and attains its dignity.
27
 
 
In a further radicalisation of this view on the relation between experience, Lehre and 
tradition, Benjamin turns towards Kant’s philosophy of history in order to understand 
the very process of the unfolding of philosophical doctrine (Lehre) as tradendum, or the 
content transmitted by means of tradition. In the same letter from October 22
nd
 1917, 
Benjamin refers to Lehre in order to characterise the multiple elements upon which the 
Kantian system should be developed and transformed. Firstly, Benjamin affirms that the 
‘metaphysical dignity’ of the truly ‘canonical’ philosophy emerges from the 
confrontation of philosophy with the ‘true doctrine’ (Lehre), and suggests therefore that 
philosophy is in its most complete expression doctrinal philosophy. For Benjamin the 
relation between doctrine and philosophy appears ‘most clearly in the philosophy of 
history’, where the ‘historical transformation’ or becoming (Werden) of knowledge is 
revealed.
28
 Benjamin thus regards the true doctrinal philosophy to be a philosophy of 
history, one which reveals the historical transformation of knowledge. Although this 
philosophical doctrine must be seen as tradendum or the object transmitted by tradition, 
Benjamin did not disclose the notion of tradition in the letters discussed. This problem 
is also absent in ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’, in 
which he introduces his programme for the further development and reorientation of the 
Kantian system. In the remaining letters dedicated to Kant in this period, as in the two 
                                                            
27 As Gershom Scholem recollects, Benjamin was already interested in the concept of Lehre and its 
religious dimension by those years: ‘In those years -between 1915 and 1927- the religious sphere assumed 
a central importance for Benjamin that utterly removed from fundamental doubt. At its center was the 
concept of Lehre [teachings], which for him included the philosophical realm but definitely transcended 
it. In his early writings he reverted repeatedly to this concept, which he interpreted in the sense of the 
original meaning of the Hebrew torah as instruction’ (The Story of a Friendship: 55-6). Although the 
centrality of the religious meaning of Lehre must be emphasised, the further meaning of Lehre as a 
philosophical doctrine (in the sense that Benjamin attributes to it in the context of the Kantian system), 
allows for an alternative reading of Lehre in this passage, in which Lehre does not transcend the 
philosophical realm but rather supplements it with the specificities of the medium in which religious 
Lehre unfolds: tradition. To this extent, I will argue, Benjamin tries to explain the Kantian concept of 
doctrine in terms of the model of tradition, determined by its historical transformability and openness.  
28 CWB: 98; Briefe: 151-2.  
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essays mentioned above, Benjamin concentrates his arguments on what may be 
regarded to be the content of tradition, a doctrinal philosophy which must be developed 
out of the recasting of the Kantian system.
29
  
 
It is from this perspective that the relationship between tradition and doctrine remained 
undeveloped in this moment of Benjamin’s authorship and, with it, the deeper 
exploration of the role that history plays as the catalyst which makes philosophy attain 
its doctrinal form. As part of his particular interest in Kant’s writings on history, by the 
end of October 1917 Benjamin finally confirmed that his own expectations ‘had only 
met with disappointment’. Benjamin specifically refers to the ‘scientific mode of 
observation and method’ posited in the introduction to Ideas for a Universal History as 
the basis for a reduced conception of history that is ‘less concerned with history than 
with certain historical constellations of ethical interest’. On the basis of this notion of 
history, ‘the ethical side of history’ is ‘inadequately represented’, he concludes.30 
Although Benjamin affirms in his letter of February 1st 1918 that it is ‘impossible to 
gain any access to history’ from the standpoint of Ideas for a Universal History, he also 
considers that it ‘would be different if the point of departure were [Kant’s] ethics’, 
thereby suggesting that an alternative philosophy of history might be possible for Kant 
even if he ‘did not travel this path’.31  Bringing together both Benjamin’s original 
interest in Kant’s struggle to conceive doctrine and his final remarks on history offered 
in the 1917-1918 correspondence, it can be said that for Benjamin the concept of 
doctrine that he had hoped to find in Kant was latent yet undeveloped in Kant’s own 
writings. Although Benjamin did not develop the Kantian philosophy of history which 
he failed to find in Kant he offered a critical reorientation of the Kantian system in ‘On 
Perception’ (whose composition has been dated to late 1917) and ‘On the Program of 
the Coming Philosophy’ (from early 1918, written thus in light of Benjamin’s 
disappointment with Kant’s philosophy of history).  
 
                                                            
29 For a brief presentation of the notion of tradendum see: Richard Eldridge, Images of History: Kant, 
Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human Subject (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 109–11. 
Also: Bram Mertens, Dark Images, Secret Hints: Benjamin, Scholem, Molitor and the Jewish Tradition 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2007). In spite of his detailed presentation of the sources of Benjamin’s concept of 
tradendum and tradition, Mertens’ discussion of Benjamin’s 1918 program for the coming philosophy in 
Chapters 4 and 5 largely omits the problem of the Kantian formulation of this concept. 
30 CWB: 103–5; Briefe: 156-9. 
31 CWB: 116; Briefe: 161. 
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In the following sections I will examine the arguments of these two texts in order to 
trace the place that doctrine occupies in Benjamin’s reading and further reorientation of 
the Kantian system. I understand this analysis as a way to examine the openness and 
transformability of history or the struggle to conceive doctrine.  
 
 
2. The Higher Concept of Experience 
 
The previous section introduced Benjamin’s interest in Kant and history from the 
perspective of Kant’s struggle to conceive of doctrine and the role that history plays as a 
catalyst for philosophy in the process of attaining the form of doctrinal philosophy. 
Although ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ do not refer 
explicitly to the problem of history —as formulated in Benjamin’s correspondence with 
Scholem—, they do introduce the concept of doctrine in order to refer to a philosophy 
which aims to reach systematic unity and maintain the openness for its further 
transformation. Both texts offer an account of the systematic unity of philosophy in 
terms of its capacity to explain the unity and continuity of experience and knowledge.  
 
‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ depart from the 
constrains that the Kantian system mandates for any development of an ‘absolute’ or 
‘higher’ concept of experience, yet both texts also maintain that the Kantian system 
contains the elements which allow for the development of this concept. In this way, both 
‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program’ give the conditions for the reformulation of the 
Kantian system in order to develop a substantive notion of experience. ‘On Perception’ 
explains the reduced concept of experience in relation to the critical moment of the 
Kantian system and its opposition to pre-critical metaphysics, giving the conditions by 
which ‘On the Program’ presents a higher notion of experience in terms of Kant’s 
doctrinal philosophy. In Kant’s attempt to achieve a systematic unity Benjamin sees the 
reformulation of the pre-critical concept of experience: if the critical moment constrains 
the basis on which pre-critical philosophy aims to explain the unity of experience and 
knowledge, the doctrinal part of philosophy goes further and reformulates such unity. 
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Thus, while ‘On Perception’ presents the Kantian critical moment, ‘On the Program of 
the Coming Philosophy’ addresses its doctrinal development.32  
 
In ‘On Perception’ Benjamin argues that the pre-critical concept of experience was an 
absolute concept based on the ‘speculative knowledge’ of God. Such absolute 
experience was possible for pre-Kantian metaphysics insofar as knowledge and 
experience were founded on a relation of continuity with God. Knowledge and 
experience were ‘speculative’ knowledge and speculative experience deducible from the 
‘supreme principle’. It is in the continuity of the deducibility of experience that the 
critical moment intervenes: ‘in the interest of apriority and logic Kant discerns a sharp 
discontinuity at the very point where, from the same motives, pre-Kantian philosophers 
sought to establish the closest possible continuity and unity’.33 In other words, Kant 
breaks down the ‘connection between knowledge and experience’ which pre-critical 
metaphysics established ‘through a speculative deduction of the world’.34 Thus, while 
the ‘exalted’ concept of experience was in ‘varying degrees’ ‘close to God and [the] 
divine’,35 the modern concept of experience no longer needed to prove the deducibility 
of the world nor the ‘empty, godless experience’.36 The pre-critical concept of 
experience is thus reduced to an ‘empty’ or ‘lower’ notion of experience which 
‘required no metaphysics’, as Benjamin notes in ‘On the Program’.37  
 
It is here that the tensions of the Kantian system emerge, as Kant did not ‘deny the 
possibility of a metaphysics’ for the emerging concept of experience. This is the point 
of departure of ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’. Once Benjamin 
distinguishes Kant’s rejection of pre-critical metaphysics he poses two alternatives, i.e. 
                                                            
32 In his presentation of these texts Peter Fenves emphasises the differences between the two fragments. 
Rather than understanding the two texts as presenting different formulations of the same argument (as 
most interpreters argue), he defends that there is a shift towards a more constrained position in ‘On the 
Program’. This would focus on the ‘higher’ rather than on the ‘absolute’ concept of experience. See: Peter 
Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time. The Messianic Reduction 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 160–61. Other differences that must be mentioned are the 
references to the ideas of reason and the emphatic use of doctrine in ‘On the Program’. It has to be noted 
that some of the central theses of the text are also nuanced in its ‘Addendum’. This difference may 
suggest that the ‘Addendum’ was likely written after Benjamin’s disappointment with Kant’s philosophy 
of history. If this is true, the transition from the ‘absolute’ (‘On Perception’) to the ‘higher’ notion of 
experience which Fenves notes may be complemented by the transition, internal to ‘On the Program’, 
from the main corpus of the text to its more restricted presentation in the ‘Addendum’. 
33 ‘On Perception’, SW 1: 94. 
34 SW 1: 94. 
35 SW 1: 95. 
36 SW 1: 102. 
37 ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ SW 1: 102. 
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either offering a metaphysics for the empty, reduced concept of experience ‘taken from 
the sciences’ or developing a productive metaphysics which exceeds the realm of 
science to explain the unity of experience and knowledge without advancing to a pure 
continuity with the first principle. To illustrate these alternatives Benjamin elaborates 
upon the different projects of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) and 
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, further revised in 1787). While the former takes the 
concept of science as its object (specifically mathematical physics), the second 
elaborates on a notion of experience which ‘was never identical with the object realm of 
that science’.38 Although it is stripped from its ‘proximity to God’, modern metaphysics 
does not renounce the aim of grounding the unity of knowledge and experience. In 
Kant, Benjamin writes, this aim is discernible in the ‘universal power to tie all 
experience immediately to the concept of God, through ideas’, by which Benjamin 
refers to the ideas of reason.
39
  
 
For Benjamin, the continuity of knowledge and experience which Kant denies to pre-
Kantian metaphysics ultimately informs Kant’s own ‘ideas upon which the unity of 
                                                            
38 SW 1: 101. 
39 SW 1: 105. My emphasis. Although Benjamin does not quote any passage from the Prolegomena, his 
distinction maps Kant’s own presentation of this work and its divergence from the first Critique. In the 
‘Preface’ Kant writes that the Prolegomena and the Critique respectively follow the ‘analytic’ and the 
‘synthetic method’. The former does not inquire whether an object of knowledge is possible or not. This 
is taken as a priori so that what is consequently required is an explanation of how it is known. The later, 
on the contrary, must prove the possibility of the object of knowledge. See: Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena 
to Any Future Metaphysics (Second Edition) And the Letter to Marcus Herz, February 1772, trans. by 
James Wesley Ellington (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2001), pp. 7–8; see also, pp. viii-ix. The 
distinction is critical to Benjamin’s criticism of Hermann Cohen in ‘On the Program’ (SW1: 101) and its 
further development in his references to Cohen in the book on the baroque.  By following the method of 
the Prolegomena to sustain his own interpretation of the first Critique and of the concept of experience in 
Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1877/85), Cohen collapsed the methods traced by Kant himself, thereby 
leading to his theory of the ‘fact of science’ for which the present state of science is taken as given and 
what must be proved is how it is true. This in turn reduces the explanation of experience to proving the 
current state of science as the most developed presentation of truth, leaving the task for its scientific status 
be proven. This sort of scientific progressivism bears the mark of a reduced Hegelianism operating 
throughout his reception of Kant (specially in the second version of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, the one 
which Benjamin and Scholem discussed in 1918). For Cohen, the formal conditions of experience are 
basically identified with experience as such, as the former ‘generates’ the latter, (Theorie der Erfahrung: 
27). This is what became the principle of Cohen’s Marburg School, as Konkhe argues, the production of 
the object and the question for its logical origin (Ursprung), which Benjamin problematises in the book 
on the baroque. See: Klaus Christian Kohnke, The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic 
Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 180-
81, 188, 198, 199. See also Sebastian Luft (ed), The Neo-Kantian Reader (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 
specially Chapters 5, which reproduces Cohen’s account of the synthetic principles. Also: Adrea Poma: 
The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen, (Albany: State University of New York, 1997) for an 
exploration of the genesis and transformation of Cohen’s major interpretation of Kant. For a critique of 
Cohen’s politics of citation from Kant’s works, see Manfred Kuhn, ‘Interpreting Kant Correctly: On the 
Kant of the Neo-Kantians’, in Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary 
Philosophy (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009).  
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experience rests’.40 In this way, Benjamin’s programme focuses on the possibility of 
developing the unity of experience by means of the work of ideas: ‘For the deepened 
concept of experience continuity is almost as indispensable as unity, and the basis of the 
unity and continuity of that experience which is not vulgar or only scientific, but 
metaphysical, must be demonstrated in the ideas. The convergence of ideas toward the 
highest concept of knowledge must be shown’.41 ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’ delineates then the conditions for a notion of experience capable of 
bringing the unity of knowledge and the metaphysical completion of philosophy, albeit 
in a way other than the deducibility from the first principles of pre-critical metaphysics. 
It must be noted that Benjamin rejects both the possibility of establishing the pure 
deducibility of experience and knowledge from God, but also the reduced Neo-Kantian 
programme of developing the concept of experience out of the exact sciences, based on 
the model of the Prolegomena.  
 
Along parallel lines, ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ 
relate the unity of experience to the unity of knowledge, and the latter to the notion of 
doctrine. In the former text, Benjamin affirms: ‘Doctrines of perception, as well as of all 
manifestations of absolute experience, belong in the ‘‘philosophical sciences’’ in the 
broader sense. Philosophy as a whole, including the philosophical sciences, is doctrine 
[Lehre].’42 In ‘On the Program’ Benjamin writes: 
 
[T]he demand upon the philosophy of the future can ultimately be put in these 
words; to create on the basis of the Kantian system a concept of knowledge to 
which a concept of experience corresponds, of which knowledge is the teachings 
[Lehre]. Such a philosophy in its universal element would either itself be 
designated theology, or would be subordinated to theology to the extent that it 
contains historically-philosophical elements. Experience is the uniform and 
continuous multiplicity of knowledge.
43
  
                                                            
40 SW 1: 107. My emphasis. 
41 SW 1: 107. My emphasis. 
42 ‘On Perception’, SW 1: 96. My emphasis. 
43 ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ SW 1: 108. The translators of the English edition have 
rendered Lehre as teachings in this passage. This of course captures the religious meaning of Lehre, 
which is clearly present in the fragment when it affirms that ‘philosophy has to be designated theology or 
be subordinated to it’. However, the passage also offers an insight into the completion of the systematic 
corpus of philosophy. Such a completion makes philosophy become theology or, at least, be subordinated 
to it. It is this meaning of doctrine which, I suggest, Benjamin derives from Kant’s struggle to conceive 
doctrine. On the notion of theology at work in Benjamin’s philosophy, Bolívar Echeverría writes that this 
‘does not appear to understand a treatise on God, but the determinate use of a discourse which pursues a 
rational explanation for the occurrences of the world; a use that does not require departing from the 
annulment of chance, but, to the contrary, recognises in chance the contingent foundation of necessity and 
order that are its own horizon of intelligibility’: Echeverría: ‘Historical Materialism and The Angel's 
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In both passages, Benjamin relates the problem of the unity of experience to the 
problem of doctrine (Lehre) as a way of recasting the metaphysical completion of both 
pre-critical dogmatic metaphysics and Kantian anti-dogmatic metaphysics. If the former 
proceeds by means of the deduction of knowledge and experience from God as a first 
principle and the latter constrains such a possibility by achieving instead unity by means 
of the ideas of reason (the ideas of God, freedom and the immortality of the soul), 
Benjamin’s coming philosophy would attain such unity in the doctrinal part of 
philosophy that coincides with the totality of knowledge historically articulated 
according to the model of the transmissibility of tradition. This doctrinal philosophy 
would include and exceed the knowledge of the specific realms of scientific knowledge. 
From the perspective of the notion of doctrine, these passages conceptualise the unity 
and continuity of experience and knowledge as the task of the coming philosophy. 
Through its completion philosophy would attain the form of doctrinal philosophy.  
 
The concluding lines of both ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’ affirm that the unity and continuity of experience can only be proved 
through language. There are however significant differences in the formulation of this 
task in both texts. While ‘On Perception’ affirms that philosophy ‘is absolute experience 
deduced in a systematic, symbolic framework as language’, ‘On the Program’ 
formulates the relation between experience and language in terms of the ‘linguistic 
nature of knowledge’: such ‘reflection’ on the nature of knowledge would ‘encompass 
realms that Kant failed to truly systematize. The realm of religion should be mentioned 
as the foremost of these words’.44 In this context, ‘On Perception’ is still concerned with 
the deducibility of the ‘absolute’ concept of experience as language. The latter text, by 
contrast, could be read as entertaining the possibility of articulating the ‘higher’ notion 
of experience through the work of the ideas of reason, in the unity of experience and the 
totality of knowledge (produced by the interrelated work of sensibility and the 
understanding). Experience, Benjamin concludes in the main body of ‘On the Program’, 
is ‘the uniform and continuous multiplicity of knowledge’. This systematic and 
continuous unity will ultimately be demonstrated in the ideas.
45
 The higher concept of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Gaze’, translated by Andrés Saenz De Sicilia, Arcade Materials: RED, edited by Sam Dolbear and 
Hannah Proctor, (Forthcoming, 2018).   
44 SW 1: 108. 
45 SW 1: 107. My emphasis. 
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experience is then understood in terms of the unity and continuity of knowledge granted 
by the ideas of reason. However, the ideas of reason are not understood as principles 
orientating the construction of a coherent articulation of knowledge. They are rather 
understood in terms of the historical transformation of those concepts which serve to 
construct such a unity. The unity and continuity of experience (initially identified with 
the unity and continuity of knowledge) extends to the realm of ideas and their historical 
transformation. Benjamin’s doctrinal philosophy attains its systematic unity only by 
means of relating experience and the totality of history.  
 
The emphasis on the linguistic nature of the unity and continuity of knowledge 
ultimately turns Benjamin’s programme towards the linguistic character of the unity of 
knowledge. This opens up two different lines of argumentation. While most interpreters 
have noted that the linguistic nature of experience and knowledge is one of the central 
problems addressed in ‘On the Language of Mankind and Language as Such’ (1916) 
and ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1921); the relation of the linguistic nature of 
knowledge to the ideas is fully explored only until the formulation of the doctrine of 
ideas (Ideenlehre) in the final version of the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ (1928) to The 
Origin of the German Mourning Play.
46
 In the essays on language and translation, the 
transformability of the unity of experience and knowledge is framed in the 
transformability of the unity of language by means of translation and the unfolding of 
human language. In the ‘Prologue’, the transformability of the concepts which serve for 
the construction of knowledge embodies the movement of what Benjamin calls 
constellations of ideas, in which ideas and concepts stand together in a relation of 
mutual determination: there, ideas are presented in concepts while concepts are 
organised in contextual relations by ideas.  
 
Before exploring the linguistic nature of language in the essays on language and 
translation and the further development of the relation between ideas and language in 
the ‘Prologue’ (which I will discuss in the second chapter), I will examine the divergent 
notions of unity which Benjamin associated with doctrine. For it is as doctrine that 
philosophy can explain the unity of experience as unity of knowledge, and it is also as 
doctrine that philosophy is able to attain its own completion. Here, the Kantian source 
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of doctrine is necessary in order to understand the project of developing a doctrinal 
philosophy, one which brings together its ‘critical and dogmatic parts’. In this context, it 
is important to emphasise that while Benjamin refers to Lehre, Kant largely labels his 
doctrinal philosophy as Doktrin. In this sense, Benjamin’s Lehre captures, yet also 
exceeds, the use of Doktrin in the Kantian system. The struggle to conceive doctrine 
(Lehre) which Benjamin first appreciated in Kant becomes apparent in the first Critique 
and its struggle to bring to completion a systematic philosophy which is, however, 
constrained by the critical method. To some extent, the first Critique enacts the tension 
between the negative or destructive critical moment of Kant’s method and its positive, 
constructive doctrinal philosophy. As it will be explained in the following section, 
despite the limits set on it, it is doctrine what catalyses the critical method and moves 
the general system towards its own completion, regardless of the hypothetical state in 
which such a completion remains. Indeed, it is because this completion remains 
hypothetical that philosophy is open to further transformation.  
 
 
2.1 The Dynamics of Doctrine: Unity and Openness 
 
In the standard English translation of the Critique of Pure Reason the term Doctrine 
translates the German terms Doktrin and Lehre. Doktrin appears more frequently in 
technical contexts in opposition to critique, the canon of the understanding and the 
discipline of the pure use of reason. By contrast, Doktrin is related to the organon of 
reason and the drive for the completion of the systematic unity of knowledge, which 
makes reason confront questions which ‘burden’ yet ‘transcend’ the limits the 
interrelated work of the faculties of the sensibility and the understanding.
47
 Doktrin is 
also used with the general meanings of logic and, more broadly, of theory. In this case 
Doktrin is synonymous to some uses of Lehre.
48
 For example, when Kant refers to the 
canon of the understanding as ‘general but pure logic’, he refers to this canon as ‘a 
proven doctrine [Doktrin]’.49 With the same general sense of logic or theory, Lehre 
appears as part of the main titles which divide the Critique into the Elementarlehre and 
                                                            
47 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Paul, Guyer and Allen, Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998): (Aviii, and A 53/ B77 - A54/ B78). See also: (A 795/B 823). 
Hereafter CPR.   
48 CPR: (53/ B77 - A54/ B78). 
49 CPR: (A 53/ B77 - A54/ B78).  
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the Methodenlehre. Here, Lehre respectively bears the meanings of ‘general’ and 
‘applied logic’.50 Lastly, defining the ‘discipline of pure reason’ in the opening of the 
‘Doctrine of Method’, Kant contrasts discipline with ‘culture’ and ‘doctrine’ (Doktrin), 
relating the former to ‘correction’ and the latter to teaching (Belehrung) and instruction 
(Unterweissung). Kant thus emphasises that in spite of being regarded as equivalent 
terms in common language, discipline and doctrine should not be confused in 
philosophy. For Kant, discipline makes a ‘negative contribution’ in the formation of 
talents as it provides a ‘correction’ to (dogmatic) metaphysics. By contrast, culture and 
doctrine have ‘a positive’ contribution as ‘teaching’.51 Kant uses this distinction in order 
to stress that the second part of the Critique is concerned with discipline or the 
correction of the method of cognition from pure reason. In this way, the distinction 
between the discipline of reason and the notions of culture and teaching serves to clarify 
the technical distinction between critique and doctrine in the Kantian system.
52
 
 
In its more technical use, the Critique of Pure Reason introduces doctrine (Doktrin) in 
opposition to critique in order to refer to the knowledge which is built upon the basis 
negatively demarcated by critique. In section VII of the B ‘Introduction’, Kant presents 
the critique of pure reason as a ‘special science’, one which produces a canon of pure 
reason or the ‘sum total of all those principles in accordance with which all pure a priori 
cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about’. Nevertheless, Kant immediately 
restricts the scope of his critique as science in order to delimit it as an ‘estimation of 
pure reason, of its sources and boundaries’, a ‘propaedeutic to the system of pure 
reason’.53 From the perspective of the limits of his own programme, Kant affirms that 
the special science which he advances as propaedeutic would not be able to reach the 
                                                            
50 Paul Guyer and Allen Wood introduce this distinction in their ‘Introduction’ to the Critique (CPR: 3).  
51 CPR: (A710/B738). Guyer and Wood follow Giorgio Tonelli’s analysis in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason within the Tradition in Modern Logic (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1994). Tonelli traces the 
development of the notions of origin, canon, discipline and doctrine in Kant (See specially Chapters 1 
and 2).  Also: Tonelli, ‘Organo, Canone, Disciplina, Dottrina in Kant (1765-1780)’, Studi Kantiani, 1, 
January 1995, Vol.8, pp.11-30. 
52 This sense of doctrine might be the one that Friedlander refers to when he writes that: ‘[f]or Kant, 
doctrine is that part of philosophy that can be transmitted and forms the basis of a tradition that can be 
passed from one generation to the next’. Following Benjamin, Friedlander refers however to Lehre rather 
than to Docktrin, as he largely omits any comment on Kant’s own terminology. The point which he 
makes serves nonetheless to frame Benjamin’s project: ‘If Kant justifies his critical project in terms of the 
sense that metaphysical systems confront each other as on a battleground, the instauration of metaphysics 
as doctrine gives it the form of science. Benjamin’s problem, from this perspective, would be to free the 
Kantian notion of doctrine from its scientific mold and make it into the highest determination of his idea 
of philosophy’. Friedlander, Walter Benjamin. A Philosophical Portrait (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), p. 32.   
53 CPR: (A11/B25). 
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form of ‘doctrine’ but only of ‘critique’. Its ‘utility’ is therefore ‘negative’, serving ‘not 
for the amplification’ but for the ‘purification’ of reason.54  
 
This distinction between critique and doctrine recasts the negative and positive ‘utility’ 
ascribed to metaphysics in the preface to the first Critique. In the B ‘Preface’ Kant 
maintains that the argument of the Critique has a negative function since it teaches us 
‘never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience’. Yet this 
negative utility, if understood from the perspective of the practical use of reason, has a 
positive use implicitly embedded in its own rationality: critique limits the speculative 
use of reason while removing ‘obstacles that limit or even threatens to wipe out the 
practical use of reason’.55 The distinction traced by the ‘Preface’ grounds the difference 
between cognizing ‘things as appearances’ and thinking ‘things in themselves’, 
necessary to explain how one might assume the ideas of freedom, God, and the 
immortality of the soul ‘for the sake of the necessary practical use of reason’, while 
simultaneously depriving the speculative use of reason of its ‘pretension’ to cognize 
these ideas as objects of experience.
56
  
 
It is in the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of 
Method’, that Kant’s struggle to conceive doctrine becomes more evident. This struggle 
is manifest in the work of reason which provides methodological principles and ideas 
for the organisation of knowledge produced by the interrelated work of the sensibility 
and the understanding. The work of reason also orientates practical action in spite of the 
limits of theoretical reason. While critique embodies the negative moment of the 
demarcation (the discipline or purification) of the limits of sensibility, understanding 
and reason, doctrine has the positive function of extending and articulating the unity of 
knowledge by orientating the multiple pieces of knowledge and the various realms of 
science towards a systematic corpus of knowledge (a corpus which Benjamin partially 
identifies with unintentional truth or Wahrheit in his early writings). If this function is 
permanently constrained by the critical moment, it nonetheless catalyses and orientates 
the search for completion which is impossible to attain exclusively by means of critique. 
                                                            
54 CPR: (A11/B25 - A12/B26). Giorgio Tonelli traces back the medical inflection which critique 
originally had and which it stills maintains in Kant’s lifetime. This manifests in Kant’s explanation of 
critique as the ‘purification’ of reason. See Tonelli, ‘‘‘Critique’’ and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A 
Historical Survey’, Kant-Studien, 1978, Vol.69 (1), pp.119-148  
55 CPR: (BXXV). 
56 CPR: (BXXX).  
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In the second part of the Critique, Kant continues with what some interpreters have 
called the ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘vindication’ of reason and the defence of its contribution 
towards a productive (non-dogmatic) metaphysics.
57
 Although the vindication of reason 
is normally explained in terms of reason providing ideas of reason for the theoretical 
organisation or completion of knowledge produced by the interrelated work of 
sensibility and understanding, the ideas of reason also play a fundamental role in 
moving knowledge towards completion by means of practical interests rather than by 
merely offering methodological tools for the organisation of knowledge —however 
hypothetical this unity is from the perspective of the theoretical use of reason.
58
  
 
Although a largely forgotten concept in the scholarship on Kant, as Gary Benhamn and 
Dick Howard affirm, doctrine has a positive contribution towards the unity or 
completion of knowledge and experience and, by extension, towards the unity of 
philosophy as systematic research.
59
 From this perspective, although doctrine is initially 
introduced in terms of its opposition to critique, the completion it intends to bring about 
marks the dynamics of reason through which humanity gives itself the infinite ‘task’ of 
positing and trying to answer questions that ‘burden’ yet also ‘transcend every capacity 
of human reason’.60 In emphasising the role that Benjamin attributes to doctrine in 
Kant’s attempt to ground the unity of experience, it can be seen how the project of 
recasting the reduced into a higher notion of experience aims to bring forth the unity of 
the critical and doctrinal elements of philosophy as the basis for an open-ended and 
systematic philosophy. Here Benjamin’s emphasis resides in the struggle to conceive 
doctrine. It is a struggle insofar as the completion of such a system is conceivable yet 
unrealisable in its entirety. This tension is the hallmark of Benjamin’s understanding of 
                                                            
57 Contemporary interpreters of Kant emphasise the rehabilitation or vindication of reason in terms of 
practical reason taking over metaphysics in the sense of ‘dogmatic metaphysics’ but also in terms of 
building up or constructing on the basis of Kant’s metaphysics of pure theoretical reason. Accounts of this 
kind can be found in Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 3-28; 66-81, and Christine M. 
Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 3, 11–12, 
27–35.  
58 In their ‘Introduction’ to the first Critique, Paul Guyer and Allan Wood also refer to Kant’s 
‘constructive doctrine’ (though in a rather broader sense which includes the ‘Transcendental Analytic’) as 
replacing the ontology of dogmatic metaphysics. They later provide a more accurate use of the term when 
describe doctrine as the ‘positive practical use’ of the ‘canon’ of pure reason, although no mention to the 
organon accompanying this positive use is made (CPR: 5, 65).  
59 Gary Banham, Kant’s Practical Philosophy: From Critique to Doctrine (New York: Springer, 2003), 
pp. 5–7. Also: Dick Howard, The Politics of Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988), pp. 89–90. 
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the Kantian notion of doctrine. As result, Benjamin’s own doctrinal philosophy remains 
always open to change and transformation, perpetually deferring the possibility of 
bringing philosophy to absolute completion. 
 
The struggle to conceive doctrine is open to a continuous development just like the 
unity of experience is open to multiple and discrete futurities. This struggle is 
particularly concentrated in the ‘Transcendental Doctrine of Method’. There, Kant 
addresses the tension between two elements of the faculty of reason: the ‘humiliating’ 
fact that human reason ‘accomplishes nothing in its pure use’ and must therefore be 
disciplined ‘to check its extravagances’, and the ‘propensity’ of the nature of reason 
which ‘drives’ (trieben) it ‘to venture the outermost bounds of all cognition by means of 
mere ideas in a pure use’, seeking then ‘to find peace only in the completion of its circle 
in a self-subsisting systematic whole’.61 In the ‘Doctrine of Method’ Kant brings 
together both the limits of reason and the nature of its driving or striving (Bestrebung), 
which moves it to go beyond them in order to attain completion. By means of the 
distinction between the theoretical and practical use of reason, Kant maintains that if 
only the former were available no further action would be possible, for which human 
tasks would be dogmatically resolved as pure commands or sceptically abandoned in 
fear of error or mistake.
62
 It can be appreciated that the struggle to conceive doctrine 
emerges from the drive towards a completion which nonetheless cannot be attained. 
Nevertheless, it is philosophy’s very openness to such completion which maintains the 
force of doctrine and catalyses its movement towards a systematic unity, however 
hypothetical each stage of its completion remains.
63
  
                                                            
61 CPR: (A797/B824-A798/B826).  
62 On the collaboration of doctrine (Doktrin) and critique Kant writes in respect to the antinomy of the 
cosmological ideas that one can derive a ‘true utility, not dogmatic but critical and doctrinal utility 
[kritischen und doktrinalen Nutzen], namely, that of thereby proving indirectly the transcendental ideality 
of appearances’ (A 507/B 535). In section IX of the same part of the first Critique, Kant formulates the 
collaboration between critique and doctrine in terms of the transformation of that which otherwise would 
be ‘dialectical’ into ‘doctrinal’ principles (A517/B545). In both cases it is clear how the problematic 
metaphysics which Kant rejects under the labels of ‘dogmatism’ and ‘dialectics’ is different from the 
doctrinal part which orientates the unity of experience and the systematic completion of philosophy. 
63 Andrew Benjamin has recently argued for the affinity between Kant and Benjamin in terms of the 
notion of striving as it is respectively used in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and in the ‘Notes to 
a Study on the Category of Justice’ (1916). Kant affirms: ‘What belongs to duty here is only 
the striving to produce and promote the highest good in the world’. W. Benjamin writes: ‘Justice is the 
striving to make the world into the highest good’. Andrew Benjamin departs from this notes to elaborate 
on the affinity (‘an affinity that at the same time can be brought into question’) between Benjamin and 
Kant in terms of the ‘possible actualization of justice as the state of the world’ which opens up an 
opportunity for the othering of the world: Andrew Benjamin, ‘The World of Striving’, Anthropology & 
Materialism. A Journal of Social Research, 2017, pp. 3, 10–11.  
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Benjamin’s reading of the struggle to attain unity and completion is directed towards the 
open-ended unity of experience which catalyses philosophy in order to reach the form 
of a dynamic and transformable doctrine. In the struggle to conceive doctrine Benjamin 
observes a complementary process to the initial breaking down of  the ‘continuity’ in 
the unity of experience that the negative moment of the Kantian method introduced 
while rejecting dogmatic (pre-critical) metaphysics. In the struggle to conceive doctrine, 
metaphysics is still possible for Kant as it is also for Benjamin. For Kant, it is the drive 
for the completion of philosophy what maintains open the questions for metaphysics: 
insofar as doctrine does not provide fixed concepts or answers to human questions, but 
principles of orientation and ideas which organise the multiplicity of knowledge and 
practical action, it provides the basis from which new theoretical and practical problems 
emerge. For Benjamin, the continuous transformation of the unity of knowledge 
grounds the ‘higher’ (doctrinal) concept of experience.64 In quoting Johan Georg 
Hamann’s dictum according to which language is both the ‘organon and criterion of 
reason’, Benjamin presents the open-ended unity of doctrine in terms of the problem of 
its development and transmission through the medium of language. Following 
Hamman’s principle that reason cannot be thought ‘independently of its transmission’, 
‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ argues for an interpretation of the 
transformation of knowledge and its drive for completion in the historical unfolding of 
language.
65
 The struggle to conceive doctrine appears thus in terms of the theoretical 
and practical completion of knowledge which is ultimately realised through the 
transformation of language. This conception of language understands its transformation 
as a movement towards completion.  
 
3. Language as History 
 
                                                            
64 It is important to emphasise that the ‘continuity of experience’ is not the merely a ‘methodological’ 
correction to ‘guide empirical research’ as Fenves maintains. It also provides the basis for practical 
action. Cf: Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: 159. The higher notion of experience may be read as 
maintaining experience as beiing always open and transformable without assuming that its absolute form 
is attainable. This might explain the transition from ‘On Perception’ to ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’ which I commented upon in previous sections. 
65 Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language, ed. by Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 207–8. 
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Benjamin develops the problem of the completion of knowledge in linguistic terms in 
‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ (1916) and in ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ (1921). In these works he considers that language is the medium through 
which the creative and receptive character of humanity manifest. This principle is 
captured in what Benjamin refers to as the ‘essential law of language’ in the former 
work. According to this, ‘to express oneself and to address everything else amounts to 
the same thing’.66 Benjamin then explores how the essential law of language is related 
to knowledge according to the distinction between divine language and human 
language. This strategy allows him to characterise a profane view on language and to 
examine whether it is possible to attain full meaning and complete expression in this 
imperfect, limited condition. Benjamin introduces the distinction between divine and 
human language throughout the essay on language, while in the essay on translation he 
addresses the interrelated work of creativity and receptivity in the process of translating 
a literary work from one language to another. Although these essays are not explicitly 
concerned with the concept of doctrine nor with the role of the ideas of reason in the 
completion of the philosophical system, they do offer an insight into the problem of the 
historical transformation of knowledge, which is ultimately the object of his doctrinal 
philosophy as the essays on Kant and the correspondence from October 1917 argue. In 
the next section I offer a brief reconstruction of the general argument on language in 
order to relate it to the problem of doctrine elaborated above. Following on the 
presentation of the historical unfolding of language, Chapter II will examine the shift 
towards an understanding of the development of language from the perspective of the 
moments of rupture or interruption that emerge in the continuity or unfolding of 
language, relating the tension between rupture and continuity to the notions of doctrine 
and ideas that Benjamin brings together in the Ideenlehre he offers in the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ to the book on the baroque.  
  
                                                            
66 SW 1: 65. Benjamin uses here the verbs aussprechen and ansprechen. 
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3.1 Profane Language and Indeterminacy 
 
In ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ Benjamin maintains that the 
linguistic nature of creation lies in the fact that ‘God invested man with the gift of 
language’ and therefore ‘elevated [him] above nature’ by endowing him with the 
capacity to ‘name’ nature.67 Although this gift elevates humanity over nature, it is not 
spontaneously nor arbitrarily used since nature is also a divine creation which expresses 
herself through her own language. In language humanity continues the creation of 
nature by allowing nature to express her own essence. In the act of naming, both the 
essence of humanity and the essence of nature come together as divine creations. In the 
scheme outlined by Benjamin, to name nature means to complete the creation of nature 
by being receptive to the essence of nature. This means for Benjamin to know the 
essence of nature. Human languages, therefore, name ‘things according to knowledge’, 
and humanity becomes ‘the knower in the same language in which God is the creator’,68 
thereby completing the task of God’s creation of nature by knowing nature. This is the 
task of Adam, whose naming of nature is both expressive and receptive in the pure 
continuity of the language of God. Thus, for Benjamin naming consists of translating 
‘the language of things into the language of man’.69 In Adamic language man and nature 
meet each other as created beings: Adam’s language is creative insofar as it is receptive 
to the essence of nature. Here, Adam’s gift is twofold: he names nature according to the 
knowledge he receives from nature. 
 
The continuity of the language of God in which nature and man partake is concentrated 
in Adam’s act of naming, which is nonetheless interrupted with the Fall and the 
emergence of the multiplicity of languages. In this context, the context of human 
language, knowledge of things cannot be thought of as the pure continuity of different 
languages partaking in divine language. However, they do partake in language as such 
(Überhaupt) which works as the medium through which human language and the 
language of things communicate. The word, Benjamin writes, is forced to ‘communicate 
something other than itself’ distinct from the essences it was able to express in ‘the pure 
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language of names’.70 Lacking thus an immediate relation to nature, the word becomes a 
‘mere sign’ arbitrarily related to the world. The continuity of translation and the 
immediacy of divine language are nevertheless shattered, for language —as Eli 
Friedlander notes—  is no longer the ‘medium’ of ‘self-expression of true nature’ but ‘a 
means to express something else’.71 Rather than being receptive of nature, human 
language over-names nature.
72
  
 
The ‘Fall of the spirit of language’ marks the emergence of the instrumental use of 
language in which knowledge is guided by an interest in nature rather than by the 
openness or receptiveness towards nature’s expressive capacity.73 This does not mean, 
however, that the immediacy of language is lost, although it might not have the same 
immediacy as divine language. It is here that the essay on translation finds its point of 
departure, for if divine language is an expression of the unity of God’s creativity and the 
unity of nature as essence, the multiplicity of languages which follows the Fall is, as 
Benjamin suggests elsewhere, the ‘storehouse’ of a multiplicity of essences.74 To reveal 
this essences it is necessary first to suspend the instrumental use of language. Once 
again, the double process of suspension or interruption appears in Benjamin’s 
argumentative structure: the instrumental use of language suspends the potential of the 
interrelated work of human creativity and receptivity towards nature’s expressive 
capacity; the suspension of the instrumental use of language becomes then necessary in 
order to recover (if however partially and momentarily) the potential of human 
language.  
 
In ‘The Task of the Translator’, Benjamin understands the exercise of translating from 
one language to another in terms of the dialectic of continuity and interruption which is 
                                                            
70 SW 1: 71. 
71 Friedlander, A Philosophical Portrait: 16. Ilit Ferber’s presentation of the continuity of divine language 
might illuminate this point, when she suggests that the ‘chain of creation is also a chain of expression’: 
Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy: Benjamin’s Early Reflections on Theater and Language (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013) p. 26. This provides a precise presentation of the relation between 
creation and language, yet only with regard to divine language. A problematic element in Ferber’s 
account of Benjamin’s conception of language is that she transposes this relation of continuity to the 
realm of human language, thereby downplaying the limits that human language faces in the process of 
unfolding towards full meaning or expression which, I argue, remains unattainable. I will comment upon 
this problem in the following chapter and the emphasis that the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to the book 
on the baroque gives to the moments of rupture and discontinuity in the development of language. 
72 SW 1: 73. 
73 SW 1: 71. 
74 ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ (1933), SW 2: 697. 
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the hallmark of post-lapsarian language. He understands translation not in terms of its 
usefulness for the readers of the work which is originally written in a foreign language, 
nor in terms of the transmission of the contents or the information of the original into 
another language. Rather, the law of translation is that of translatability.
75
 With this 
term Benjamin names the immediacy which pertains to human language and is hidden 
in the instrumental use of language, recasting the creative and receptive character of 
language yet in a profane context. Translatability is ‘an essential quality of certain 
works’, writes Benjamin, to refer to the openness of the literary work to the act of 
translation, or to its openness to encounter itself with another language (the language of 
the translator). The translatability of the work refers, therefore, to the possibility of the 
translation transplanting ‘the original into a more definitive linguistic realm’, one in 
which different languages ‘supplement each other’ and contribute towards the 
completion of a pure language by means of their intentions.
76
 The interrelated work of 
different languages is their ‘natural’ or ‘vital connection’.77 Here, Benjamin understand 
the process of translation as the continuous growing of language or the unfolding of 
each language in the direction of a pure language. This view is determined by the model 
of divine language which, as Friedlander remarks, considers names as expressions of 
essences ‘whose end is full significance’.78  
 
However, while divine language is pure knowledge, the coming together of multiple 
languages into translation raises the original language into a ‘higher and purer linguistic 
air’ in which it cannot permanently live however. Indeed, the translation cannot 
‘certainly’ reach this higher and purer linguistic realm ‘in its entirety’.79 Translatability, 
therefore, points towards a pure language which nevertheless remains an ‘inaccessible 
realm of reconciliation and fulfilment of languages’. The most complete or complex 
linguistic realm is always open and renewed in subsequent translations.
80
 Translatability 
refers then to the openness of the work to its ‘continued life’ or ‘afterlife’, its openness 
to a more complete form of expression which, nevertheless, finds no ultimate form.
81
 It 
is in this sense that Beatrice Hanssen describes the eschaton of this teleological 
                                                            
75 ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’, SW 1: 254. 
76 SW 1: 258. 
77 SW 1: 254. 
78 Friedlander, A Philosophical Portrait: 15.  
79 SW 1: 254. 
80 SW 1: 258. 
81 SW 1: 254. 
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conception as the aspiration to ‘pure language’, resembling the infinite yet unsolvable 
task which the Kantian drive towards a systematic unity of knowledge and practice 
posits for human reason.  
 
Although this serves to characterise the eschatological aspiration of language, its 
tendency to completion or full significance, the restoration of the original logos avoids 
both the search for an original in the sense of a first, lost meaning that must be 
recovered in order to attain meaning, and the future-oriented eschatology of fulfilment 
and salvation (which for Benjamin manifests itself in visions of history determined by 
utopian visions). As it will be discussed in the next chapter, in the ‘Prologue’ to the 
Origin of the German Mourning-Play, origin (Ursprung) and originary (Ursprungliche) 
are distinguished from both Hermann Cohen’s own use of origin (Ursprung) and 
Benedetto Croce’s genesis (Entstehung). With these distinctions Benjamin points out, 
firstly, two different philosophical methods: Cohen’s logical idealism and a proper 
‘historico-philosophical’ investigation. Secondly, in an internal distinction to the latter 
form of investigation Benjamin differentiates between his own Ursprungphilosophie 
and Croce’s genetic lineage as two divergent historiographic methods or forms of 
writing history. In regard to the eschatological conception of language, Benjamin’s 
Ursprungsphilosophy turns towards the past, looking at the unfolding of language from 
the perspective of the breaks and ruptures in the process of translation.
82
  
 
If translatability is first introduced as the continuous transformation of language in a 
recasting of the continuity of divine language, the essay on translation then brings the 
limits and the historicity of each language together by means of the incomplete quality 
                                                            
82 See: Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History. Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings and 
Angels: 34–35. For the opposition between Benjamin and Cohen in terms of their conceptions of the 
messianic as being respectively directed towards the past and the future, see: Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, 
‘The Ties Between Walter Benjamin and Hermann Cohen: A Generally Neglected Chapter in the History 
of the Impact of Cohen’s Philosophy’, Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, 13 (1)  (2004):127-14; 
and Deuber-Mankowsky, ‘Hanging Over the Abyss. On the relation between knowledge and experience 
in Hermann Cohen and Walter Benjamin’, in Reinier Munk, Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism, 
(Dordrecht, Springer, 2005) pp.  161-190. An alternative reading of Cohen which may weaken the 
opposition traced by Deuber-Mankowsky (by avoiding to label Cohen’s messianism as future-oriented) is 
offered in the same collection by Andrea Poma, ‘Suffering and Non-Eschatological Messianism in 
Hermann Cohen’, pp. 413-427; Chapter 11 in The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen; and Chapters 6 
and 15 in Yearning for Form and Other Essays on Hermann Cohen, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). Julia 
Ng’s argument on Benjamin and Cohen is closer to Deuber-Mankowsky’s in ‘Kant’s Theory of 
Experience at the End of the War: Scholem and Benjamin Read Cohen: A Commentary’ MLN   German 
Issue: Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem, and the Marburg School, Vol. 127, No. 3, (April 2012), pp. 
462-484 (468-70). 
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of each translation. It ultimately considers both the translated language and the language 
of the translator as ‘fragments of a greater language’. Indeed, the only way in which 
translation may bring the language translated to a higher level is by recognising that its 
‘ways of meaning’ are different to those of language of the translator.83 By recognising 
this difference, the translator brings the two languages together. Thus, if the first part of 
the argument points towards the recasting of the continuity of divine language into 
human language, the second part emphasises the fragmentariness of human language as 
the condition of possibility for the recreation of the work in translation. It is because 
each language remains incomplete that they can always be risen to a higher level by 
means of translation. Translation ultimately produces a new work which benefits from 
(and enriches) two languages yet which also remains undetermined and open to further 
revision.   
 
The language translated and the language of the translator enrich and complement each 
other. Here, the argument takes another turn, ascribing to the translator the task of 
releasing through his or her own language the ‘pure language that is exiled among alien 
tongues’.84 The translator’s task is thus marked by its creativity but also by its 
receptivity towards the medium of language as such. Recognising the limits of both the 
object- and subject-language, the translator identifies a space of ‘essential 
indeterminacy’ towards which both languages point.85 Here, the openness of the 
translator resides in ‘allowing’ his or her own language ‘to be affected’ and transformed 
by the foreign language. In this shift, Benjamin ultimately understands translation in 
terms of the unfolding of languages towards a pure yet unattainable language within 
which history is embedded.  
 
Two final remarks on the essay on translation will relate Benjamin’s concept of 
language to the struggle to conceive doctrine and the completion of knowledge. These 
will serve as a conclusion to this chapter. Firstly, in conceiving of the movement of 
language and the connection between languages as the process of completion of pure 
language, Benjamin understands the work that is translated in terms of its ‘afterlife’, 
consequently seeing the work not merely as the ‘the setting for history’ but as 
                                                            
83 SW 1: 260. 
84 SW 1: 261. 
85 Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy: 74.  
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something which has a ‘history of its own’.86 Benjamin understands the unfolding of the 
work not as an element of the history of language; rather, unfolding in language, history 
comes closer to its own completion via the completion of pure language. Benjamin 
refers then to the concept of ‘revelation’ in order to explain this movement towards 
completion in terms of the dynamics of nearness and distance between all languages and 
pure language. Considering the notion of pure language it can be seen ‘how far 
removed’ the hidden meanings of language is ‘from revelation’ and ‘how close 
[revelation] can be brought by the knowledge of its remoteness’.87 For Benjamin 
translation offers a double insight into nearness and distance: by bringing together the 
multiplicity of languages in translation, the process of translation comes closer to 
revelation (allowing language to express itself), and yet at the same time translation 
reveals the remoteness of ever completing such a process. 
 
The teleological or eschatological conception of language understands the movement of 
history as the movement of language, and the unfolding of history as the completion of 
pure knowledge in language. This realm of pure knowledge is, however, presented 
under two different guises in the essays on language and translation. While the former 
understands pure knowledge in terms of the continuity of divine language, the essay on 
translation attempts to formulate the possibility of this continuity in the realm of human 
language; this process remains, however, incomplete. Here, the continuity of pure, 
divine language mirrors the pure continuity of knowledge which ‘On Perception’ 
attributes to dogmatic, pre-critical metaphysics, i.e. the ‘Leibnizian lex continua’.88 In 
this sense, Ferber’s understanding of language as a chain of creation that is at the same 
time a chain of expression serves to present the continuity of pure divine language.
89
 
The continuity introduced in the essay on translation could be seen to be closer to the 
continuity of knowledge and experience formulated in ‘On Perception’ and, mainly, in 
‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ in terms of the unity of experience and 
knowledge which is open to transformation and revision through their own process of 
completion and transmission. In the passages on Kant’s critical philosophy and profane, 
human language, the unity of experience and knowledge is a conceivable yet 
unattainable task. What this chapter has stressed by means of an emphatic reading of 
                                                            
86 SW 1: 253. 
87 SW 1: 262. 
88 Fenves, The Messianic Reduction: 159.  
89 Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy: 131. 
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what Benjamin understands as Kant’s struggle to conceive doctrine, is the openness that 
at the same time constrains and catalyses the dynamics of completion.  
This chapter opened with a brief presentation of a selection of fragments from 
Benjamin’s early writings in order to show his interest in the transformability of history 
and the problem of its presentation. To this end the Hauptmann review offered an 
insight into the different ways of staging historical change, either as a continuous 
unfolding of natural events or as a process that can be interrupted and opened up to 
multiple, unknown outcomes. The letters on education, history and tradition bring into 
question the future-oriented will that permeates the confrontation between different 
forms of experience in the 1913 essay ‘Experience’. If the transformation of history is 
understood in terms of the interruption of a distorted image of history (spiritless 
experience), Benjamin turns the task of philosophy towards the presentation of the 
transformability of history in order to make visible the possibilities for such an 
interruption. In the correspondence between Benjamin and Scholem, the transmissibility 
of tradition keeps open future possibilities for such a transformation. In its confrontation 
with history, philosophy attains its doctrinal form as a philosophy of history. The 
correspondence reveals multiple problems nonetheless. On the one hand, it raises the 
question on the form of such a doctrinal philosophy (the philosophy of history) and its 
contents (the transformation of knowledge); on the other, it asks how this doctrinal 
philosophy can bring forth the transformability of history to present history as open to 
multiple, unknown futures. In ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming 
Philosophy’, Benjamin maintains that the reorientation of the Kantian system consists in 
developing a systematic philosophy capable of explaining the unity of experience as the 
unity of knowledge in its linguistic transformation. Thus, in order to make room for 
history Benjamin transforms the struggle to conceive doctrine in the task of 
understanding the historical unfolding of knowledge in language.  
 
On the basis of the characterisation of the role of doctrine in Benjamin’s texts on Kant, 
this chapter considered the Kantian concept of doctrine in order to argue that 
Benjamin’s Lehre brings together the religious dimension of Lehre (marked by tradition 
and transmissibility) with Kant’s technical use of Doktrin  (marked by openness and its 
drive towards completion). In the revision of Kant, this chapter showed that doctrine 
brings the Kantian critical method into completion by means of regulative principles 
and the ideas of reason, regardless of how hypothetical this completion remains from 
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the perspective of the critical method. This hypothetical status is, however, necessary in 
Kant for the development of the critical method insofar as its orienting principles guide 
the articulation of the multiplicity of knowledge, providing a coherent (if partial) 
articulation of the theoretical and practical use of reason. To some extent, doctrine 
catalyses critique towards its own development.  
 
The struggle to conceive doctrine is twofold. Firstly, doctrine is always constrained by 
the critical method and, therefore, its results are always hypothetical. Secondly, in its 
permanent drive for completion, doctrine moves the philosophical system towards a 
coherent yet partial account of the unity of experience. Through this characterisations of 
doctrine, we returned to one of the central formulations of ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the 
Program of the Coming Philosophy’, namely, that the unity of knowledge must be 
explained in linguistic terms. We showed how the unity of experience and knowledge 
changes according to its linguistic nature and the difference between its total completion 
in divine language and its unattainable completion in human language —despite the 
latter’s continuous unfolding towards a ‘higher linguistic realm’. Here, the emphasis on 
the dynamics of completion and incompletion informing Benjamin’s reading of doctrine 
illuminates the task of articulating a philosophy which aims to attain its own totality by 
means of concentrating the total yet incomplete history of its objects: the unity of 
experience, the unity of knowledge, the unity of meaning, and the totality of history.  
 
In order to make room for the transformability of history, Benjamin turns towards a 
doctrinal philosophy capable of presenting the unity of the total yet incomplete history 
of experience, knowledge and meaning. The problem of historical change remains, 
however, an abstract formulation subordinated to the continuous unfolding of 
experience, knowledge and language towards unattainable completion. The essay on 
translation offers, nevertheless, an important turn towards a more explicit form of 
presenting the transformability of history by understanding the work in terms of its 
‘afterlife’. If this notion concentrates the history of the work, in terms of its unfolding 
towards a higher linguistic realm, Benjamin opens up an opportunity to look more 
closely at the process of unfolding in order to discern its moments of rupture and 
diversion. As Hanssen suggests, ‘The Task of the Translator’ advances a ‘shift’ ‘to the 
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history of language and to history as language’;90 it can be added that as result of this 
shift history becomes the condition for the actualisation of meaning.  
 
Although this shift opens the opportunity to examine the dynamics of continuity and 
ruptures which is inherent in history, this opportunity is nonetheless explored not in the 
essay on translation but in The Origin of the German Mourning Play and its ‘Prologue’. 
In the book on the baroque the continuous transformation of the work is examined from 
the double perspective of its unfolding and its subordination to multiple interpretations 
which, as translations, modulate or liberate the force of the original language of the 
work or its ‘echo’, as Benjamin calls it.91 As the next chapter will discuss, The Origin of 
the German Mourning-Play understands the afterlife of the original work not as a 
continuous unfolding towards pure language, but as a violent process informed by 
moments of disappearance and re-emergence of the work and the force of its language. 
To pattern this rhythm requires to conceive of language as history, yet looking 
backwards to trace the conflict informing the growth of language for which translation 
is ‘the very organon or medium’.92 The book on the baroque focus less on the unfolding 
of language towards completion than on the breaks and ruptures marking the historical 
development of language. 
 
In this way The Origin of the German Mourning Play turns from the teleological or 
eschatological reading of knowledge and meaning towards a concept of criticism which 
traces the moments of rupture in the unfolding of the work’s afterlife, searching 
particularly for what is lost in such a development. Here, doctrine plays a critical role. 
The ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ maintains both its contribution towards the systematic 
unity of philosophy and its transformability and transmissibility by means of language. 
As an extension of this idea, the next chapter argues that the presentation of doctrine in 
the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ radicalises the formulation of its transformability by 
explicitly relating it to the past in search of moments of rupture which reveal lost 
opportunities for the production of an alternative present. In the ‘Prologue’, Benjamin 
                                                            
90 Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34. The limits for the shift towards history in the essay on 
translation are related to the attempt to relate human language to pure language after the fall despite the 
limits that Benjamin himself set for this relation. On the ‘abstract’ tendency in the essay on language see: 
Ilit Ferber, ‘Lament and Pure Language: Scholem, Benjamin and Kant’, Jewish Studies Quarterly, 21.1 
(2014), 42–54 (pp. 47–49). In Philosophy and Melancholy, Ferber also reads the essay on translation as 
marking a shift towards the ‘historical dimension’ of language:154-55.  
91 OGT: 48; GS I: 228-9. 
92 Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34. 
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writes that in its ultimate form philosophy will ‘assume the quality of doctrine’ based on 
a ‘historical configuration’ rather than on the ‘mere power of thought’. In the ‘Prologue’ 
the continuous unfolding of knowledge in language is indeed regarded as the 
‘objectivity with which history has endowed the principal formulations of philosophical 
reflections’.93 As I will explain in the course of the next chapter, doctrine aims to bring 
together the total history of these reflections in order to discern the irregular rhythm 
informing their historical transformation. Thus, the book of the baroque addresses the 
irregular rhythm of the transmissibility of tradition. 
                                                            
93 OGT: 37; GS I: 217 
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Chapter II 
 
 
Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie:  
From the Historical Configuration of the Doctrine of Ideas  
to the Weight of Tradition 
 
 
 
In the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to The Origin of the German Mourning-Play (1928) 
Benjamin elaborates upon the relationship between philosophy and doctrine formulated 
in ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’. In the ‘Prologue’, Benjamin addresses 
specifically the role that ideas have in philosophical investigation and the ability of the 
latter to attain the unity of doctrine. In the opening of the ‘Prologue’ Benjamin affirms 
that in its ‘finished form’ philosophy will ‘assume the quality of doctrine’, adding that 
‘philosophical doctrine is based on historical configuration’ (rather than on the ‘mere 
power of thought’).1 Benjamin understands doctrine in the specific sense of ‘doctrine of 
ideas’ or Ideenlehre.2 With this formulation, he brings together the notions of doctrine 
and ideas which were critical to the interpretation (and recasting) of Kant’s struggle to 
conceive doctrine. This chapter will focus on two main topics related to the unfolding of 
doctrine as doctrine of ideas. First, the ‘historical configuration’ on which this doctrine 
is based and, second, its relation to the concept of tradition. From this perspective, the 
aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to examine the historical configuration under which 
philosophy acquires the status of doctrine of ideas (Ideenlehre) and, second, to 
                                                            
1 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, tr. by John Osborne (London-New York: 
Verso, 1998), p. 27. Hereafter OGT. Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, in Gesammelte Schriften. 
Werkausgabe Vol. I (Frankfurt am Main: Surkhamp, 1980): 207. Hereafter GS1 followed by page 
number. In this thesis I follow the most accepted translation of Trauerspiel as Mourning-Play in the main 
text and in the amended references to the title of Benjamin’s 1928 book since rendering Trauerspiel as 
tragic drama misses Benjamin’s critical distinction between mourning-play and tragedy. 
2 OGT: 27; GS I: 226.  
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characterise this ‘historical configuration’ as the weight of tradition, as Benjamin will 
retrospectively refer to it in the 1936 version of the essay on technical reproducibility.
3
 I 
will suggest that the doctrine of ideas approaches history and historical change from the 
standpoint of the concept of tradition, considering the latter as the condition for 
securing the substantive experience of history or the recognition of its transformability. 
When Benjamin problematises the crisis of tradition in his writings on technical 
reproducibility, he raises the question on the possibility of attaining experience in light 
of the absence of the medium through which it is configured.  
 
As it was anticipated in the previous chapter, the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ makes 
explicit the breaks and ruptures informing historical change in order to discern moments 
in which alternative futures could have come into being, thereby producing a more 
radical interpretation of the transformability of both history and doctrine than the one 
formulated in ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’, its supplements and the 
essays on language and translation. Illuminating those moments of rupture Benjamin’s 
doctrinal philosophy also reveals the alternative paths that history did not follow. In its 
explicit engagement with the past, doctrine brings forth the transformability and 
openness of history, giving then the conditions under which those alternative, missing 
futures can be fragmentarily actualised to suspend or interrupt the given order of the 
present. 
 
The aim of this chapter is, thus, to examine the transition of Benjamin’s doctrinal 
philosophy towards a doctrine of ideas marked by a ‘historical configuration’, and to 
which Benjamin refers in different ways as ‘philosophical history’ and ‘science of 
origin’.4 Throughout this chapter I will argue that the best way to comprehend this 
group of concepts is by following John Pizer’s reading of Benjamin’s philosophy as 
Ursprungsphilosophie, a radical ‘philosophy of origin’.5 This radical philosophy of 
                                                            
3 ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility’, SW 3: 103.  
4 OGT: 47; GS I: 227.  
5 John David Pizer uses the term Ursprungsphilosophie to characterise those philosophies of history 
which have at its core an ‘open-ended’ concept of origin (one which includes but exceeds historical 
genesis and change) and remain, therefore, invulnerable to poststructuralists critiques of origin as 
referring to ‘fixed’ moments, phenomena, or regard it to be a ‘rigid’ concept. In English, Pizer prefers to 
refer to these philosophies as radical theories or philosophies of origin to stress the peculiarity of the 
German term Ursprung which is normally lost in its English translation. Toward a Theory of Radical 
Origin: Essays on Modern German Thought (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), specially 
the Introduction and Chapter II.   
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origin encompasses three main elements: the doctrine of ideas, the immanent notion of 
critique and its method of digression. This chapter is divided in three main parts. The 
first part offers a brief account of The Origin of the German Mourning-Play to 
characterise its general project and to situate the contribution of its ‘Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue’. The second part discusses Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie and what 
Samuel Weber (alluding to Carl Schmitt’s political theology) called Benjamin’s 
methodological extremism,
6
 which I further disclose in two sections respectively 
dedicated to what might be called the principles of exceptionality and immersion. These 
sections explain the doctrine of ideas in terms of its object (‘truth bodied forth in 
ideas’), its method (‘digression’) and the medium in which the latter presents the former 
(the ‘treatise form’ or the ‘philosophical essay’). These sections argue that 1) in order to 
present truth or the movement of ideas in philosophical writing, the method of 
digression searches for the exceptional in the transformation of the ideas by means of a 
historical immersion; 2) for which the exceptional is what makes the recognition of both 
ideas and truth possible.  
 
Finally, in the third part of this chapter, I will relate the doctrine of ideas to the notion of 
allegory by means of the formulations of critique and synthesis offered both in the 
‘Prologue’ and in the second section of the book, ‘Trauerspiel and Allegory’. The aim 
of the third section is to show the affinity between Benjamin’s method for the study of 
the baroque (which he extends as his philosophical method) and the baroque itself, 
focusing on allegory or allegorical synthesis as the baroque’s device of signification or 
expression. Critical to this affinity is that Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie and 
baroque allegory attain signification or expression by means of a synthesis that 
Benjamin characterises as tregua dei (the temporary suspension of conflict) in 
opposition to perpetual peace (pax dei), and from which conflict always emerges anew. 
This notion of synthesis as tregua dei informs the model of cultural transmissibility 
formulated in the ‘Prologue’ to which Benjamin retrospectively refers as the weight of 
tradition. 
 
 
                                                            
6 Samuel Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision’, in  Benjamin’s -Abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), pp. 176–78. 
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1. The Baroque and The Task of the Critic  
 
Opening with the dedicatory ‘Conceived 1916. Written 1925. Then, as now, dedicated 
to my wife’, The Origin of the German Mourning-Play concentrates the development of 
Benjamin’s early philosophy. As Howard Caygill writes, the book marks ‘a point of 
collision between the various tendencies which were working themselves through in 
Benjamin’s thought’.7 Among the divergent origins of the book, the most explicit line 
of development is the distinction between the literary forms of Classic Greek tragedy 
and the German mourning-play or Trauerspiel of the German baroque from the 
seventeenth century.
8
 Benjamin had traced this distinction in two fragments from 1916, 
‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’ and ‘The Significance of Language in Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy’, to distinguish, out of these literary forms, the understanding of time and death 
in Classic Greek culture and modern, Christian Europe. While the former is marked by 
‘mythic’, ‘fulfilled time’ for which death is the moment of completion of life and praise 
(the fulfilment of ‘fate’ and destiny in the death of the tragic hero),9 the latter consists in 
an empty, ‘earthly time’ of ‘repetition’ for which death marks the moment of 
‘mourning’ for eternally deferred fulfilment.10 With this distinction, Benjamin argues 
for the ‘autonomy’ or ‘the right to exist’ of the Trauerspiel as a literary genre distinct 
from Classic tragedy.
11
 The distinction is further elaborated in The Origin of the 
German Mourning-Play and the division, internal to the Christian tradition, between the 
Protestant and Catholic expressions that the mourning-play reached in the works of 
Shakespeare and Calderón. Paying attention to the specific development of 
Protestantism and its critical role in the emergence of modernity, the book on the 
baroque is closely related to the discussions on political theology, sovereignty, violence 
and law articulated in ‘Capitalism as Religion’ and ‘Towards a Critique of Violence’, 
                                                            
7 Caygill, The Colour of Experience, (London: Routledge, 1998): 52. 
8 In the first part of the book on the baroque Benjamin discusses mainly the works of Georg Philip 
Harsörffer (1607-1658), Andreas Gryphius (1616-1664), Daniel Casper von Lohenstein (1635-1683) and 
Johan Christian Hallman (1640-1716). 
9 Benjamin, ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, SW 1:. 56-57. 
10 Benjamin, ‘The Role of Language in Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, SW 1: 60.  
11 Ferenc Feher, ‘Lukács and Benjamin: Parallels and Contrasts’, New German Critique, 1985, 125–38 (p. 
125). John Pizer also discusses this formulation in ‘Ursprung’s Destructive/Redemptive Rhythm: Walter 
Benjamin’, in Toward a Theory of Radical Origin: Essays on Modern German Thought (Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 41–42. See also Pizer, ‘History, Genre and “Ursprung” in 
Benjamin’s Early Aesthetics’, The German Quarterly, 60.1 (1987), 68–87. In a similar way, Weber refers 
to ‘the lack of sovereignty’ of the Trauerspiel and the Trauerspiel’s ‘need for sovereign attitude’; see 
Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision’, in Benjamin’s -abilities, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p. 180-1.  
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both from 1921.
12
 These discussions left their mark mainly in the first part of the book, 
‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’. Benjamin argues there that the distinctive character of the 
Trauerspiel consists of its profane conception of time which transforms history into the 
setting for political conflicts and sovereign violence, incarnated in the figures of the 
Sovereign, the martyr, the tyrant and the intriguer who engage in the struggle for a 
denied authenticity that is reserved for the tragic hero. As Benjamin writes in The 
Origin of the Mourning-Play, both the content and the structure of the Trauerspiel are 
rooted in ‘historical life’. Unlike Classic tragedy, the object of the Trauerspiel is 
‘history, not myth’.13 Subject to earthly and profane time the characters of the baroque 
drama confront their finitude and the loss of eschatology through mourning and 
melancholy, in a setting delineated by the problem of sovereign decision in early 
modernity.
14
 
 
Two other tendencies which converge in the 1928 book are the characterisations of 
symbol and allegory as distinct devices of signification or expression for Classic tragedy 
and the baroque Trauerspiel, as well as the methodological discussion on the role that 
ideas play for the understanding of literary genre and ‘art forms’ —the question that 
ultimately the doctrine of ideas of Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie must answer. The 
first tendency comes from Benjamin’s doctoral dissertation, The Concept of Art 
Criticism in German Romanticism (1919), and the essay Goethe’s Elective Affinities 
(1919-1925).
15
 This argument is the critical contribution of the second part of the book, 
‘Trauerspiel and Allegory’. Contrary to multiple readings of allegory which maintained 
that it is an expressionless device of signification (therefore unable to attain 
signification), Benjamin argues that  allegory is both expressive and meaningful if, 
however, it does not attain signification in the same way than Classic and Romantic 
conceptions of the symbol. It is also by means of allegory that the mourning-play 
                                                            
12 SW 1: 236-252 and 288-291. 
13 OGT: 62; GS I: 242-3. 
14 It is in this sense that history breaks through the aesthetic presentation of traditional or classic drama to 
produce the Trauerspiel, in opposition to Schmitt’s latter understanding of the Trauerspiel as self-
enclosed literary work which bears no relation to the historical world. For Schmitt, the exceptionality of 
Hamlet consists in the intrusion of time in the play: the disturbance that historical time (or historical 
violence) produces in the ‘unintentional character of the play’ which, nevertheless, makes possible for the 
character of Hamlet ‘become a true myth’. Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time 
into the Play, trans. by David Pan and Jennifer R. Rust (New York: Telos Publishing Press, 2009), p. 44. 
Also: Victoria Kahn, ‘Hamlet or Hecuba: Carl Schmitt’s Decision’, Representations 83 (Summer, 2003), 
p. 69. 
15 SW 1: 116-200, 297-360. 
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presents the concept of time of the baroque period. In opposition to the symbol that 
relates the eternal moment to the ephemeral, allegory opens up the ephemeral to its own 
transience or transformability, subject to perpetual change and decay. Transience and 
decline, however, do not preclude the possibility of producing an allegorical synthesis 
which is necessary to attain expression (if only momentarily), as it will be discussed in 
the final sections of this chapter.  
 
The other tendency marking the book on the baroque is the discussion of the doctrinal 
philosophy (‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’) and of its own historical 
development in linguistic terms (‘On Language as Such...’ and ‘The Task of the 
Translator’). As it was explained in the previous chapter, Benjamin argues that 1) 
philosophy achieves its doctrinal form only as a philosophy of history which 2) 
systematically explains the historical transformability of experience as the development 
of language by means of translation. The book on the baroque approaches the unfolding 
of language from the perspective of the interruptions and ruptures which preclude any 
continuous, linear or progressive narrative of such transformation. Benjamin’s 
philosophy of history is thus focused on the critique of progressivistic approaches to 
historical change from the perspective of those breaks in history which might be 
forgotten or misunderstood by dominant narratives. Emphasising the irregular rhythm of 
historical change, which the book on the baroque encompasses under the term Ursprung 
or origin, Benjamin’s philosophy of history is better understood as 
Ursprungsphilosophie. It is in this context that the book on the baroque offers an 
account of the development of the ‘art forms’ (i.e. the Trauerspiel) from the standpoint 
of their origin or the irregular rhythm of their own historical transformation.
16
 
 
The multiple argumentative lines converging in The Origin of the German Mourning-
Play are synthesised in two passages from two different versions of Benjamin’s 
Curriculum Vitae. According to these the task of the book was ‘the philosophical 
significance’ of allegory which had been ‘forgotten and misunderstood’,17 showing as 
well the ‘affinity’ that exists between this and ‘the literary form of the Trauerspiel.18 
These two remarks serve to orientate the multiple discussions of the main two parts of 
                                                            
16 OGT: 45; GS I: 226.  
17 ‘Curriculum Vitae’ (III), SW 2: 77-78.  
18 ‘Curriculum Vitae’ (IV), SW 4: 382.  
 
 
73 
the book and to introduce the contribution of its ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’. On the 
one hand, while the first part of the book explains the temporality of ‘profane’, 
‘historical’ time in the Trauerspiel, the second establishes the affinity between 
Trauerspiel and allegory as its device of signification by showing that the latter is 
concerned with the passing of time as ‘natural history’. On the other hand, the 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ addresses the methodological problems that made possible 
the forgetting and misunderstanding of both the Trauerspiel and allegory (as well as of 
their interrelation) by ‘historico-literary’ and ‘philosophical’ studies; thereby providing 
the conditions for their further recovery. From this perspective, following on from the 
essays from 1916, The Origin of the German Mourning-Play develops the distinction 
between tragedy and Trauerspiel on the basis of the conceptions of time and death in 
Classic Greek culture and modern, Christian Europe. The novelty of the book resides in 
its approach to the forgetting and misunderstanding of the Trauerspiel in subsequent 
literary, historical and philosophical studies, consequently arguing for a methodological 
correction that might recover both the autonomy of the baroque and its affinity with 
allegory as device of signification or expression.  
 
Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie does not search for an ultimate definition of the 
baroque as literary form. It rather aims to defamiliarise accepted discussions on genre 
definition. Furthermore, in departing from the forgetting and misunderstanding of the 
baroque in existing methodologies Benjamin develops his own concept of immanent 
criticism in terms of the recovery of what he calls the baroque’s ‘historical resonance’ 
(historische Nachhall),
19
 or the recovery of those features of the baroque which were 
forgotten or misrepresented in Neo-Classical, Romantic and Neo-Kantian aesthetics. 
Although this task is accomplished against the tendencies of the multiple attempts to 
define the baroque, immanent critique understands those incomplete definitions as the 
medium through which the baroque was delivered from its moment of emergence in the 
seventeenth century to Benjamin’s own present. With this insight into the problem of 
cultural transmission, Benjamin examines the historical transformation of the 
Trauerspiel from the perspective of the transmissibility of tradition in its double 
meaning of transmission and betrayal.
20
  
                                                            
19 OGT: 48; GS I: 228-9. 
20 Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition’, in A. Benjamin and P. Osborne, 
Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy. Destruction and Experience (Manchester: Clinamen, 2000) pp. 12–15, 
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The task of recovering the resonance of the baroque mourning-play cannot be 
understood, therefore, as the recovery of a phenomenon that went lost in the history of 
literary genres. A ‘fashionable’ object of study in post-war Germany, the baroque was 
not simply a ‘marginal heterodox region’ for German culture in the twentieth century, as 
Jane O. Newman has argued. Benjamin’s generation found itself ‘celebrating’ the 
contribution of the baroque to German culture rather than discovering or ‘inventing’ this 
allegedly ‘obscure’ and ‘degenerated’ period as an object of study.21 However, to use 
Newman’s vocabulary, although it is true that Benjamin was not ‘discovering’ or 
‘inventing’ a new phenomenon, it is more precise to say that he was interested in the 
multiple historical inventions of the Trauerspiel. Juxtaposing this divergent and even 
opposite inventions immanent critique suspends their methodological efficacy and 
opens the Trauerspiel to new conditions of reception. Immanent critique might be read 
then as Benjamin’s response to the over-determination of the baroque by different 
methodologies in conflict. In terms of the 1916 essay on language, those methodologies 
were not receptive to the baroque’s nature, consequently ‘over-naming’ (rather than 
naming or translating) its essence.
22
 To suspend those methodologies is the first step 
towards the undoing or destruction of such over-determination, giving thus conditions 
for the recognition (Wiederkennen) of the baroque. In this context, Benjamin’s 
Ursprungsphilosophie aims to give the conditions under which the baroque’s resonance 
can be grasped against the grain of previous ways of modulating its force. It is in this 
sense that recovering the resonance of the baroque is produced in indirectly, tortuous or 
violent forms (as Caygill suggests in regard to the production of substantive 
                                                                                                                                                                              
20–21. From the standpoint of the problem of periodisation and the construction of historical narratives, 
Newman argues that Benjamin was amid a series of discussions on what ‘should be understood and what 
should be forgotten’ in regards to the different literary genres that were seen as the foundational moment 
of modern European culture. See: Jane O. Newman, Benjamin’s Library: Modernity, Nation, and the 
Baroque (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 2. For Benjamin, however, the problem appears 
in the interstice of these two problems, namely, in how some forms of understanding the baroque forgot 
its distinctive elements by subordinating them to other dramatic forms in the history of literary genres, 
consequently missing the fact that it was an autonomous genre. Newman offers the most detailed account 
on the sources of  Benjamin’s book on the baroque and of the multiple discussions both on the genesis of 
the Trauerspiele and their subsequent reception. However, her approach lack of a comprehensive 
engagement with Benjamin’s overall project of formulating a philosophy of history for which the notion 
of origin and the doctrine of ideas are critical. This problem manifests in the absence of a detailed 
discussion of the methodological concerns of the ‘Prologue’ beyond the problem of periodisation of the 
baroque and in the use of genesis as origin in some passages of the initial chapter.  
21 Jane O. Newman, Benjamin’s Library: 25–27. Cf: Michael W. Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter 
Benjamin’s Theory of Literary Criticism, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 55 (fn. 10).  
22 ‘On Language as Such and On the Language of Man’, SW 1: 73. 
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experience).
23
 To grasp the force of the baroque demands first to undo or destroy the 
methodological constrains historically set upon it.  
 
Here, Benjamin’s immanent criticism comes closer to the notion of translation  
formulated in ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1921). There Benjamin maintains that the 
task of the translator consists in finding the position in which his or her own language 
can produce ‘the echo of the original’.24 Translation, he adds, unlike the work of 
literature, is not ‘in the middle of the forest of language but on the outside, facing the 
wooded ridge’. Taking some distance from this forest, the translator is ‘aiming’ to find 
‘that single spot where the echo is able to give’ ‘the reverberation of the work’.25  From 
this perspective, the concept of criticism developed throughout the book on the baroque 
consists of a linguistic intervention that creates the conditions for the baroque’s force or 
resonance to reach the present. If translation is a cognitive act in the 1921 essay, The 
Origin of the German Mourning-Play regards the task of criticism as that of producing 
the conditions under which the works from the past resonate in the present. To produce 
these conditions is what Benjamin calls recognition or Wiederkennen.
26
 In order to 
produce these conditions and to recognise the resonance of the work, Benjamin’s 
Ursprungsphilosophie operates by means of a historical immersion in search for the 
(forgotten and misunderstood) exceptional through the method of digression.  
  
                                                            
23 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience: 2.  
24 SW 1: 258-9. 
25 SW 1: 258-9. 
26 OGT: 46; GS I: 227. 
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1.1 Philosophical History 
 
The presentation of the method of digression is one of the central contributions of the 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to Benjamin’s authorship. Its application is more evident 
in the first of the two main parts of the book, ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, in which he 
confronts the different readings that subordinated the mourning-plays of the seventeenth 
century to other literary forms, whether forms of tragedy that reached their highest 
expressions in the past (Classic Greek tragedy and Renaissance drama) or forms of 
tragedy that would find their most fulfilled expression in the coming centuries 
(eighteenth century neo-Classic drama). In light of the former, the mourning-play 
represented a moment of decline in the history of narrative forms: it was considered a 
tragedy unable to achieve its highest form and remained, therefore, an imitation of more 
advanced or developed cultural forms. In light of the latter reading, the mourning-play 
had not achieved its true tragic form, consequently being an incomplete, unfinished 
anticipation of neo-Classic tragedy. Whether in decline or in a process to be completed, 
the mourning-play was viewed as an imperfect form whose overcoming was necessary 
for tragedy to attain its authentic expression. What is common to both views is that they 
regarded fifteenth-sixteenth century Renaissance and eighteenth century neo-Classicism 
to be the true inheritors of Classic culture, actualising and developing the Greek ideal of 
reason which modern Europe retrospectively constructed as its own foundational 
moment. In both views, the political and theological tensions informing the baroque 
remain obscure and dependant cultural expressions which are either in decline or in wait 
to be overcome by more advanced cultural forms.  
As different interpreters have noted, Benjamin’s critique of the mourning-play amounts 
to a defence of its autonomy as a literary genre, a defence of its ‘right to existence’. This 
defence is articulated in two distinct yet interrelated ways. First, Benjamin discerns the 
specific differences between the mourning-play and those forms of tragedy on the basis 
of which the former was interpreted and, consequently, misrepresented or forgotten. 
These differences are explained according to both the historical context in which the 
Trauerspiel emerged and the theological and political problems to which it gave 
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expression.
27
 This examination of the Trauerspiel is complemented by a critique of the 
methodologies that subordinated the Trauerspiel to divergent concepts of tragedy as a 
way of proving that they inadequately dealt with the drama of the seventeenth century. 
Here, Benjamin roughly parallels ‘historico-literary studies’ with inductive methods of 
research and ‘philosophical’ aesthetics with deductive methods for genre definition.  
Historico-literary studies depart from the revision of divergent works which they 
consider to be examples of tragedy in order to produce a general concept against which 
other forms of drama are measured or contrasted. Using this method, Benjamin argues, 
the investigator only proves a pre-conceived concept of tragedy, one which is based 
mainly on generalisations of his or her psychological reactions to specific plays which 
are taken as norms that validate or discriminate those which do not produce the same 
effect. This method ultimately recedes into a form of ‘psychologism’.28 There is, 
however, a positive feature in this method, namely, the rejection (‘a productive 
scepticism’) of abstract, fixed, or eternal concepts that bear no relation to the concrete 
work.
29
 Nevertheless, the radicalisation of this positive insight in historico-literary 
analyses concluded with a description of literary genres in linear evolutionary terms for 
which so-considered minor genres are either mere imitation or anticipation of other 
genres. Although this method rightly privileges the work over general abstract norms, it 
offers no account of the conflict which informs the history of the works and the 
complex process of deviations from which they emerge.  
By contrast, ‘philosophical’ or ‘conceptual’ treatments of genres ‘succumb’ to the 
temptation of departing from general concepts in order to examine concrete works. 
Although Benjamin ultimately explains that the general concept is inductively 
constructed (consequently reducing this method to the unrestricted psychologism 
discussed in relation to historico-literary studies), he refers to those aesthetics that 
transformed Classic tragedy into an abstract norm against which modern forms of drama 
are compared without even enquiring ‘whether the tragic is a form which can be 
realized at all at the present time’, thereby excluding any interest in the ‘history of [art] 
forms’.30 Against this background, Benjamin brings together both the closer historical 
                                                            
27 In ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’ Benjamin had already noted that the ‘tragic marks out a frontier of the 
realm of art at least as much as of the terrain of history’ (SW 1: 56).    
28 OGT: 38; GS I: 21. 
29 OGT: 38; GS I: 21. 
30 OGT: 37-38, 50; GS I: 220. 
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examination of the concrete work in historico-literary studies and the philosophical 
interest of general aesthetic theories in the most general concepts. This 
Ursprungsphilosophie  is thus considered a philosophical history which aims to offer an 
account of both the historical transformation of genre and the construction of concepts 
to systematise their critical features. This philosophical history does not relies on 
general concepts as ideals but, rather, it aims to construct ideas open to further 
transformation. Ideas concentrate their own history and reveal the interruptions and 
deviations marking their own unfolding. To this end Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie 
provides a doctrine of ideas or Ideenlehre. 
To illustrate these debates it is worth quoting at length two passages from the first part 
of The Origin of the German Mourning-Play. The first one relates to the subordination 
of the paradoxical figure of the baroque sovereign to one-sided interpretations of its 
multiple dimensions: ‘[f]or the ‘‘very bad’’’ there was the drama of the tyrant, and there 
was fear; for the ‘very good’ there was the martyr drama and pity. This juxtaposition of 
forms appears strange only as long as one neglects to consider the legal aspect of the 
baroque princedom. Seen in ideological terms they are strictly complementary. In the 
baroque, the tyrant and the martyr are but two faces of the monarch.’31 In divergent 
directions the drama of the tyrant and the martyr drama radicalised elements which 
permanently inform the baroque playwrights. Assuming either of these forms of drama 
as the exemplary form of modern tragedy the baroque sovereign is consequently seen as 
an imperfect character which precludes the mourning-play from attaining an allegedly 
tragic authenticity. From the perspective of the drama of the tyrant, the indecisiveness 
of the baroque sovereign reduces the figure of the prince to a martyr lacking in 
authority. From the perspective of the martyr drama, the baroque sovereign lacks the 
determination to accept his own suffering and thus fails to reach the moment of 
martyrdom, being then a tyrant. Thus, to assume either the tyrant or the martyr drama as 
true modern tragic forms leads to forgot one of the antinomic components of the 
baroque sovereign and to misunderstand the twofold nature of the Trauerspiel. What the 
juxtaposition of these two negative interpretations of the Trauerspiel shows is two 
extreme presentations which inadequately deal with the paradoxical nature of the 
baroque. Each one betrays a critical element of the baroque. Only through their 
juxtaposition is the exceptionality of the baroque recognisable. 
                                                            
31 OGT: 69; GS I: 249-50. 
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The second passage confronts the place given to the baroque in divergent historical 
narratives:  
Classicist schemes are predominant: ‘‘Gryphius is the undisputed master, the 
German Sophocles, and behind him Lohenstein, the German Seneca, takes secondary 
place; only with certain reservations can Hallman, the German Aeschylus, be placed 
alongside them’’ (Paul Stachel). And there is in the dramas undeniably something 
which corresponds to the Renaissance-facade of the poetics. Their stylistic 
originality thus much be said in advance- is comparably greater in the details than in 
the whole. This possesses a certain ponderousness and yet a simplicity of action 
which is distantly reminiscent of the bourgeois drama of the German Renaissance.32  
 
In Seneca and German Renaissance Drama (1907) Paul Stachel understood the baroque 
as a modern version of classic tragedy, therefore grounding its legitimacy in its (limited) 
potential to attain the value of Classic culture. In German Baroque Poetry (1924) 
Herbert Cysarz explained the baroque literature as preceding the ‘true German 
Renaissance’ in eighteenth century Weimar Classicism, reducing it to a proto-
configuration of the true German values. As Newman notes on the previous passage, 
Benjamin’s critique can be read as a twofold critique of Stachel and Cysarz, defending 
the baroque ‘as an interruption of the Baroque-as-Renaissance construction and as a 
supersessional narrative of its own, which christens the Baroque tragic drama as new 
‘‘origin’’ of what Benjamin calls the ‘‘un-Renaissance-like’’ tradition of ‘‘modern 
German Drama’’’.33 Although Newman makes a problematic use of the notion of 
‘origin’ in this passage, she rightly points out Benjamin’s critique of those readings that 
subordinated the exceptionality of the Trauerspiel to other forms of drama in both its 
pre- and post-history. The critical element I want to comment upon is the exceptionality 
that becomes visible or recognisable in Benjamin’s philosophical history. The recovery 
of the Trauerspiel’s force does not proceed by means of an investigation allegedly 
capable of tracing the primordial, unique and stable essence of the baroque. On the 
contrary, the idea of the Trauerspiel is revealed precisely in its capacity to resist to 
multiple characterisations that failed to deal with its complexity, consequently 
subordinating it to other forms or drama. The Trauerspiel’s exceptionality is appreciated 
against the grain of those conceptualisations that ultimately modulated its force or 
resonance. In this way, the idea of the Trauerspiel is not discovered but constructed by 
means of a historical immersion that brings together the divergent and opposite 
                                                            
32 OGT: 59; GS I: 239-40. 
33 Newman, Benjamin’s Library: 35. 
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characterisations under which the Trauerspiel has been presented in the history of its 
reception.  
What Benjamin ultimately shows is the role that the exceptional or the extreme plays in 
divergent methods of research: historico-literary studies bring together extremes in 
evolutionary, linear terms, considering the extreme as an imitation or anticipation of 
other genres without recognising its proper value; for ‘philosophical’ studies, extremes 
are necessary to construct the concept of genre, yet the historical process from which 
they spring forth is ‘merely virtual’.34 Benjamin’s methodological extremism looks at 
the extreme or the exceptional through the phenomenon’s resistance to be subordinated 
to given norms or concepts which in turn forces new interpretations to emerge.  
In the ‘Prologue’ Benjamin discerns the singularity or specificity of the baroque in the 
work’s historical ‘necessity to be there’35 and in its quality as a ‘document in the life of 
language and evidence of its possibilities at a given time’.36 This is, to some extent, the 
content of the first part of the book, ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’, in which he explores the 
violent context within which the baroque emerged and which, more importantly, 
became the concept of history (profane history) around which the playwrights were 
organised. However, the singularity of the baroque is more evident in the contrasting 
conceptualisations which were unable to grasp its singularity. The mourning-play’s 
right to exist is recognisable in the conflict staged by different methodologies that are 
unable to explain it with the concepts available to them, consequently making the 
mourning-play dependant on given concepts of tragedy. The exceptionality of the 
baroque is made visible in the totality of its own history, including its moment of 
genesis and its further presentation in divergent methodologies, or what Benjamin calls 
its afterlife or after-history.
37
  
Benjamin’s immanent critique points towards what might be called the violence of 
critique: the subordination of that which is exceptional to inherited conceptual schemes, 
confirming thereby the very scheme rather than challenging its ability to deal with 
works that escape the norm. Whether a deviation from the ‘average’ tragedy or an 
imperfect manifestation of the ‘ideal’ embodiment of tragedy, literary and philosophical 
                                                            
34 OGT: 30; GS I: 218.  
35 OGT: 52; GS I: 233. 
36 OGT: 49; GS I: 230.  
37 OGT: 47; GS I: 227-8. 
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criticism subordinated the exceptionality of the baroque to given norms.
38
 To explain 
the alternative method for the construction of the idea of the Trauerspiel developed 
throughout The Origin of the German Mourning-Play is the task of the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’. This method is the method of digression or Umweg. 
 
 
2. ‘Method is a Digression’ 
 
The ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ explains Benjamin’s philosophical doctrine as 
Ursprungsphilosophie, a radical philosophy of origin which encompasses the doctrine 
of ideas with the notion of immanent critique that, correspondently, operates through the 
method of digression or Umweg. The first sections of the ‘Prologue’ (I-VI) argue 
precisely for the necessity of this method in terms of its capacity to do justice to the 
doctrine of ideas.
39
 To some extent, the method of digression is dependent on the 
reformulation of the concepts of doctrine and ideas that Benjamin introduces in his 
discussion on Kant, and which he latter develops in the book on the baroque in terms of 
the doctrine of ideas. In this new context, truth gains predominance over knowledge. 
Unlike ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ and its supplements, the doctrine of 
ideas is no longer related to the problem of the unity of experience in terms of the unity 
of knowledge (Erkenntnis), but to the ‘higher’ concept of truth (Wahrheit) and its 
recognition (Wiederkennen) in the ‘movement of ideas’.40 In this change, substantial 
experience does not come from the confrontation of the ephemeral with the totality of 
knowledge, but from the recognition of ‘timeless’ truth in the movement of ideas 
organising and giving significance to specific phenomena.  
Benjamin does not abandon the aim to relate the ephemeral or transient character of 
experience to the totality or the unity of doctrinal philosophy. He rather addresses the 
problem of experience from the point of view of the encounter with the literary work 
(or, more generally, the work of art). It is in the critique of the work that the ephemeral 
is related to the totality of history, and where the transformability of history becomes 
visible or recognisable in the movement of ideas. To make this totality recognisable, 
                                                            
38 OGT: 35, 44; GS I: 216, 225. 
39 OGT: 27-9; GS I: 226. 
40 OGT: 28-30; GS I: 208-10. 
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ideas must be approached with the method of historical digression. Benjamin opens the 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ with the following lines:  
It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually confront the 
question of presentation [Darstellung]. In its finished form philosophy will, it is 
true, assume the quality of doctrine [Lehre], but it does not lie within the power of 
mere thought to confer such a form. Philosophical doctrine is based on historical 
configuration.41 
 
This passage distinguishes two main problems. First, it establishes the relationship 
between philosophy and philosophical writing as form of presentation (Darstellung). 
While the former is, in its finished form, doctrine (echoing ‘On the Program of the 
Coming Philosophy’), the latter can only respond to this form by means of a historical 
form of presentation or configuration. The ‘Prologue’ must prove the relation between 
philosophical doctrine and its method. The second problem is the distinction between 
pure thought (bloßen Denken) and doctrine. In strict sense, these are not analogous 
concepts which allow for a comparison. Doctrine refers to a specific form of 
philosophy, while pure thought refers to a specific faculty distinguished from others 
(such as sensibility and understanding in the Kantian and neo-Kantian systems). The 
distinction nevertheless serves to specify that pure thought is not the medium by which 
philosophy reaches its ultimate doctrinal form, thereby emphasising the role attributed 
to history and historical change. Here, Benjamin distances himself from Kant but, more 
importantly, from Hermann Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge.42  
                                                            
41 OGT: 27; GS I: 207. 
42 System der Philosophie, Erster Teil: Logik der reinen Erkenntnis [System of Philosophy. First Part: 
Logic of Pure Knowledge], Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1902. For Cohen experience becomes identical with 
the laws of logic or pure thought. As Nickolas Lambrianou notes, the concept of origin (Ursprung) 
remains within the neo-Kantian discussion on ‘objectifying/originating’ facts. As Cohen’s famously 
asserts in his Logic: ‘... Thinking is thought of origin. Nothing can be given to origin. Principle is 
precisely and literally foundation. Ground must become origin. Accepting that thought must discover 
being in origin, then this being cannot have any other ground than that which thought is able to give it. 
Pure thought only becomes true as thought of origin’ (Logik der reinen Erkenntnis: 36, my emphasis; 
cited in Poma, The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen: 88-89). If there is a given fact in Benjamin’s 
argument, it is the historicity of the ideas or the objectivity articulated in their historical transformation, 
which cannot be apprehended as pure thought as Benjamin maintains in the opening of the Prologue. It is 
important to stress, as Poma does, however, that Origin is open to unattainable completion in Cohen, for 
which it remains an open task yet to be pursued. For this reason it is more a problem than a concept 
whose solution (or production/generation) requires an ‘indirect route’ or Umweg (Logic: 84/Poma: 95). 
See: Nickolas Lambrianou, ‘Neo-Kantianism and Messianism. Origin and Interruption in Hermann 
Cohen and Walter Benjamin’, in Walter Benjamin. Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. by Peter 
Osborne (New York: Routledge, 2005), Vol. I, pp. 85–86. Also: Werner Flach, ‘Cohen’s 
Ursprungsdenken’, in Munk, Cohen’s Critical Idealism, pp. 41-67, for a discussion of the continuity in 
thought that Cohen aims to articulate in a reformulation of Lebniz. On Benjamin’s reception of Cohen 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, for Kant the doctrinal philosophy results from the 
work of reason upon the interrelated work of the sensibility and the understanding, 
orientating this towards a systematic account of knowledge and experience that exceeds 
the specific realms of knowledge. While Cohen privileged the work of logic in the 
generation or production of ideas, for Benjamin philosophy achieves its doctrinal form 
by means of a historical configuration rather than by means of thought, whether as 
Kant’s reason or as Cohen’s pure thought. Following the distinction between the object 
and the method of philosophy, the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ develops the affinities 
between truth and historical digression. Firstly, Benjamin conceives of truth not as an 
‘external’ element which secures the unity of multiple realms of knowledge or specific 
sciences. Truth is rather internal to the movement of ideas and resists being presented or 
‘projected’ in specific ‘realm[s] of knowledge’.43 Truth, Benjamin writes, is ‘bodied 
forth in the dance of presented ideas’.44 If truth is neither projected in specific realms of 
knowledge nor in their systematic unity, it is however presented in the movement of 
ideas. Being the object of philosophy subject to change, transition and movement, the 
philosophical method required to present it must recast its own dynamics. Benjamin 
argues that the method enacted by the treatise or the philosophical essay is the most 
appropriate to grasp such movement: ‘Its method is essentially presentation. Method is a 
digression (Umweg). Presentation as digression. Such is the methodological nature of 
the treatise.’45 The question is how the method of digression presents the movement of 
ideas in which truth is embodied. This question requires an explanation of the kind of 
movement that ideas and digression follow and to determine how they mirror each 
other. Both explanations are given in terms of irregular rhythms, one developing in 
history and the other in writing. These are interrelated insofar as the method of 
digression presents, in the irregular rhythm of the treatise or ‘the philosophical essay’, 
the irregular rhythm of the historical movement of ideas. 
  
It is necessary to emphasise three main aspects of Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie 
which have been developed so far. First, its doctrine of ideas considers truth to be the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and his reading of Leibniz, see also: Paula Schwebel, ‘Intensive Infinity: Walter Benjamin’s reception of 
Leibniz and its Sources’, MLN, Vol. 123, Number 3, April 2012 (589-610). 
43 OGT: 28, 29; GS I: 208-9.  
44 OGT: 29; GS I: 209. 
45 OGT: 28; GS I: 208. 
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object of philosophy. Second, truth is embodied in the irregular movement of ideas. 
Third, digression, with its own irregular rhythm, is the method for the presentation of 
the irregular movement of ideas. What I have stressed is that the necessity for the 
method of digression is grounded in the object it approaches: it is a method marked by 
irregular movement insofar as its object of study is irregular movement, i.e. the 
movement of ideas. When Benjamin affirms that ‘ideas are the object’ of ‘philosophical 
investigation’,46 it must be added that this is the case insofar as truth is embodied in the 
ideas’ movement. To this extent, the characteristics attributed to the method of 
digression map out the characteristics of the movement of ideas.
47
  
The method of digression is paradoxical. While method means the way towards, 
digression means detour, diversion, or the undoing or reversing of the way made 
through. This negative moment, marked by the German prefix Um-(weg), brings 
continuous movement to a halt. Digression, notes Benjamin, consists of the absence of 
an ‘uninterrupted purposeful structure’, which thereby opens up opportunities for ‘new 
beginnings’, ‘roundabouts’ and ‘continual pausing’ in the presentation of the object of 
study.
48
 This pausing or suspension allows for the discovery of ‘new meanings’ or, 
more precisely, for the discovery of the object of study anew.  
Benjamin illustrates the irregular rhythm of digression by means of a comparison with 
the act of viewing a mosaic, thus introducing the fragmentary character in which the 
objects under examination appear to digression.
 
Two main elements establish the 
affinity between configuring the image of the mosaic which is observed and the rhythm 
of digression. Firstly, both are determined by the ‘the distinct and the disparate’, for 
which the ‘value of the fragments of thought [Denkbrüchstucken] is all the greater the 
less direct their relationship to the underlying idea’. Secondly: ‘the relationship between 
the minute precision of the work and the proportions of the sculptural or intellectual 
whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to be grasped through immersion 
[Versenkung] in the most minute details of the material-content’.49 The comparison 
establishes the fragmentary quality of the object of research as well as the irregular 
rhythm with which the fragments must be addressed via the method of research. The 
                                                            
46 OGT: 29; GS I: 209. 
47 Paradoxically, the ‘Prologue’ opens with the method required to grasp the movement of ideas to then 
move on to an explanation of the ideas’ movement. This form of presentation might respond to the 
necessity of showing that both the method and object of investigation immanently inform each other.  
48 OGT: 27-28; GS I: 207-8. 
49 OGT: 28-29; GS I: 208-9. My emphasis. 
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emphasis on the act of perceiving the mosaic introduces two elements for Benjamin’s 
method and the doctrine of ideas which might be called the principles of immersion and 
exceptionality.
50
 
On the one hand, the value of the image articulated by the observer of the mosaic is all 
the greater the less direct their fragments are related to it. Naturally, each fragment of 
the mosaic is related to the image which the mosaic constructs. However, the act of 
grasping the image is of greater value the more disparate the mosaic’s elements are. 
Here, Benjamin privileges the extreme or the exceptional. It is the exceptional fragments 
(i.e. those with the less obvious relation to the overall image) which enrich the 
experience of looking at the mosaic in order to attain its final image. The exceptional 
resists being subsumed to the image, thereby deferring the images’ final configuration. 
It forces the viewer to stay in front of the mosaic and to immerse him or herself in its 
fragments once and again. The value of the fragments (‘distinct and disparate’) resides 
in their capacity to force the viewer to pause and to begin anew the process of active 
examination. The value of the exceptional does not originates in its own contribution to 
the configuration of the final image but in its contribution to the unfolding of the 
process of immersion. The exceptional resists to be subordinated to the final image and 
forces the image to change according to the discovery of the mosaic’s details anew. The 
exceptional then opens the image to multiple transformations. Thus, truth-content (the 
image of the mosaic or truth embodied in ideas) is only attained by means of an 
immersion into the material-content (the tiles of the mosaic or the ideas); in an 
immersion which the exceptional makes all the more significative.  
Returning to the method of digression and philosophical writing, Benjamin writes that 
the ‘prose form’ of the treatise or the philosophical essay forces the reader to ‘stop’ and 
‘restart with every new sentence’, and is at its most successful when the reader is forced 
to ‘pause and reflect’, and not when he or she is carried with or inspired by enthusiasm. 
As corollary Benjamin writes: ‘[t]he more significant its object, the more detached the 
reflection must be’.51 The comparison with the reception of the mosaic brings to the 
forefront of Benjamin’s doctrine of ideas what Samuel Weber calls Benjamin’s 
                                                            
50 Contrary to Ferber, I suggest that in interpreting the immersion into the mosaic in terms of the 
observer’s act of viewing the mosaic (rather than in terms of the intentional arrangement of the parts of 
the mosaic by its creator as she does) ‘Benjamin’s figure of the mosaic’ complies ‘with Benjamin’s 
understanding of configuration’. See Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy: 178-80.  
51 OGT: 29; GS I: 209. 
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methodological extremism, which I will explore in terms of the principles of 
exceptionality and immersion in the following sections. To grasp the movement of ideas 
requires their complementary operation. Only on the basis of their interrelated work can 
philosophical writing operate as digression and, therefore, be able to recast the 
movement of ideas (and the truth they embody). In order to prove this, however, an 
examination of the irregular rhythm of the movement of ideas is required. 
 
 
2.1 Methodological Extremism 
 
As Samuel Weber notes the affinity between Benjamin’s concepts of the extreme or the 
exceptional and the political theology of Carl Schmitt is twofold. Benjamin himself 
recognised this in a letter to Schmitt from December 1930. On the one hand, The Origin 
of the German Mourning-Play ‘owes’ to Schmitt’s work ‘in its presentation of the 
seventeenth-century of sovereignty’. On the other, Benjamin affirms that he ‘confirmed’ 
his own method of investigation in ‘matters concerning the philosophy of art’ in the 
political works of Schmitt, specifically in Dictatorship. From the Beginning of the 
Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle (1921).
52
 As Weber 
argues, the methodological affinity to which Benjamin refers is concentrated in the 
centrality ascribed to the extreme or the exceptional in their methods of investigation, 
which Weber describes as their shared methodological extremism.
53
 Although Weber 
rightly points out the methodological character of the extreme both in Schmitt and 
Benjamin, he elaborates mainly upon Benjamin’s ‘confirmation’ of his philosophy of art 
in the political theology of Schmitt. However, taking ‘the question of sovereignty’ as 
the central element of Benjamin’s ‘philosophy of art’, Weber focuses on the theory of 
sovereignty that Benjamin takes (and reformulates) from Schmitt’s political works 
rather than on the exploration of the extreme which had confirmed Benjamin’s own 
method of research. This exploration would rather show the divergent effects that the 
extreme has for Schmitt’s theory of concepts (Begriff) and Benjamin’s doctrine of ideas, 
and the consequences that this divergence respectively has in Schmitt’s theory of 
                                                            
52 GS I: 887.  
53 Weber, Benjamin’s -abilities: 179-80. 
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sovereign decision and in Benjamin’s recasting of the role of the sovereign and the state 
of exception in the Trauerspiel book and the late Theses on the Concept of History 
(1939).
54
 
Weber articulates the notion of methodological extremism by reading Schmitt’s 
characterisation of the extreme in his Political Theology (1922) together with the 
opening of the first part of The Origin of German the Mourning-Play. Schmitt writes 
that ‘the normal proves nothing, the exception proves everything; it confirms not only 
the rule: the rule lives only from the exception’.55 Benjamin opens the analysis of the 
baroque by announcing that his study is directed towards ‘the extreme, taking to account 
the baroque drama’ by bringing the ‘diffuse and disparate together’.56 Although Weber 
addresses the limits of this affinity by discussing Schmitt and Benjamin’s interpretation 
of the concept of sovereignty in the baroque, he does not distinguish their differences at 
the methodological level, considering the role played by the extreme in the very process 
of configuring norms (Schmitt) and ideas (Benjamin).  
The methodological consequences of understanding the ‘state of exception’ as an 
extreme or exceptional phenomenon eluding any definition illustrates the difference 
between the two thinkers. Schmitt opens his Political Theology with the affirmation that 
the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’, thereby foregrounding the concept 
of sovereignty as being grounded on a ‘borderline concept’ (‘the state of exception’) 
that refers to a ‘borderline case’ (‘the extreme emergency’).57 For Schmitt, the 
exceptional resists any conceptualisation, opening up a space for decision and action: 
the sovereign is he or she who decides ‘whether there is an extreme emergency as well 
                                                            
54 Weber, Benjamin’s -abilities: 181. This issue is the subject of a specific scholarship on Benjamin which 
has increased since the publication of the letter in Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften I (1974), originally 
omitted by Adorno and Scholem in Briefe (1966). See especially Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller Roazen (Standford: Stanford University Press, 
1995); and State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). For 
Agamben’s most detailed discussion on Messianism: The Time That Remains: A commentary on the 
Letter to the Romans, trans, Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). David Pan 
discusses Agamben’s reading of Schmitt in ‘Carl Schmitt on Culture and Violence in the Political 
Decision’, Telos 142 (Spring 2008), pp. 49-72; and ‘Against Biopolitics: Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, 
and Giorgio Agamben on Political Sovereignty and Symbolic Order’, The German Quarterly 82.1 
(Winter 2009), pp. 42-62. 
55 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, translated by George 
Schwab (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 15.  
56 OGT: 58; GS I: 238. 
57 Schmitt, Political Theology: 5. Also: Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Beginning of the Modern 
Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class-Struggle, trans. by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015), pp. 14–15. 
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as what must be done to eliminate it’.58 The exceptional or borderline case thus opens 
the space for practical decision-making: ‘the decision [to declare whether there is an 
extreme emergency] frees itself of every normative restriction and becomes in an 
authentic sense absolute’.59 For Schmitt, the space for practical action inaugurated by 
the extreme emergency grounds sovereign decision, a moment of absolute affirmation 
that calls for the ‘state of exception’ and for the solutions that would allegedly lead to its 
dissolution. By contrast, for Benjamin, the exceptional forces a historical revision 
leading to an understanding (in Schmitt’s vocabulary) of how the exceptional came to 
be a borderline case eliciting a borderline concept. Hence, rather than opening the space 
for practical action or grounding the moment of sovereign affirmation, Benjamin turns 
his methodological extremism towards the past and the task of recovering the conditions 
for the recognisability of the extreme as a phenomenon that has been historically 
construed as exceptional, producing rather the opportunity to momentarily suspend the 
given order of things. In contrast to Schmitt’s sovereign, Benjamin understands the 
sovereign’s task as preventing the state of exception from happening or ‘to avert it’.60  
For Benjamin, the centrality of the exceptional is revealed in its value or contribution 
towards the configuration of ideas and the construction of a ‘philosophical history’ or 
Ursprungsphilosophie. In showing the historical contingency of the norm or the idea, 
Benjamin temporally suspends their efficacy without grounding the (practical) necessity 
of Schmitt’s sovereign or absolute affirmation. The exceptional forces the destructive 
character of philosophy to emerge, catalysing the destruction of given conceptions 
which elude the complexity of that which is exceptional or extreme.  
If there is a moment of affirmation or creation in Benjamin, this follows the destructive 
moment that calls for a truce or for the temporary suspension of conflict. The 
divergences in the methodological extremism in Schmitt and in Benjamin lead their 
conceptions of the ‘state of exception’ to different answers regarding the question on 
                                                            
58 Schmitt, Political Theology: 6. My emphasis. 
59 Schmitt, Political Theology: 12. 
60 OGT: 65; GS I: 245 Regarding the differences in the conception of sovereign decision in Benjamin and 
Schmitt, Weber writes: ‘Schmitt had construed the theological-political analogy in terms of a relationship 
of fundamental similarity; the sovereign transcends the state as God transcends the creation. By contrast, 
Benjamin’s notion of secularization stresses precisely the incommensurability of the change it entails’ 
(Benjamin’s -abilities: 188). It should be added that in the incommensurability that breaches the analogy 
between God and the sovereign takes place the suspension of the ‘legal’ or ‘mythical’ violence by that 
which Benjamin calls ‘divine violence’ in ‘Towards a Critique of Violence’ (1921). It is by means of such 
suspension that the space for political action is created (establishing now an analogy between the divine 
and the human which grounds Benjamin’s profane, weak Messianic conception of political power).  
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sovereign decision. For Schmitt, the task of the sovereign is to determine whether there 
is an exceptional emergency and thus declare the state of exception, while for Benjamin 
the task of the sovereign is to avert the state of exception. In contrast to the immediate, 
direct affirmation of Schmitt (‘analogous to miracle in theology’),61 Benjamin’s calls for 
an interruption of the given order of things, one which might bring momentary solution 
(Lösung) but never complete redemption (Erlösung) to human problems.
62
  
Benjamin’s inversion of the function of Schmitt’s sovereign is more clearly reflected in 
the Theses on the Concept of History (1939), where he affirms, in thesis VIII, that the 
task of historical materialism is to make the catastrophe informing historical change 
apparent and to understand that ‘the ‘‘state of exception’’ we live in is the true norm’, 
for which the task for the true materialist thinker is thus to find the conditions for 
producing ‘the true estate of exception’. Benjamin continues deploying Schmitt’s 
vocabulary yet in order to define the critic’s task in opposite terms. Reversing the gaze 
of history towards the past to illuminate alternative futures, Benjamin’s methodological 
extremism suspends the moment of sovereign decision to actualise the messianic force 
of the past in the present. It is within the logic of this inversion that the state of 
exception is not a ‘miraculous ‘‘decision’’’ but the catastrophe as ‘process of thought 
and representation revealing the archaeological foundations of modernity’.63 The 
                                                            
61 Schmitt, Political Theology: 38.  
62 Benjamin differentiates solution from redemption in terms of those secular answers responding to 
human problems and of the aspiration to religious fulfilment in the baroque period (recasting the 
fulfilment reserved for the tragic hero). He then maps the difference onto the opposition between 
Trauerspiel and tragedy: ‘solution’ as ‘redemption’ ‘resounds in the conclusion of tragedy’ but in a 
‘limited form’ constrained to the individual ‘tragic hero’ (OGT:79, 116-7; GS I:258; 296). Unlike tragedy, 
the Trauerspiel perpetually defers redemption and leaves its character with secular solutions. Benjamin 
draws this distinction first in the essay on violence (1921) to introduce the multiple forms of violence, 
force and power that the German term Gewalt encompasses. There, he affirms that neither ‘solution to 
human problems’ (Lösung) nor the ‘redemption’ of humanity (Erlösung) are ‘conceivable’ if Gewalt is 
excluded in principle. (SW 1:247; GS II.1:196). The emphatic reading of the distinction between Lösung 
and Erlösung presented above parallels Caygill’s distinction between ‘fulfilment in historical time and 
fulfilment of historical time’ (‘Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition’: 10). As 
interruption of the given order of things Lösung occurs in historical time. It opens the present to change, 
although it also opens this chance for change to the possibility of a counterrevolutionary outcome. For a 
discussion on the different temporalities of suspension or ‘cessation of ordinary time’ in Schmitt and 
Benjamin, see: Horst Bredekamp, ‘From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, Via Thomas Hobbes’, in 
Walter Benjamin. Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. by Peter Osborne (New York: Routledge, 
2005), Vol. I, pp. 454–55.  
63 Christine Buci-Glucksman, Baroque Reason, The Aesthetics of Modernity, tr. Patrick Camiller, 
(London and California: SAGE Publications, 1984), p. 66. Schmitt’s Hamlet or Hecuba (1956) might be 
read as a further inversion of Benjamin’s own inversion of Schmitt’s Political Theology (1922). It 
attempts to ‘restore the vitality’ that Benjamin had allegedly ‘evacuated from the Baroque sovereignty’ —
which ultimately reduces the sovereign to the melancholic figure of Hamlet. See: Jennifer R. Rust and 
Julia Reinhard Lupton, ‘Schmitt and Shakespeare’, introduction to Hamlet or Hecuba, p.  xxix. Cf: fn. 14 
in this chapter. 
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exceptional then grounds two different conceptions of concepts and ideas both in 
Schmitt and Benjamin, leading consequently to two different views on practical political 
action in regard to the affirmation or suspension of modern sovereign decision.
64
  
 
 
2.2 Ideas and Exceptionality 
 
The task of Benjamin’s philosophical history is to articulate a notion of idea which is 
able to explain the extreme or the exceptional. His formulation of the notion of ideas 
follows an irregular path in the ‘Prologue’. He first explains the value of the ideas in the 
work of Plato and then recasts them in terms of Adamic names. Echoing the 1916 essay 
on language, he distinguishes the role of ideas in the continuity of divine and human 
language guaranteed by God before the Fall and the role of ideas in post-lapsarian 
language, thereby defining the historical character gained by ideas in a secular, profane 
context. Through this transition, Benjamin brings together 1) the essential character that 
the ideas have for Plato, 2) the continuity between divine and Adamic language and 3) 
the historical presentation of the transformability of the ideas in post-lapsarian 
language. This presentation is ultimately compared with a Leibnizian monad which 
reinforces the aim to attain continuity yet this time in profane language. This Leibnizian 
continuity works as an ideal, however. It is an unattainable model in the realm of 
profane language. The emphasis on the irregular, discontinuous rhythm informing 
                                                            
64 GS I:697. This discussion on the interruption of the given order of the present (understood as the state 
of exception which has become the norm) opens an opportunity to reflect on Caygill’s conclusion on ‘On 
the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ and the violent or event tortuous forms in which experience is 
attained. For Caygill, ‘On the Program...’ grounds the conditions for ‘alternative concepts of freedom in 
rhythms as well as the warps and distortions of experience’. However, he explains this in regard to the 
essay on Violence (1921) and ‘Naples’ (1924). On the former, he affirms that ‘the ‘‘metaphysical realm’’ 
through which the concept of experience is changed by the concept of freedom’ offered in the ‘On the 
Program...’ is finally ‘revealed to be a realm of violence’ in which the ‘laws and categories of experience 
issue not from an act of self-legislation but from a decision to call a truce in a condition of violence’ (The 
Colour of Experience: 26-7). What I am suggesting is that Caygill’s argument on freedom is compatible 
with the emphasis given here to the process of interruption. Although this emphasis on interruption 
appears first in ‘On the Program’ and is also present in the 1921 essay on translation, it is fully exploited 
in the essays on violence and in the ‘Prologue’. Ferber advances a similar argument in respect to the 
‘Prologue’ when she writes that it is in the ‘caesuras’, in the ‘cracks and hindrances that emerge from 
within the wholeness of the [Trauerspiel book’s] argument’; ‘these caesuras are the openings through 
which truth can reveal itself’: Ferber, ‘Interruptions in Brecht and Benjamin’, Assaf: Studies in the 
Theatre, 2005, 35–53 (pp. 36–37). More importantly, this argument serves to stress that the ‘true’ state of 
exception that suspends the catastrophe which has become the norm consists of a temporary interruption 
of such catastrophe, a solution rather than redemption or a truce rather than eternal peace: a counter-
resistance which by means of a destructive moment brings such a catastrophic history to a halt.  
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history marks one of the critical differences between the early essays ‘On Language as 
Such’ (1916),  ‘On Perception’ and ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’ (both 
from 1917) on the one hand, and ‘The Task on the Translator’ (1921) and the 
‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ (1928), on the other.65  
Benjamin opens the discussion on ideas by presenting the ‘supreme metaphysical 
significance’ they have in the Platonic system as essences. In this sense, Benjamin 
understands ideas as ‘unities’ which are given ‘to be reflected upon’, and whose unity is 
not a ‘conceptual unity’.66 With this first approach to the concept of ideas Benjamin 
traces the difference between truth, ideas and concepts. While truth is embodied in 
ideas, it has no direct relation to concepts. Concepts have, rather, a mediating role 
which ‘enable phenomena to participate in the existence of ideas’.67 In this way, 
Benjamin establishes a series of relations in which truth is embodied in ideas, while 
ideas, by means of concepts, are related to phenomena. The mediating role of concepts 
has a double function: firstly, they divide phenomena into their parts and relate them to 
ideas; secondly, in the same movement they make the idea visible through the relations 
that concepts establish between phenomena and their components:  
Through their mediating role concepts enable phenomena to participate in the 
existence of ideas. It is this same mediating role which fits them for the other 
equally basic task of philosophy, the presentation of ideas. As the salvation of 
phenomena by means of ideas takes place, so too the presentation of ideas through 
the medium of empirical reality. For ideas are not presented in themselves, but 
solely and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept; as 
the configuration of these elements.68  
 
Here, Benjamin recasts the Kantian system in which ideas of reason give unity to 
knowledge formulated through the combined work of the sensibility and the 
understanding. On the basis of this unity, new concepts emerge and practical action is 
guided. The central difference consists in the fact that Benjamin addresses the ideas 
from the perspective of their historical transformation rather than from their 
contribution towards a coherent orientation of speculative and practical reason towards 
                                                            
65 Despite their remarks on the profane context within which the continuity of language operates in 
Benjamin, John Pizer and Richard Wolin maintain that the telos of the ‘Prologue’ (and of the essay on 
language) is the ‘recuperation’ or ‘restoration’ of the ‘pure language’ which ‘allowed man for the perfect 
condition of the external world’. See: Toward a Radical Theory of Origin: 42; An Aesthetics of 
Redemption: 43.  
66 OGT: 30; GS I: 210. 
67 OGT: 34; GS I: 214. 
68 OGT: 34; GS I: 214. 
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the future. With this difference Benjamin turns towards the historical articulation of 
ideas. The mediating role attributed to concepts enables both the idea to be presented or 
to bear actuality and phenomena to be organised: ‘Ideas are [phenomena’s] objective, 
virtual arrangement. Their objective interpretation’.69 In this way, Benjamin introduces 
the best known characterisation of his notion of ideas: ‘Ideas are to objects as 
constellations [Sternbilder] are to stars’.70 Although commonly used to synthesise 
Benjamin’s notion of idea, this analogy is problematic insofar as it suddenly blurs the 
centrality ascribed to the mediating role of concepts. In an almost Kantian correction, 
Benjamin affirms: ‘[ideas] are neither the concepts nor their laws. They do not 
contribute to the knowledge of phenomena, and in no way can the latter be criteria with 
which to judge the existence of ideas’.71 Just as Kant maintained that ideas do not 
produce empirical knowledge but, rather, provide unity to the multiplicity of cognitions 
related to the sensible, Benjamin dissociates the ideas from the task of producing 
knowledge about phenomena. Ideas rather relate to concepts which systematise 
phenomena by breaking them down into different elements and by establishing relations 
between the elements of different phenomena. Ideas have, therefore, a second-order 
function which is missing in the analogy of the Sternbilder. Ideas give an objective 
interpretation of phenomena by providing the ‘virtual arrangement’ of the concepts 
which organise phenomena and establish their contextual relations:  
Ideas are timeless constellations [Konstellationen], and by virtue of the elements 
being seen as points in such constellations, phenomena are subdivided and at the 
same time redeemed, so that those elements which it is the function of the concept 
to elicit from phenomena are most clearly evident at the extremes. The idea is best 
explained as the presentation of the context within which the unique and extreme 
stands alongside its counterpart.72  
 
Here Benjamin recasts the principle of exceptionality, regarding concepts as the 
elements which construe an specific idea. The most extreme or exceptional concepts 
enrich the idea by extending or amplifying its scope. Constructing constellations of 
concepts, ideas organise or virtually arrange phenomena yet only by means of 
organising concepts in contexts or systems of relations. Like the mosaic, the richer the 
constellation, the less direct the relations between its discrete elements. As Ferber 
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70 OGT: 34-5; GS I: 214-5. 
71 OGT: 34-5; GS I: 215. 
72 OGT: 34-35; GS I: 215.  
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explains: the extreme ‘demarcate(s) yet enrich the idea’s borders’.73 The extreme 
negotiates the limits of the idea. The empirical or the phenomena, on the other hand, can 
be ‘the most properly understood the more clearly it is seen as an extreme’. Benjamin 
thus affirms that the idea is not the ‘average’ but the ‘general’ or the most 
comprehensive (Allgemaine).
74
 Then, he concludes, concepts produce ‘at one single 
stroke’ the ‘salvation [Rettung] of phenomena and the presentation of ideas’.75 In this 
way the idea neither produces the unity of divergent concepts nor stands as their 
‘average’; rather, it brings together the multiplicity of concepts into an order which 
gives them meaning as contextual relations. Yet this meaning is only significant if the 
concepts that are gathered together include extreme concepts (i.e. if the group of 
concepts collects borderline concepts for borderline cases).
76
  
On the previous point Weber stresses that an idea is construed as ‘a function of that 
which it is not’.77 This has a twofold meaning. The idea has to include both exceptional 
phenomena and their exceptional conceptualisations. This is finally explained by 
Benjamin in terms of the contribution that the extreme or the exceptional has for the 
synthesis that ideas produce: ideas ‘perform a service that they are not able to perform 
as concepts’; ‘they do not make the similar identical, but they effect a synthesis between 
extremes’.78 In the opening of ‘Trauerspiel and Tragedy’ Benjamin confirms that his 
study is directed towards a 'synthesis' of ‘diffuse and disparate’ ‘extremes’ which he 
                                                            
73 Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy: 64.  
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as a possibility: Andrew Benjamin, Working with Walter Benjamin: Recovering a Political Philosophy 
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ultimately associates with ‘allegorical’ synthesis in the second part of the book,  which 
he thus opposes to the synthesis produced by the symbol in political terms as tregua dei 
or the temporary suspension of war in truce.
79
 Such a synthesis does not transform the 
idea into a more general concept of a higher order than those it gathers. It rather brings 
the multiplicity of concepts and their oppositions together into ‘contextual relations’. 
However, the mere gathering together of similar elements or concepts does not 
articulate an idea. There is no need for a context or a system of relations to make sense 
of what is merely different unless it includes the extreme or the exceptional just as in 
Kant ideas are necessary to orientate what otherwise would remain as contradictory 
points of view: the standpoints of mechanical causation and moral freedom or the 
speculative and practical uses of reason.  
The principle of exceptionality radicalises the concept of ideas formulated in the 1917 
‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’. In the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’, the 
drive for unity and systematic completion is catalysed by the exceptional. The principle 
of exceptionality however does not explain the historical transformation of ideas. 
Considering that ideas are not among the given elements of the world of phenomena, 
the opening of the sixth section of the ‘Prologue’ asks then for ‘the manner in which 
they are in fact given’.80  It is this question which Benjamin aims to answer by means of 
his revision of ideas as Adamic names and of their historical transformation in post-
lapsarian language. The principle of immersion as historical digression complements the 
work of the principle of exceptionality.  
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2.3 Ideas and Historical Immersion: the Rhythm of Origin  
 
In tracing the linguistic element of ideas as contextual relations between concepts, 
Benjamin ultimately searches not for principles that might orientate the multiplicity of 
knowledge towards a complete unity in the future but, rather, for the origin of this unity 
and its discontinuous historical transformation. In this way, Benjamin opens this unity 
to its own lost futurities. The giveness of the ideas is not explained, therefore, in terms 
of the operation of reason (providing regulative principles) or pure thought (giving 
logical principles), but in terms of their presence and transformation in the medium of 
language. This is not, Benjamin writes, all that far removed from ‘Platonic anamnesis’ 
or ‘remembering’.81 However, the task is not to grasp the essence of the ideas but to 
understand their transformation as the process through which they are both 
communicated and forgotten. Rather than Plato, the model is Adam, whose ‘act of 
naming’ releases the ideas that in the Platonic system have to be remembered or 
restored.  
In Adamic language, ideas and names coincide. The name captures the essence of the 
object as it is both creative and receptive to the language of God. There is no 
subordination of the object to the name: in naming, Adam completes the object and 
accomplishes God’s act of creation. In the ‘Prologue’ this ideal model serves to 
characterise the language of philosophy and its historical transformation, echoing the 
earlier argument on divine language made in the essays on language and translation. 
While divine and human language are connected through a relation of continuity before 
the Fall, history consists of the ‘continuous struggle’ for the presentation of ideas in 
which discontinuity and interruption are intrinsic to the process of historical 
transformation.
82
 Benjamin’s characterisation of language towards a more explicit 
formulation of its discontinuity marks the entry into the concept of origin. In the context 
of this struggle, Benjamin changes the focus of Platonic redemption, transforming the 
remembering of original forms of perception into the ‘restoration’ of the conditions 
which make visible the totality of the historical development of ideas as the condition 
for both their communication and forgetting. More than remembering unique, primal, 
and stable essences, redemption means here to recover ideas’ history as the history of 
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the transformation of concepts. It is to this end that Benjamin writes in section VI that it 
is this Platonic anamnesis which makes the idea ‘absorb’ the totality of its historical 
formulations.
83
 
The first appearance of the notion of origin or Ursprung in the ‘Prologue’ follows the 
critique of deductive methods for the definition of literary genres and Croce’s reduction 
of history into the systematisation of ‘genetic’ (genetische), linear change. In this 
context, origin provides the conditions for a substantive concept of history which is 
open to conflict and to infinite, discrete configurations. What Benjamin suggests is that 
a history of the change in artistic forms is not incompatible with an Ideenlehre able to 
explain the ‘art forms in the problem of origin’.84 Although an ‘entirely historical 
category’, Benjamin writes, origin ‘has nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]’ as it 
does not describes the process of the emergence of a phenomenon (‘the process by 
which it came into being’) but, rather, ‘that which emerges from [its] process of 
becoming and disappearance’.85 Origin then refers to the total history of the 
phenomenon, including its moment of emergence but also its multiple transformations 
throughout the course of history. Benjamin emphasises here those moments of 
disappearance or forgetting. He adds two remarks on the process of historical becoming 
which supersedes the moment of factual emergence. Firstly, origin is ‘the stream of 
becoming’, and its ‘rhythm’ ‘absorbs the material of emergence’ (Entstehungmaterial). 
Secondly, the originary (ursprüngliche) character of phenomena never ‘appears in the 
naked and manifest existence of the factual’ but instead manifests itself as a ‘rhythm 
that is apparent only to a dual insight’: restoration and imperfection.86 Before discussing 
the last two terms I want to emphasise the centrality which Benjamin places on the 
double rhythm of origin. Origin does not refer to a specific moment of history (as 
emergence or genesis do), but to the transformation of a specific phenomena in the 
course of history. To grasp the origin of a phenomenon is to grasp the rhythm of its 
transformation, from the moment of its emergence to its multiple moments of 
disappearance and re-appearance in history. This is why Benjamin refers to origin as the 
stream or current of becoming. The becoming of phenomena is a process of 
transformation marked by interruptions, folds and moments of suspension. It is also 
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critical to note that to reveal the phenomenon’s origin, it ‘must undergo a process of 
destruction’, as Ferber emphasises.87 To gather the history of phenomena means to 
suspend the form in which phenomena are immediately given to us. 
To explain the dual insight of restoration and imperfection Benjamin writes that looking 
at a phenomenon as originary phenomenon (Ursprungsphänomen) ‘determines the form 
[bestimmt sich des Gestalt] in which an idea constantly confronts [sich auseinandersetz] 
the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in the totality of its history’.88 To 
assume the point of view of origin (rather than the perspective of historical emergence 
or genesis) means to search for the rhythm with which an idea has confronted the world 
in order to reveal the idea’s meaning in the totality of its own history. Such 
confrontation makes visible the phenomenon’s process of becoming as an irregular and 
discontinuous transformation, marked by interruptions and moments of disappearance 
and reappearance. Only in the recovery of its total history, and especially in their 
moments of oblivion, may phenomena be seen as originary phenomena and their ideas 
be presented.  
Critical to Benjamin’s doctrine of idea is that origin provides a standpoint from which 
every phenomenon can be seen as an originary phenomenon: the ‘task of the 
investigator’ is to regard the phenomenon as ‘certain until its most innermost structure 
appears to be so essential as to reveal it as an origin’, as the ‘object of discovery’ or the 
object of ‘recognition’ (Wiederkennen).89 To recognise phenomena as originary requires 
a change in the standpoint from which phenomena are viewed, from standpoint of their 
genesis to that of their origin. From this standpoint ‘philosophical history’ reveals ‘the 
configuration of the idea’ in the ‘remotest extremes and apparent excess of the process 
of development’ of phenomena: ‘the sum total of all possible meaningful juxtaposition 
of opposites’.90 Although Benjamin did not identify the originary phenomenon with its 
idea, it seems that the configuration of the idea consists of looking at the phenomenon 
as originary phenomenon. Yet rather than blurring the distinction between the 
phenomenon and its idea in the moment of recognition, the phenomenon is seen in 
relation to the totality of the conceptualisations which have been formulated to present 
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its idea.
91
 Here, the principle of exceptionality explored in the previous section is related 
to the principle of immersion, for which the search for the exceptional elements which 
configure the idea can only be realised in the process of immersing oneself in the 
history of those elements, thereby producing the sum total of all possible meaningful 
juxtapositions of opposites: 
 
The presentation of an idea can under no circumstances be considered successful 
unless the whole range of possible extremes it contains has been virtually explored. 
Virtually, because that which is comprehended in the idea of origin still has 
history, in the sense of content, but not in the sense of a set of occurrences which 
have befallen it. Its history is inward in character and is not to be understood as 
something boundless, but as something related to essential being, and can it 
therefore be described as the pre- and post-history [Vor- und Nachgeschichte] of 
this being.92 
 
The exceptional has to be searched for in the pre- and post-history of the phenomenon, 
in the totality of its historical development. Benjamin then reformulates the task of what 
he has referred to as his ‘philosophical history’ and ‘science of origin’: ‘to establish the 
becoming of phenomena in their being’, which is not satisfied until the phenomenon has 
‘absorbed all its history’. On the basis of the identification of the being of phenomena 
with their total history, Benjamin warns that the ‘real world’ (or an ‘objective 
interpretation of the world’) ‘could well constitute this task’. Becoming its own total 
history, the ‘idea’ is ultimately a monad: the ‘purpose of the presentation of the idea is 
nothing less than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world’.93 With this further 
understanding of ideas as monads, Benjamin brings together both the ephemeral (each 
concrete phenomenon) and the absolute or universal (the total history of the phenomena 
and the task of presenting the world).  
The monadological character attributed to ideas as abbreviations of the world aims, 
therefore, to guarantee the continuity of experience from the ephemeral and transient to 
the totality of history and the world. In the concrete experience of the ephemeral 
Benjamin aims to read the totality of history, thereby transforming the ephemeral 
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moment into substantive experience. However, this Leibnizian moment should not 
detract attention from the emphasis which Benjamin puts on the moments of rupture, 
interruption, disappearance and forgetting in history, all of which produce an irregular 
rhythm in historical change and the transmission of tradition. These moments of rupture 
and discontinuity constitute the reason why restoration, remembering and, ultimately, 
the doctrine of ideas are necessary. Leibnizian continuity operates, therefore, as the 
ideal model which is however unattainable. For this reason the task of making 
phenomena to absorb the totality of their history remains incomplete and eternal, an 
infinite task. Although the reference to Leibniz could suggest the possibility of attaining 
the continuity of experience in terms of pre-critical metaphysics (which Benjamin 
entertained but did not follow in ‘On the Program of the Coming Philosophy’), the 
totality of history concentrated in the idea remains however incomplete. Absolute 
experience consists, therefore, in recognising phenomena as originary phenomena, 
namely, as embodying the totality of their own history as a conflict open to change: the 
struggle of divergent and even opposite concepts for the presentation of their ideas.
94
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3. Immanent Critique and Allegorical Seeing  
 
 
In the previous sections I explained that Benjamin’s doctrinal philosophy is a 
philosophy of history that might be specifically understood as Ursprungsphilosophie. 
This radical philosophy of origin encompasses a doctrine of ideas for the determination 
of the idea of specific phenomena by means of an immanent critique of its origin 
through the method of digression. The method of digression demands the interrelated 
work of the principles of exceptionality and the principle of historical immersion. I also 
explained that both the method and object of critique inform each other continuously, so 
that they ‘take shape immanently’.95 Having explained the method that the book on the 
baroque follows for the critique of the Trauerspiel (the determination of its idea through 
its origin) this section elaborates on one of the critical features of the Trauerspiel as 
object of research: allegory as the Trauerspiel’s device of signification. 
 
If the objects of critique are collected from their processes of historical transformation, 
the criteria formulated by immanent critique are developed through the historical 
revision of the object of critique. This section explains Benjamin’s immersion into the 
history of the conceptualisation of allegory in order to discern its extreme formulations, 
so that its idea is ultimately constructed in their juxtaposition. This is how Benjamin 
addresses the significance of allegory in the second part of The Origin of the German 
Mourning-Play, ‘Allegory and Trauerspiel’. The historical path which he follows is 
clear. He starts with the ‘speculative’ and undeveloped concept of allegory in 
Classicism to then show its influence in the opposition between symbol and allegory in 
Romanticism. From this revision Benjamin extracts the partial comprehension of 
allegory as ‘technique of illustration’ (Classism), which due to its ‘conventionality’ or 
arbitrariness is opposed to the ‘necessity’ of the symbol (Romanticism). This 
undermining of allegory’s expressive capacity anticipates the negative characterisation 
of allegory as ‘ambiguity’ and ‘extravagance’ in the neo-Kantian aesthetics of Hermann 
Cohen and Carl Horst. Against the grain of the history of reductive conceptions of 
allegory Benjamin shows that allegory is expressive although in a different way than the 
symbol. 
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It is critical to note that Benjamin’s revision of Romanticism is all the more significant 
in so far as it stands in a double relation to allegory. It roughly parallels the opposition 
of Classicism to allegory by regarding the latter to be an imperfect means of 
signification, failing then to note the marks of allegorical thinking which its own 
characterisation of symbol bears. Stressing the affinities between the Romantic symbol 
and allegory Benjamin undoes the linear narrative of allegory as imperfect means of 
signification or expressionless technique. Allegory is as effective as the symbol is in 
attaining expression (Ausdruck), although this expression is of a different nature given 
their divergent relations to time and history.
96
 The affinity that Benjamin rediscovers 
between symbol and allegory turns the Romantic conception of allegory into the 
extreme or exceptional formulation in the apparently linear history running from 
Classicism to Romanticism and neo-Kantianism, opening allegory to a renewed 
interpretation whose central problem is the question on allegorical expression or 
‘allegorical synthesis’. Allegory is thus presented by means of its multiple 
conceptualisations in order to make it absorb its total history, including those elements 
that, resisting such conceptualisations, were forgotten or misrepresented (i.e. allegory’s 
expressive capacity). These interpretations or conceptualisations of allegory fail to 
appreciate that allegory (like the Romantic symbol) has the capacity for ‘expression’ 
and produces a ‘synthesis’ which (unlike the Romantic symbol) is open to change and 
conflict.
97
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3.1 Allegorical Synthesis  
 
Benjamin traces the origin of allegory through its constant fluctuation over the course of 
history. First, he refers to the Romantic conception of symbol as further development of 
the Classicist principle of the apotheosis of individual concrete existence, placed ‘within 
a progression of events’ towards the ‘infinite’, the ‘redemptive’ and the ‘sacred’. Within 
this logic, the religious symbol appears as the concrete ‘manifestation’ of an ‘idea’, or 
the unity between the ‘material’ and the ‘transcendental’ which relates the individual to 
the divine as part of an ‘unbroken whole’.98 Although Classicism developed a profane 
concept of symbol, the notion of allegory remained only as its ‘speculative’ counterpart. 
This means that no theory or definition of allegory was provided. In consequence 
allegory was construed merely as the ‘dark background against which the bright world 
of the symbol might stand out’.99 Then, both Classicism and Romanticism regarded 
allegory as a ‘technique’ which bears no capacity for expression but only for partial 
illustration or oblique ‘designation’.100 Allegory is thus defined by the vague character 
that makes it unable to synthesise specific contents and attain meaning. 
 
In this way, Benjamin’s task consists of recovering the specific sense in which allegory 
is a form of expression (Ausdrucksform) rather than a mere technique of illustration 
(Bildertechnik).
101
 For Benjamin, allegory is not the conventional sign or mark which 
‘refers to other things than itself’. It is rather the embodiment of an idea, albeit not the 
absolute or religious idea ‘incarnated’ in the symbol.102 In opposition to the common 
identification of allegory and conventional sign on the one hand, and symbol and 
expression of essential being on the other, Benjamin aims to explain allegory as a 
substantive form of expression which, nevertheless, escapes from the relation of 
continuity between the absolute and the ephemeral presented by the symbol (the 
incarnation or embodiment of the divine in the earthly world). This might illustrate what 
Samuel Weber formulates, although in a different context, as the relation between the 
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baroque and transcendence: the baroque excludes ‘transcendence by incorporating 
it’.103  
 
Benjamin cites Joseph von Görres in order to introduce one of the first forms of 
understanding allegory which distinguishes allegory from symbol without reducing it to 
the conventional, incomplete or imperfect mark: ‘the one [symbol] is a sign for ideas, 
which is self-contained, concentrated and which steadfastly remains itself, while 
recognizing the other [allegory] as successively progressing, dramatically mobile, 
dynamic image which has acquired the very fluidity of time’.104 In this secular 
comparison between symbol and allegory, the former presents a fixed, finished or 
complete totality, while allegory captures movement and progression, change and 
historical transformation. The former presents the eternal instant, the latter the passing 
of time. They stand in relation to each other (continues Görres) ‘as does the silent, great 
and mighty natural world of mountains and plants to the living progression of human 
history’.105 Symbol and allegory are thus marked by two different forms of presenting or 
articulating time. While the former idealises the ‘face of nature’ ‘in light of 
redemption’, in allegory ‘the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of 
history as petrified, primordial landscape’. Here, Benjamin emphasises the profane 
concept of history which is brought about by ‘allegorical seeing’ (allegorische 
Betrachtung). This presents history as the Passion of the world, although focusing on 
the ‘stations of its decline’ rather than on the ultimate goal of salvation.106  
 
This reconstruction of the ‘allegorical way of seeing’ situates allegory and symbol as 
divergent forms of presenting ideas, rather than merely considering allegory to be 
expressionless. Here, Benjamin emphasises the mode in which allegory presents change 
and historical transformation. In this sense, allegory also presents or embodies a totality, 
yet not the absolute, divine totality that descends into the symbol as much as the totality 
of history concentrated in the image. However, to make transience visible elicits a 
medium of presentation that is not the complete or whole unity. It is instead the 
incomplete fragment or the ruin (the torso) from which the ‘false appearance of totality 
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is extinguished’ which best serves the presentation of the idea of history.107 Critical to 
both the ruin and the fragment is that they concentrate the totality of history, yet not as 
the ‘false appearance’ of a finished unity but as the process of change and continuous 
transformation.  
 
It is because of the ambiguity of the allegorical way of seeing, which oscillates between 
the dissolution of false totalities and the concentration of the totality of history, that 
allegory was ‘mistrusted’ by different theories of signification. Benjamin refers to the 
rejection of allegory in the neo-Kantian philosophies of Hermann Cohen and Carl Horst. 
Cohen regards the richness of meaning in allegory as an ‘extravagance’ which opposes 
and exceeds the ‘law of economy’ that bounds together nature and mechanics, and 
claims that the ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning attributed to allegory precludes 
the ‘clarity and unity of meaning’ pursued by philosophy.108 Horst elaborates on this 
comparison by regarding allegory as ‘intrusion’ or, even, as the ‘violent crossing’ or 
assault on the borders of meaning: ‘a harsh disturbance of the peace and a disruption of 
law and order of the arts’.109 In response Benjamin explains that the synthesis produced 
by allegory is ‘not so much [a synthesis] in the sense of peace as a tregua dei between 
the conflicting opinions’, thereby opening up the state of peace to further conflict.110 It 
is the opposition between two forms of ‘synthesis’ what guides Benjamin’s historical 
digression on allegory and the resulting characterisation of allegorical seeing. The 
synthesis produced by allegory constructs a temporary, unfixed meaning, in opposition 
to the eternal synthesis pursued by the symbol, whether in its Classic, neo-Classic, 
Romantic or Neo-Kantian variations. For this reason, allegorical synthesis resembles a 
truce or tregua dei, the temporary suspension of conflict, rather than the aspiration to 
perpetual peace or pax dei.  
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The political notions that Benjamin introduces serve to understand allegorical synthesis 
in terms of the continuous tension between conflict and peace, or the dynamics of 
resistance and counter-resistance. This continuous tension enables the conditions for 
attaining temporary peace upon which conflict always begins anew. In the same way, 
allegorical synthesis attains an unfixed meaning which is always open to change. It is 
the lack of eschatology, the abolition of the ‘hereafter’, which determines allegory as a 
device of signification in continuous movement. If Benjamin named the symbol as the 
‘usurper’ which ‘came to power’ in the chaos that followed the ‘wake of 
romanticism’,111 allegory is the truly intriguer which catalyses the struggle for perpetual 
yet unattainable peace. Allegory embodies the violence of critique, continuously 
dissolving and establishing new rigidities, thereby deferring the possibility of attaining 
perpetual meaning. As Benjamin writes, in the Trauerspiel ‘history wanders onto the 
stage’ though only through the ‘historical activity’ catalysed by ‘the corrupt energy of 
the schemers’.112 Thus, allegory concentrates only the ‘multiplicity of historical 
contingent forms’ (as Max Pensky rightly suggests), but it also opens history to its own 
contingency: allegorically seen, the present is open to multiple outcomes rather than to a 
sum of moments moving towards perpetual peace.
113
  
 
The second part of The Origin of the German Mourning-Play suggests a turn from 
allegory to allegorical seeing, which makes explicit that images can be seen from the 
perspective of either ‘symbolic gaze’ or ‘allegorical seeing’. This responds to what 
Benjamin calls the antinomies of allegory, specifically, the antinomy of allegory being 
continuously informed by the extremes of the elevated and the profane, eternity and 
transience, wholeness and fragmentariness.
114
 Allegory faces the double risk of being 
reduced to one of its essential features. Allegory might be understood as exclusively 
related to the elevated and be consequently transformed into the symbol. Yet it might 
also be equated (as neo-Classic, Romantic and neo-Kantian aesthetics did) with the ruin 
and the store of images which ‘signify death and damnation’, thereby being reduced to 
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the image of the ‘heap of ruins’.115 In identifying allegory with ruins or fragments the 
researcher focus exclusively on that which is transient and ephemeral, falling into the 
‘frenzy of destruction’ and setting limits upon ‘allegorical contemplation’ which 
dominate over its ‘ideal quality’.116 Here, Benjamin attempts to relate the concrete, 
ephemeral character of the reception of the work to the lasting character of the absolute, 
even though the absolute is transformed into the totality of history concentrated in the 
image of the ruin, ‘the supposed infinity of a world without hope’.117 This double 
insight is precisely what allegorical seeing brings to the fore: allegorically seen, ruins 
reveal the totality of the history in the passing of time rather than pure transience.
118
 
 
From this perspective, Benjamin discerns two different forms of criticism, one 
respectively based on allegorical seeing in opposition to another based on the Romantic 
‘gaze’. While the Romantic ‘symbolic gaze’ awakens the dead fragment into a living 
work, allegorical seeing seeks for the historical process accumulated in the ‘dead’ 
object, the transient history sedimented in the ruin. Critique is presented, therefore, in 
terms of the mortification of the work which destroys the ‘false appearance [Schein] of 
totality’ of the object, offering an entry point into the totality (however incomplete) of 
history. It provides neither a final synthesis nor a system, but a point of reference for 
systematic orientation in the transformation of history. Reading the passing of time as 
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Ferber writes: ‘One of the most important features of allegorical form, for Benjamin, is its unique 
structure of meaning, unstable and fluctuating, in a constant state of deferral —the complete opposite of 
self-sufficient meaning. Such unsteadiness similarly marks the allegorist’s essentially melancholic state of 
mind, as he constantly searches for a way to stabilize meaning and control its turbulent, inconstant 
nature’... ‘Instead of providing an integral relationship between signifier and signified, it treats meaning 
as arbitrary and chaotic. In other words, it resists meaning rather than constructs it.’ Ferber, Philosophy 
and Melancholy: 86. The problem with this reading is that even if allegory is unstable Benjamin offers the 
conditions under which an allegorical synthesis occur, one which attains signification even if only in a 
temporary way. The reading pursued in this thesis is closer, therefore, to Friedlander’s and T. J. Clark’s 
arguments against the ‘fetishization of incompletion’ as Benjamin’s ‘method’. Friedlander argues against 
this problem in regard to Benjamin’s broader notion of ‘dialectical image’ while Clark argues specifically 
on ‘montage’ and the Trauerspiel. See: T. J. Clark, ‘Should Benjamin Have Read Marx?’, Boundary 2, 
30.1 (2003), 31–49 (p. 42), and Eli Friedlander, ‘The Measure of the Contingent: Walter Benjamin’s 
Dialectical Image’, Boundary 2, 35.3 (2008), 1–26 (p. 5: note 5). Burkhardt Lindner argues that in 
showing incompletion allegory however also accumulates different meaning positions, for which rather 
than fluctuation there is a process of sedimentation (which cannot be merely translated to the context of 
the avant-gardes as some interpreters do): Burkhardt Lindner, ‘Allegorie’ in Michael Opitz and Erdmut 
Wizisla, Benjamins Begriffe I, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), pp. 52-53.  
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constitutive of allegory prepares the work for a ‘rebirth’ in which the external 
appearance of the object, ‘its ephemeral beauty’, is ‘stripped of’ and the fragment is 
negatively transformed from ‘historical content’ into ‘truth content’.119 Negatively, 
insofar as allegory relates the work to its own history by showing its incompletion in the 
present.
120
  
 
 
3.2 The Weight of Tradition 
 
Allegory produces ‘the irregular rhythm of the constant pause’ that informs the 
Trauerspiel, its ‘sudden change of direction, and consolidation into new rigidity’.121 
Once again, irregular rhythm appears as hallmark in Benjamin’s book on the baroque. 
Yet this time it serves to reveal the way in which allegory attains meaning through the 
process of dissolving and creating new rigidities, or suspending and configuring new 
meanings. Having explained the relationship between Benjamin’s 
Ursprungsphilosophie and the method of digression for the recognition of the origin of 
phenomena in the first three sections of this chapter, the analysis of allegory in the 
previous section serves to show the affinity between the standpoint of origin and 
allegorical seeing. The digression pursued by Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie is an 
allegorical practice of seeing or reading history. Both origin and allegorical seeing 
coincide in the transforming synthesis they produce out of the dissolution or suspension 
of given concepts or images that reify history, thereby opening history to new 
configurations.
122
  
                                                            
119 OGT: 182; GS I: 358. 
120 In her presentation of the mortification of the work of art Ilit Ferber affirms that loss is a ‘condition of 
possibility for a work to become legible’. This principle could be applied not only to the specific sense of 
criticism as the mortification of the work of art, but also to the more general notion of immanent critique 
that operates by means of a historical immersion searching for the extreme, whose force or resonance has 
been partially lost or forgotten. Ferber, Philosophy and Melancholy, p. 26. The destruction of the image’s 
false appearance of totality, the loss and mortification of the work avert the ‘reconciliation’ which is 
elicited to attain the ‘totality’ of the symbol: Burkhardt Lindner, ‘Allegorie’, p. 68. This must be read in 
the context of the distortion of distortion (I. Wohlfahrt) or the interruption of interruption discussed 
previously in Chapter I.  
121 OGT: 197; GS I: 373.  
122 This is partially suggested in Buci-Glucksmann’s title ‘Baroque: Allegory as Origin’ (Baroque 
Reason, p. 63. My emphasis). It would be more precise to say then that Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie 
sees history allegorically through the concept of origin. If allegory is the formal principle in modern 
aesthetics (Burkhardt Lindner, ‘Allegorie’, pp. 52-53), origin is its theoretical counterpart in the 
construction of a critical historiography.  
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Although this process has a positive moment in the creation of significance and in the 
consolidation of ‘new rigidities’ from which change starts anew, the emphasis is given 
to the momentary suspension or destruction of inherited concepts or images that reduced 
the complexity of phenomena (i.e. the divergent conceptualisations of the baroque 
allegory in aesthetic theories). This emphasis then relates the standpoints of origin and 
allegorical seeing to the destructive character of experience which clears the space for 
new meanings, images and actions to emerge. However, Benjamin focuses on the 
process of destruction that inaugurates new possibilities rather than in advancing the 
possible outcomes of this process, which are yet to be discovered, created or 
experienced. Such outcomes might be read as borderline cases which cannot be 
anticipated without running the risk of subordinating them to inoperative conceptual 
schemes, therefore reducing their force.  
 
Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie thus directs the task of philosophy and critique 
towards the past in order to recover alternative presents and futures which became lost, 
finally producing a substantive experience of history in the recognition of those 
alternative futurities that might be actualised in the present. The standpoints of origin 
and allegorical seeing destroy the false appearance of the totality of concepts and 
images, thus revealing them incomplete. Illuminating the total history in which they are 
embedded, immanent critique opens them to new meanings. The image of history as 
conflict is, as I have argued, the contribution of The Origin of the German Mourning 
Play to Benjamin’s doctrinal philosophy —intimated yet undeveloped in ‘On the 
Program of the Coming Philosophy’ and the essays on language and translation. Three 
remarks are necessary to concentrate this trajectory. ‘On the Program...’ regards 
philosophy as having the task of achieving its doctrinal form as philosophy of history. 
The essays on language and translation pursue this philosophy of history as an 
investigation into the historical transformation of language, an inquiry into profane, 
post-lapsarian language which points out to the transformation of language and 
obliquely illuminates the moments of rupture and breaks within the latter. The book on 
the baroque illustrate such brakes and deviations, presenting in its ‘Prologue’ immanent 
critique and digression as the methodological tools that provide their most significative 
account. By means of digression immanent critique patterns the phenomena’s 
emergence and their origin: their process of emergence, disappearance and 
reappearance in divergent cycles of memory and oblivion.  
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Critical to both immanent critique and allegorical seeing is thus the focus on the double 
insight of continuity and forgetting that marks historical transmissibility, which makes 
accessible the double meaning of tradition as transmission or handing down and 
betrayal or surrendering. The objects that tradition delivers or passes on are transformed 
or shaped in the same process. Tradition thus negotiates the limits of the contents it 
transmits in cycles of memory and oblivion. Patterning this irregular rhythm is the task 
of Benjamin’s Urprungsphilosophie. As The Origin of the German Mourning Play 
argues, ideas are presented only by means of the history of concepts that have served to 
characterise phenomena, or what Benjamin refers to as the struggle for the presentation 
of ideas in concepts (organising and redeeming phenomena). In this context, Benjamin 
writes that concepts are ‘endowed’ with the objectivity of history.123 To present the idea 
of an specific phenomenon means to recover the historical struggle for its 
conceptualisation. It is from this perspective that Benjamin retrospectively refers to the 
objectivity with which history and tradition endow phenomena as the phenomena’s 
historical testimony or the weight of tradition. In consonance with the book on the 
baroque, Benjamin notes in the 1936 version of the essay on technical reproducibility:  
 
The authenticity [Echtheit] of a thing is the quintessence of all that is transmissible 
in it from its origin [Ursprung] on, ranging from its physical duration to its 
historical testimony [geschichtliche Zeugenschaft]. Since the historical testimony is 
founded on the physical duration, the former, too, is jeopardized by reproduction, 
in which the physical duration plays no part. And what is really jeopardized when 
the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object, the weight it 
derives from tradition. What withers is the aura of the artwork. The technology of 
reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the sphere of tradition. Mass 
existence actualizes [actualisiert] what is reproduced.124 
 
This passage echoes the definition of the authentic in the ‘Prologue’: the ‘authentic [Das 
Echte] -the hallmark of origin [Ursprungssiegel] in phenomena- is the object of 
discovery, a discovery which is connected in a unique way with the process of 
recognition [Wiederkennen]’.125 The critical difference between the two presentations of 
the objectivity with which history endows phenomena consists of the standpoint from 
which the book on the baroque and the Artwork essay look at this process. Both agree 
                                                            
123 OGT: 47; GS I: 217.  
124 ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility’, SW 3: 103; my emphasis. In this thesis 
I mainly follow what is now known as the third version of the essay on reproducibility according to the 
publishers of the new critical edition of the complete works of Walter Benjamin (Werke und Nachlass. 
Kritische Gesaumtausgabe, Band 16), previously known as second version both  in the German edition of 
Gesammelte Schriften and the English collection of Selected Writings. 
125 OGT: 46; GS I: 227.  
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on the transmissibility of tradition being the medium through which phenomena are 
endowed with objectivity or with the historical testimony they carry with them. 
However, the book on the baroque looks at the internal conflict of the transmissibility of 
tradition in terms of the dialectics of transmission and betrayal presented in the previous 
sections while the Artwork explores the consequences of the shattering of the medium 
of transmissibility in the age of the technical reproducibility of the work of art. The 
former introduces immanent critique as the method that looks at history from the 
standpoint of tradition (operating by means of historical immersion in search for the 
exceptional); the latter raises the question on whether immanent critique is still effective 
while confronting the technically reproducible work of art which makes visible both the 
shattering of the weight of tradition and the loss of the work’s historical testimony.  
 
If Benjamin’s Ursprungsphilosophie proposes digression as historiographic method for 
patterning the irregular rhythm of the transmissibility of tradition, the Artwork essay 
reveals the historiographic crisis inaugurated in late capitalism with the emergence of 
the technically reproducible work of art. This historiographic crisis is ultimately 
presented as the crisis of experience or the undermining of the conditions under which 
the substantive experience of history is attained. The second part of this dissertation 
focuses on the crisis of experience which emerges out of the shattering of tradition, 
tracing the different strategies that Benjamin developed in order to explain the 
possibility of grounding substantive experience in this new context.
126
 The following 
chapters examine divergent strategies to ground experience in light of the shattering of 
tradition in order to examine the possibilities for transforming the ephemeral, lived 
moment (Erlebnis) into substantive, historical experience (Erfahrung). I argue that in 
facing the crisis of tradition as historiographic crisis Benjamin grounds experience in 
memory, moving then from the perspective that looks at history from the standpoint of 
tradition to another perspective shaped by the work of individual and collective 
                                                            
126 Before advancing some elements to open up this discussion, it is critical to emphasise that the lines 
from the Artwork essay should not be read as suggesting that prior to the crisis of tradition inaugurated by 
capitalism and technical reproducibility, the transmissibility of tradition was secured. This chapter has 
stressed that the process of transmissibility consists in the struggle of different chains of transmission in 
which the violence of critique becomes apparent in the subordination of the exceptional to inherited 
conceptual schemes without a further revision of that same conceptual scheme. This process produces 
moments of oblivion or forgetting for which a philosophical history is indeed needed in order to ground 
substantive experience. In terms of the ‘Prologue’, even if the rhythm of origin ‘swallows’ the ‘material 
of the process of emergence’, it does not collapse it into a single line of development nor into a unified 
conceptual scheme: OGT: 45; GS I: 226.  
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memory. In light of the crisis of tradition, memory becomes the ground for a new 
historiography, one which recasts the allegorical way of seeing in the principle or law of 
montage that Benjamin appropriates from avant-garde artistic practices (which, in turn, 
radicalise the constructive character of early photography and cinema). In the light of 
the crisis of tradition, the allegorical undoing of reduced inherited conceptualisations of 
specific phenomena is recast in the suspension of the image’s appearance of totality by 
means of montage.   
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Second Part 
 
 
Experience in the Light of the Crisis of Tradition 
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Chapter III   
 
 
Experience and Memory: Epic Narration and Montage 
 
 
 
The second part of this dissertation examines the notion of experience formulated by 
Walter Benjamin in his writings from the mid 1920’s onwards, specifically, in those 
concerned with the changes in the production and circulation of the work of art 
associated with the emergence of technical reproducibility. This discussion is disclosed 
in two main parts, dedicated to the realm of experience in epic literature on the one 
hand, and epic theatre, photography and film on the other. These different realms of 
artistic production have, according to Benjamin, a common ground since they 
concentrate the tensions of the transformation of the structure of experience which 
results from what Benjamin calls the ‘shattering of tradition’ and the crisis of collective 
transmissibility brought about by modernity, ultimately radicalised in late capitalism.
1
  
In these two chapters I argue that what characterises Benjamin’s account of epic 
narration and theatre, film and photography, is their potential to secure an alternative 
concept of experience. This notion of experience neither attempts to recover the 
conditions for the tradition that is shattered nor pursues the annihilation of any further 
remnant of tradition — which leads to the ecstatic affirmation of reduced forms of 
sensibility (Erlebnis) and the further impossibility of grounding substantive experience 
(Erfahrung). Rather, in the light of the shattering of tradition Benjamin argues that an 
alternative ground for experience might be found in the work of memory. Looking for 
an alternative notion of experience in the absence of tradition this reading eludes what 
John McCole and others have called Benjamin’s antinomic conception of tradition. 
                                                            
1 ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, SW 3: 104; WuN: 100.  
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McCole refers to Benjamin’s antinomies of tradition as the opposition between two 
different tendencies: one that nostalgically mourns the lost tradition and aims at its 
recovery and conservation, and other that aims to annihilate or liquidate what ultimately 
becomes an ‘oppressive tradition as such’.2 McCole’s formulation serves to distinguish 
two different sides of the notion of experience respectively marked by the mourning of 
an irretrievable past and the progressivistic conception of technology. Reading the 
notion of experience from one of its two antinomic components leads to one-sided, 
conservativist or liquidationist interpretations of Benjamin. Although some interpreters 
challenge McCole’s presentation they ultimately affirm the existence of this antinomy 
in order to show how it can be overcome. Uwe Steiner, for example, regards the 
positions of ‘The Storyteller’ and the Artwork essays as ‘obviously’ ‘so incompatible’ 
that they ‘serve to confirm the perception of Benjamin’s Janus-faced nature’, one face 
looking backwards at the impossible recovery of tradition and other directed forwards to 
the affirmation of technological change. Indeed, he considers each text as the extreme 
poles of Benjamin’s thought.3 Although Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings affirm 
that reading the ‘The Storyteller’ from the ‘impression of Benjamin as a nostalgic for 
the way things used to be’ and attributing an ‘unwarranted optimism’ to the Artwork 
essay neglects Benjamin’s ‘uncanny ability to turn almost any assignment to his own 
end’, they finally regard the Leskov essay as a ‘rather nostalgic assumption of a living 
transmission informing a precapitalist artisanal community’ and, therefore, of the 
structure of experience it passes through in ‘counsel’ and ‘stories’.4  
                                                            
2 John McCole, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1993), pp. 3, 18, 21–30. An alternative formulation of this antinomic thinking is offered by Irving 
Wohlfarth’s characterisation of Benjamin's thinking through an ‘ontology of extremes’. See: Wohlfarth, 
‘The Measure of the Possible, The Weight of the Real and the Heat of the Moment: Benjamin’s Actuality 
Today’, in (ed.) Lauda Marcus and Lynda Nead The Actuality of Walter Benjamin, (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1998), pp. 13-39 (p. 16). Also: Wohlfarth, ‘No-Man’s Land: On Walter Benjamin’s 
‘‘Destructive Character’’, in Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, Benjamin’s Philosophy. Destruction 
and Experience (Manchester: Clinamen, 2000), pp. 155-82. 
3 Uwe Steiner, Walter Benjamin: An Introduction to His Work and Thought (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), p. 119. 
4 Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Walter Benjamin. A Critical Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), pp. 531, 643. An exemplary case is recent scholarship that assumes the 
antinomic distinction is the work of Miriam Bratu Hansen, who explicitly uses McCole’s terminology to 
introduce her argument as an attempt to ‘question the liquidationist tenor’ of the Artwork essay and its 
reception. She argues that in showing this tenor she may ultimately expose the ‘liquidationist agenda’ and 
the ‘culturally conservative strand’ which the Artwork essay conceals. Although she does not present her 
own argument in terms of the conservation of tradition, Hansen nevertheless formulates a critique of the 
progressivistic elements in the essay by means of a defence of the concept of aura which is the hallmark 
of tradition in the essay on reproducibility. In her argument, Hansen ultimately recasts the opposition 
between aura and the Brechtian elements of Benjamin’s film theory to restrict the latter in favour of the 
former. I will return to this argument in the next chapter: Hansen, Cinema and Experience, p. 80–83, 103, 
 
 
117 
In contrast to these readings, I will argue that by means of divergent concepts of 
memory Benjamin is able to confront the crisis of tradition by offering an alternative 
ground for experience; one that neither aims to recover the lost tradition nor to affirm its 
further liquidation. I will focus, specifically, on the mnemonic character of the principle 
of montage which governs the relation between narration and theatre, photography and 
film. This relation is presented in different forms throughout this period, having one of 
its clearest formulations in the ‘Program for Literary Criticism’ (1929-1930). There, 
Benjamin claims that the relation between literary and film criticism should be reversed. 
If film criticism normally imitates literary criticism produced according to the model of 
the novel, in the age of technical reproducibility literary criticism should learn from 
film criticism.
5
 Although the new ‘Program’ does not develop the relationship between 
film and literature in detail, it does establish the relationship between film and literary 
criticism in terms of the notion of ‘materialist critique’: a form of critique composed of 
‘the critical gloss and the cite’, ‘consisting entirely of quotations’.6 What determines the 
character of materialist critique as a construction made up of fragments is the 
fragmentary character of its objects of critique: epic literature and drama, photography 
and film.  
Instead of looking at historical experience from the standpoint of tradition, materialist 
critique looks at it from the standpoint of fragmentary memory. Benjamin generalises 
this method in the Konvolut N of the Arcades Project, where he refers to his 
investigation as developing ‘the art of citation without quotation’, for which his own 
philosophical practice is then ‘intimately related to that of montage’ (N1, 10). This art is 
then referred both as the method and principle of his historical materialism, when he 
first writes: ‘Method of this project: literary montage’ (N1a, 8). Secondly: for the 
‘realisation of the Marxist method’ the ‘principle of montage’ has to be carried over 
(N2, 6).
7
 This passage refers then to historical materialism’s ‘construction of history as 
such’. Later, in the ‘Thesis on the Concept of History’ Benjamin refers again to 
‘construction’ in thesis XIV and to the ‘principle of construction’ of materialist 
                                                                                                                                                                              
116–7. A contemporary liquidationist reading of Benjamin may be found in the comparison that Maria 
Gough draws between Benjamin and Tretiakov in ‘Paris, Capital of the Soviet Avant-Garde’, October 
(2002), 53–83 (pp. 55, 77).  
5 ‘Program for Literary Criticism’, SW 2:294. 
6 SW 2:291.  
7 Arcades Project: 458, 460, 461. On these passages see Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectic of Seeing, 
(Cambridge, MA. and London: MIT Press, 1999), 71-77. 
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historiography in XVII.
8
  What these notions of construction have in common is the task 
of presenting or configuring history by means of the montage of fragments. The 
question is to what extent these forms of presentation offer conditions for attaining 
historical experience in the absence of tradition. We will answer this question by means 
of a discussion on the historiographic form of montage and the concept of experience 
associated with it in literary and visual montage. 
The fragmentary character of the principle of montage is presented from three different 
perspectives regarding epic narration, epic drama, and photography and film. First, from 
the standpoint of literature, the essays on Franz Hessel (1927-9) and Alfred Döblin 
(1930) refer to their epic character of their work as the result of the principle of 
montage.
9
 In relation to Brecht’s epic theatre, the ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934) 
presents its structure by sketching a comparison between epic drama and the 
photographic montages of John Heartfield,
10
 whilst the two versions of ‘What is Epic 
Theatre?’ (1931 and 1939) explore Brecht’s theatre from the standpoint of its ‘episodic 
value’ and its affinity with the film strip.11 From the standpoint of photography and 
film, the ‘Small History of Photography’ (1931) explains the principle of construction 
or the constructive character of photography in terms of the Brechtian recognition 
(Erkentnnis) which is attained by building up something artificial, from fragments, in 
order to contest the reified image of reality as totality.
12
 In a further radicalisation of the 
principle of construction, the third version of the essay on technical reproducibility 
(1935) regards the principle of montage as the law (Gesetz) that organises film and the 
emerging work of art.
13
   
What epic narration and theatre, photography and film all share is the structure of 
montage as principle of construction of literary, dramatic, photographic and 
cinematographic presentation (Darstellung).
14
 This principle is further developed in 
terms of its inner, fragmentary structure, but also in terms of its capacity to present 
                                                            
8 ‘Theses On the Concept of History’, Illuminations: 261, 262.  
9 ‘Review of Hessel’s Heimliches Berlin’, SW 2:70; ‘The Crisis of the Novel’, SW 2:301. 
10 ‘The Author as Producer’, in Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. 
by Ana Bostock (London: Verso, 2003), p. 94–6.  
11 ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (First and Second Versions) Understanding Brecht, pp. 6, 16. 
12 ‘Small History of Photography’, in Walter Benjamin, On Photography, ed. & trans. by Esther Leslie 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2015), pp. 91–92. See also Leslie’s comments on this fragment in her 
introduction to this volume: p. 24-9. 
13 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128.  
14 Benjamin continuously refers to Darstellung in the essays on narration, photography and the Artwork. 
See respectively: SW 2:299; GS III:230; On Photography: 99; and SW 3:116; WuN 16:128. 
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modern experience through its own fragmentariness. The fragmentariness of the 
principle of montage corresponds to the fragmentariness of experience in late 
capitalism. This is made clear in the multiple comparisons of the work of art with the 
conveyor belt or the assembly line that organises the life of workers and city-dwellers. 
In contrast to the image of the traditional stage actor, for instance, the essay on 
reproducibility regards the image of the film actor not as a ‘unity’ or ‘integral whole’, 
but as an assemblage of multiple performances that responds to the needs of the 
machine, which cuts down the actor’s interpretation into ‘mountable episodes’ 
(montierbarer Episoden).
15
 As Benjamin affirms in the second essay on Baudelaire 
(1939), the sensibility of the audience, on the other hand, is also marked by the rhythm 
of film just as modern perception is ‘conditioned’ by the rhythm of the ‘conveyor 
belt’.16 
Considered an inherent element of the work of art in the age of its technical 
reproducibility, montage recasts the fragmentary character of modern sensibility. In this 
context, the principle or law of montage organising the work of art presents the 
characteristics of what Benjamin calls shock-based perception (chockförmige 
Wahrnehumung), a form of sensibility formed according to the technologies of 
reproduction in urban life.
17
 Both montage and modern sensibility are fragmentary 
configurations formed according to the necessities of the new apparatus. In these 
configurations, however, Benjamin reads multiple possibilities, attributing to this new 
sensibility the opportunity to either recede into a form of reduced perception, namely, 
the lived moment (Erlebnis), or to ground substantive experience (Erfahrung) in spite of 
the shattering of tradition. This distinction points out divergent forms of sensibility. The 
former consists in a more immediate response to the present, one that manages the 
shocks produced by urban life through a protective mechanism which is both amnesic 
and —as Susan Buck-Morss has argued— anaesthetic.18 The latter is a form of 
sensibility which is fully attained in an equilibrium or interplay with technology and its 
principle of montage. Experience (Erfahrung) consists then in the actualisation of the 
potentiality of technology in which technology and its products (i.e. photographic and 
                                                            
15 SW 3:110, 112-3; WuN 16:119. 
16 ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, in Walter Benjamin, The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Charles 
Baudelaire, ed. by Michael Jennings, trans. by Eiland, Howard and others (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), p. 178. Hereafter the 1939 essay on Baudelaire will be cited as OSMB 
17 OSMB: 191. 
18 Buck Morss, Susan, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered’, 
October, 62 (Autumn 1992), 3–41.   
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cinematographic presentations) are addressed as fragmentary constructions which attain 
no completion regardless of the appearance of totality they might achieve. This 
equilibrium or interplay would give form to a new physis or ‘second nature’ marked by 
the liberation of both technology and human nature from its subordination to capitalism.  
In opposition to both the shattering of tradition and the amnesic relation of the lived 
moment to the present, it will be argued that memory becomes the basis for substantive 
experience. What I want to emphasise here is the specific relevance these concepts have 
in Benjamin’s characterisation of the potentiality of the new technologies in three 
moments that frame the discussion on the work of art.  First, in ‘To the Planetarium’, 
the final section of One Way Street (published in 1928), Benjamin introduces what 
might be considered his most ecstatic characterisation of the constructive and 
destructive potential embedded in the new technologies. If Benjamin entertains the 
possibility of cosmic experience being attainable by means of modern technology, in a 
form of ‘ecstatic trance’ or ‘experience’ that produces knowledge of what is ‘nearest’ 
and ‘remotest to us’ (but ‘never of one without the other’), he also recognises the effects 
that technological warfare produces in its attempt to master such ‘cosmic powers’. If, as 
the first astronomers intended, cosmic trance put humanity in connection with the 
universe, it is war what more radically altered the modern landscape with the 
‘multitudes, gases... electric forces, high frequency currents’ deployed on the battlefield 
in the spirit of technology. Thus, although technology bears the potential for the 
emergence of a new physis that could have enlarged human nature on both the macro 
and microcosmical level, so that it was no longer tied to that ‘tiny fragment of nature 
that we are accustomed to call Nature’, the nights of war and annihilation imbued 
humanity with feelings that ‘resembled the bliss of the epileptic’, unleashing revolts that 
attempted ‘to bring the new body under its control’. Against the background of the 
distorted potentiality of technology to attains cosmic experience, Benjamin identifies 
the ‘power of the proletariat’ with the ‘measure of the convalescence’ of the new, 
shaken body.
19
 Here, Benjamin presents the potentiality of technology in terms of its 
distortion by the logic of capitalism and fascism. In this context the revolutionary 
capacity of humanity consists in its capacity to actualise the originary potential of the 
new technologies. Thus, substantive experience is attained through the double process 
of interrupting the distorted relation between humanity and technology in capitalism and 
                                                            
19 One-Way Street, SW 1: 486-7. 
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producing an equilibrium between them. Given the subordination of technology to the 
logic of capitalism, the possibility of securing substantive experience is thus mediated 
by the ‘revolt’ which interrupts the logic of capital. This revolt is nonetheless unable to 
recover the potentiality with which modern technology once emerged. Once this 
potentiality is distorted or suspended, its actualisation cannot be but fragmentary and 
momentary.  
Technically reproducible art inaugurates new forms of sensibility that remain suspended 
or distorted in the capitalist expression of modernity. Their reactivation by means of the 
interruption of such distortion is the task of Benjamin’s theory of experience and the 
politicization of art. In his essay on technical reproducibility, Benjamin maintains the 
double process of distortion of the new realm of experience and the further interruption 
of this distortion, although this time he contrasts what he first called cosmic experience 
with the lived moment: ‘Humanity, which once, in Homer, was an object of 
contemplation for the Olympian gods, has now become one for itself. Its self-alienation 
has reached the point in which it can live through [erleben] its own annihilation as a 
supreme aesthetic pleasure. Such is the aestheticization of politics, as practiced by 
fascism. Communism replies by politicizing art’.20 As it will be explained in the 
following sections, the politicization of art is understood within the logic of a 
revolutionary ‘innervation’, one which accelerates the ‘adaptation’ to technology yet 
only by interrupting the lived moment (Erlebnis) as the dominant form of sensibility in 
capitalist modernity. In this process of interruption, new opportunities emerge for 
humanity to expand its space for play or action, creating a space in which humanity 
must train itself to learn how to inhabit it. This new space is open to multiple, unknown 
outcomes and futures, both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary. 
A further development of the notion of experience and its opposition to the lived 
moment can be found in Benjamin’s 1939 essay on Baudelaire. This work associates 
experience to the ‘structure of memory’. Experience is regarded to be the product less of 
‘facts firmly anchored in memory [Erinnerung] than that of accumulated and frequently 
unconscious data that flow together in memory [Gedächtnis]’, thereby distinguishing 
between totalizing and fragmentary memory.
21
 Experience is thus grounded in a long-
term form of sensibility which opposes both the amnesic immediacy of the lived 
                                                            
20 SW 3:122; WuN 16:128. Translation amended. 
21 OSMB: 172.  
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moment and the robust notion of memory, being thus fragmentary and unstable. In the 
light of the crisis of tradition, unconscious, short-lived memory or reminiscence 
(Gedächtnis) becomes critical in order to secure experience. Although the relation 
between experience and memory is already anticipated in the essays on epic narration, 
dedicated to Hessel and Döblin (1927-30), as well as in the discussion of epic 
storytelling and narration in ‘Experience and Poverty’ (1933) and ‘The Storyteller’ 
(1936), the essay on Baudelaire confirms this relation by discussing Baudelaire’s lyric 
poetry and his attempt to ground experience on the basis of the lived moment. To some 
extent, Baudelaire’s ultimate recourse to the mnemonic device of correspondences to 
ground experience reveals the insufficiency of the lived moment to secure experience 
and the limits of Baudelaire’s own project.  
The following sections explore the interrelated work of the principle of montage and the  
work of memory in the specific sense of reminiscence or Gedächtnis. I will argue that 
under the crisis of tradition experience is grounded in this specific form of memory, 
configured through the principle of montage in epic narration. My approach towards the 
interrelated work of montage and memory begins by exploring the transition from 
immanent to materialist critique in Benjamin’s ‘Program for Literary Criticism’ as a 
immanent critique of his own method as Howard Caygill suggests. Against Benjamin’s 
own characterisation of this transition, based on the limits of immanent critique, I 
suggest that the two forms of critique operate following the same principles yet 
confronting different contexts, one in which tradition is available for critique and other 
in which tradition is absent. Then I explore the specific value that epic narration has for 
his views on literature and argue that it is epic narration which recasts the 
transmissibility of tradition (that modernity brings into a crisis) in the work of memory 
by means of the principle of montage. Distinguishing different formulations of memory 
(memory, remembrance and reminisence) in the essays on Gottfried Keller, Franz 
Hessel and Alfred Döblin and Nikolai Leskov, I trace the relation between experience 
and reminiscence in epic writing back to epic storytelling. To some extent, the 
mnemonic character of epic written narration consists in its capacity to reinstate the epic 
value of storytelling. I finally turn towards Benjamin’s 1939 essay on Baudelaire and 
his lyric poetry. Although this works does not relate properly to the epic, it indirectly 
proves the relationship between experience and reminiscence or Gedächtnis while it 
examines the limits of Baudelaire’s lyric poetry. Although Baudelaire aims to ground 
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experience out of the ecstatic affirmation of the lived moment as hallmark of modernity 
and attempts to do so in lyric poetry, his ultimate recourse to a mnemonic device (such 
as correspondences) proves that substantive experience elicits memory as condition of 
possibility. Thus, if the conclusion that Benjamin draws is directed towards the value of 
the lyric poetry of Baudelaire, the structure of his argument indirectly confirms the 
interrelatedness of experience and memory.  
Critical to the characterisation of the lived moment in the essay on Baudelaire is the 
organisation of modern urban perception by means of the assembly line. The essay then 
addresses the fragmentariness of modern shock-based perception which the method of 
montage critically conveys in different regimes of presentation. In the final chapter of 
this thesis I return to the principle of montage yet  from the standpoint of the essays on 
photography, cinema and epic theatre, which understand montage as the law (Gesetz) 
that organises the technically reproducible work of art.  
 
1.  The Crisis of Criticism  
 
Howard Caygill and Uwe Steiner make a lucid case for the relevance that epic written 
narration has in Benjamin’s writings from the late 1920’s onwards, specifically, with 
reference to his understanding of contemporary forms of sensibility and the production 
of experience. Benjamin’s project to reinstate the epic as narrative form contests the 
shattering of tradition and the crisis of collective transmissibility in modernity and late 
capitalism.
22
 To some extent, the value of the originary potential of the epic resides 
precisely in its collective dimension, as Fredrich Jameson argues in regards to Brecht’s 
own formulation of the epic.
23
 For Benjamin, as for Brecht, the epic is concentrated in 
the ancient art of storytelling and the dynamics produced by the ‘fabric’ or ‘wave of life’ 
that maintains the practice of handing down stories from one generation to the next, and 
which thereby grounds both the collective dimension of experience and the possibility 
of its transmissibility which exceeds or negotiates the limits of the subject or the 
                                                            
22 See: ‘Modernism: From Immanent to Strategic Critique’, in Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 61–79. 
and ‘The Reinstatement of Epic Narration’, in Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 126-137. 
23 Fredric Jameson, Brecht and Method (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 55–73. 
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individual in favour of commonality.
24
 Benjamin’s attempt to reinstate the force of the 
epic is therefore directed towards the recovery of the collective dimension of experience 
that is lost when the art of storytelling comes to an end. This loss reveals the crisis of 
tradition and the absence of conditions for the collective transmissibility of experience.  
In the ‘Program for Literary Criticism’, written between 1929-1930 as introduction to 
the unfinished Collected Essays on Literature, Benjamin maintains that literary 
criticism should learn from film criticism.
25
 Although he does not offer a detailed 
account of the affinities which bring literature and film together onto common ground 
he problematizes the conditions for literary criticism from the standpoint of the 
collective dimension of experience. In the new ‘Program’ Benjamin traces the roots of 
the crisis of criticism back to the emergence of public and private literary circles, which 
emerged with the widespread circulation of books and the printing culture of the 
Enlightenment. While the former aims to attain entertainment and animation the latter 
‘regards books as books of life, as sources of wisdom’, albeit leading to a ‘sectarianism’ 
that breaks free from ‘ritual complexes’.26 Book circulation in small circles ‘releases the 
body from traditional collectives’ but fails however to ‘reinsert’ it in new collective 
configurations. Here, the absence of collective activity is even regarded as the cause of 
‘symptoms of madness’.27 To some extent, the crisis of literary criticism is intrinsic to 
the emergence of criticism itself and the book culture which detached the individual 
from the collective. This crisis became more evident in light of the opportunities that 
technical reproducibility opened up for the emergence of new forms of art that could be 
collectively experienced, yet that were received and experienced with the individualistic 
model of book form. This tension is at the core of Benjamin’s reply to Oscar A. H.  
Schmitz’ review of Sergei Eisenstein’s 1925 Battleship Potemkin (published in March 
1927 in Die literarische Welt). 
Premiering first in Moscow on January 18
th
 1926 and then in Berlin three days later, 
Battleship Potemkin immediately became the object of debate among critics on 
divergent sides of the political and artistic spectrum. In March 1927, Die literarische 
                                                            
24 SW 3, p. 146; GS II, 442.  
25 Along with essays on Keller, Hessel and Döblin, the Collected Essays on Literature had included 
works dedicated to Robert Walser, Karl Krauss, Julien Green, Marcel Proust and André Gide, and the 
essays ‘Novelist and Storyteller’, ‘Surrealism’, ‘The Task of the Critic’ and  ‘The Task of Translator’. 
The contract with the titles of the collection is reproduced in Momme Brodersen, Walter Benjamin: A 
Biography (Verso, 1996), p. 183.  
26 SW 2: 290. 
27 SW 2: 290. 
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Welt grouped together a series of responses to the film, including pieces by Schmitz and 
Benjamin. In his review, Schmitz accused Potemkin of lacking any artistic value due to 
its immersion in the collective rather than in the individual —‘the differentiated 
humanity from which art grows’.28 By contrast, Benjamin’s response situates the film 
within the debates on the new realm of experience inaugurated by cinematographic 
technique and its capacity to open a ‘new realm of consciousness’ that resists to any 
form of individualization which may ultimately deem the collective as ‘unfree’.29 
Benjamin’s reply brings to the fore his argument on the potentiality new technologies 
have for the production of new forms of experience which nonetheless remain 
constrained if addressed from categories corresponding to other forms of sensibility. 
What the review reveals is precisely the model of film criticism that imitates subject-
centred positions such as those assumed by literary critique in relation to the novel. It is 
by virtue of the collective dimension embedded in new technologies that literary 
criticism must undertake new directions and abandon those positions that detach the 
individual from the collective. Otherwise: criticism undermines the very potentiality of 
cinema. Cinematographic technique is explained in terms of tension between the 
destructive and creative possibilities which revolve around the formation of political 
tendencies (politische Tendenzen):  
But just as the deeper rock strata emerge only where the rock is fissured, the deep 
formation of ‘‘political tendency’’ likewise reveals itself only in the fracture 
points of artistic development; it is there that the different political tendencies 
may be said to come to the surface. In every new technical revolution the political 
tendency is transformed, as if by its own volition, from a concealed element of art 
into a manifest one.30  
The geological image in this passage presents cinema as the fissure that opens new 
futurities in the present, concentrated —or liberated— within the ‘spaces of the 
immediate environment’ of the ‘prison-world’. It is this world that cinema ‘exploded 
with the dynamite of its fractions of a second’.31 Extending space and time by means of 
a process of irruption, just as geological events transform the given landscape, film 
offers humanity the opportunity to undertake ‘extended journeys’ in the ‘widely 
                                                            
28 Oscar A. H. Schmitz, ‘Potemkin and Tendentious Art’, Anton Kaes, Nicholas Baer, and Michael 
Cowan, The Promise of Cinema: German Film Theory, 1907–1933 (Oakland: University of California 
Press, 2016), p. 356.  
29 SW 2: 17-18.  
30 SW 2: 17.  
31 SW 2: 17.  
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scattered ruins’ of this prison-world.32 Film, thus, contests the possibility of grounding 
critique in the subject position associated with the novel but also reveals a new realm of 
experience that emerges with the technologies of reproduction and the disruption they 
cause into sensibility on a broader scale.
33
 Although Benjamin brings into question the 
notions of consciousness and political tendency elsewhere, his reply to Schmitz points 
out the new realm of experience to which humanity may have access and which, like a 
fissure, opens or enlarges the space for collective experience. The collective dimension 
that may crystallise in new political tendencies is the hallmark of film from which 
literary criticism should learn. In order to grasp the collective dimension inaugurated by 
film and the technologies of reproduction Benjamin maintains that a further programme 
of literary criticism is needed, one in which the concept of immanent critique previously 
introduced in his book on the baroque must be developed into materialist critique. 
 
1.1 From Immanent to Materialist Critique 
 
The ‘Program for Literary Criticism’ takes the relationship between literature and film 
as the basis for the transition into a new materialist concept of literary criticism opposed 
to immanent critique and different expressions of deductivism.
34
 The opening lines of 
the fragment set out the context of the crisis of criticism. They affirms that ‘annihilatory 
criticism’ [vernichtende Kritik] has ‘degenerated into sheer exhaustion and 
harmlessness’ and thus calls for the return of criticism to the ‘level of consciousness’ 
[Bewuβtsein].35 To some extent, Benjamin argues that criticism must recover its force. 
He opposes the notion of materialist critique to ‘immanent criticism’ which ‘improvises 
the criteria [Maßstäbe] it applies’, and which ‘can lead to satisfying results in individual 
cases’. The new program is characterised as ‘a detour through materialist aesthetics, 
which would situate books in the context of their age’. Such criticism would lead to a 
                                                            
32 SW 2: 17.  
33 Steiner calls attention to the following fragment from 1935 in order to support the transition from the 
epic to film, rather than the relation that is established in the ‘Program’: ‘Film rather than narration’ (GS 
3:1282). It is clear that Benjamin did not abandon his interest in the epic. Indeed, the second version of 
‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (1939) testifies to this by crediting Brecht’s theatre as the recovery of originary 
elements of the epic. 
34 SW 2: 294; GS VI: 166 
35 SW 2: 289. GS VI: 164 
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new, dynamic, ‘dialectical aesthetics’.36 Although Benjamin stages his argument in 
terms of a critique of immanent critique, the new materialist critic is consistent with the 
concept of immanent critique formulated in the Trauerspiel book both in their method 
of research and in their opposition to deductivism. Regarding the rejection of the 
application of external criteria to the work of art, the new ‘Program’ affirms that ‘the 
starting point of criticism must be the perception that aesthetic categories [Kategorien] 
(criteria) are completely devalued’.37  
In contrast to both immanent critique and deductivism, Benjamin defines ‘materialist 
critic’ in terms of a montage-like construction composed ‘of at most two elements: the 
critical gloss and the cite’. It is a notion of criticism, he claims, that ‘should be 
developed entirely of quotations’.38 Indeed, this notion of materialist critique can 
certainly be seen as an ‘immanent critique of immanent critique’, as Caygill argues.39 
This immanent critique unfolds the earlier notion of immanent critique and its rejection 
of deductivism in the book on the baroque. Nevertheless, understanding this critique as 
a transition from immanent to materialist critique overlooks the paradoxical strategy of 
contrasting the emerging concept of materialist critique with a weak formulation of 
immanent critique, which in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ indeed had the potential 
to make the work absorb its history in order to fulfil its idea.  
It is paradoxical too, that against Benjamin’s strategy of presenting a weak formulation 
of immanent critique in order to motivate his new materialist programme, Uwe Steiner 
regards the former as being marked by a ‘metaphysical tendency’, one which ultimately 
embeds the notion of criticism within ‘the doctrine of the autonomy of art’ and for 
which the baroque book is still ‘caught up in metaphysics’.40 Steiner’s position 
summarises what has become the dominant reading of the transition from the book on 
the baroque towards a materialist critique or from Benjamin’s first to his second ‘cycle 
of production’,41 in which the former embodies a metaphysical philosophy that is later 
transformed into a materialist critique of culture. In this opposition, the radicalism of the 
                                                            
36 SW 2: 294. GS, VI: 166. 
37 SW 2: 290; GS VI: 164.   
38 SW 2: 290. Cf. OGT: 41-43 for Benjamin’s critique of deductivism.  
39 Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 63-66. 
40 Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 88, 96. 
41 CWB: 322.  
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latter —‘characterized by a political commitment’— is proved against the backdrop of 
immanent criticism as the bearer of metaphysical, dogmatic residue.
42
  
Benjamin’s problematic strategy allows for a different interpretation of the transition 
from immanent to materialist critique. The relation of literary criticism to film criticism 
offers a tentative solution: ‘[t]he relation of book criticism to film criticism is the 
reverse of what it should be. Book criticism should learn from film criticism. Instead, 
film criticism mainly apes book criticism’.43 Emphasising the affinities between 
immanent and materialist critique in terms of their methods (the immersion into the 
material content) and their objects (glosses, cites and quotations), the transition from 
immanent to materialist critique can be explained in terms of the material they work 
through rather than in the opposition staged by Benjamin himself (and the 
interpretations of Steiner and Caygill). Immanent critique requires a further 
development precisely because the object of critique undermines the possibility of 
looking at history from the standpoint of the transmissibility of tradition. The novelty 
and radicalism of materialist critique consists in recognising the shattering of tradition 
for which an alternative medium for the development of criticism is needed. In this way, 
the critical difference between immanent and materialist critique consists of the media 
through which they operate. Immanent criticism works through the retrospective 
digression which reconstructs and suspends of the multiple chains of transmission 
which deliver the object of critique from the past to the present (the multiple 
conceptualisations of the Trauerspiel); materialist critique operates in the light of the 
shattering of tradition and the unsettling of experience that the work of art in the age of 
its technical reproducibility produces. Unlike the baroque which is confronted through 
its transmissibility by tradition, technically reproducible works of art are unable to bear 
the historical testimony of their own origin (Ursprung). As Benjamin writes in the 
Artwork essay: ‘The authenticity [Die Echtheit] of a thing is the quintessence of all that 
is transmissible in it from its origin [Ursprung] on, ranging from its physical duration to 
                                                            
42 Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 110-2. As Steiner himself recognises, the materialist ‘critique of the concept 
of cultural history’ is later developed in the Fuchs essay (1934-1937), which resorts more fully to the 
concept of origin in the Trauerspiel book and the idea of the ‘continued life of artworks’. Standing 
alongside Steiner is Osborne’s claim that Benjamin’s materialist aesthetics is marked by a distance from 
the metaphysics of the theory of ideas in the Trauerspiel, i.e. the ‘timelessness’ of Benjamin’s ideas, 
which constrains the historical-philosophical project that the book aims to unfold under the notion of 
allegory: Peter Osborne, ‘Small-Scale Victories, Large-Scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin’s Politics of 
Time’, in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: 58.  
43 SW 2: 294. 
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its historical testimony’.44 While immanent critique operates by immersion in tradition, 
materialist critique confronts the technically reproducible work that bears no historical 
testimony. Both notions operate through similar principles: the immersion into the 
material content of the work and its organisation by means of glosses and cites. In 
addition, they complement each other in their accounts of different literary forms: if 
immanent critique offers an account of the problem of transmissibility of tradition, 
materialist critique confronts the shattering of tradition as the radicalisation of the 
problem of transmissibility as historiographic crisis. 
The relation between immanent and materialist critique is thus twofold: while the book 
on the baroque characterised the eruption of modernity from the standpoint of different 
notions of historical time in tragedy and Trauerspiel, the essays on literature explore 
late capitalism from the perspective of those genres that bear the marks of the loss of  
tradition and memory, most notably the story and the novel. Therefore, while the 
Trauerspiel shows that modern experience is marked by the loss of certainty in any 
eschatological future, the essays on literature present modern experience as being 
permeated by the loss of the traces of the past from which it emerges. With no future 
and past at hand modernity concentrates itself on the problem of the new. This twofold 
loss is embodied in the emergence of information and the almost pure transience of the 
newspaper, which ‘lives’ only at ‘the moment in which it is new’.45 From this 
perspective, the essays on literature and film present the crisis of experience as a 
historiographic crisis that verges on the risk of reducing the present to the mere cumulus 
of lived moments. In the light of the shattering of tradition both the work of art and 
critique must respond to the crisis of experience by other medium than tradition in order 
                                                            
44 SW 3: 103. 
45 SW 3: 148. In the essay on reproducibility, Benjamin entertains the possibility of a productive self-
alienation based on mass actualisation which had substituted actualisation by means of tradition: ‘By 
replicating the work many times over it, [technical reproducibility] substitutes a mass existence for a 
unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her own situation, it 
actualizes that which is reproduced’: SW 3:104; WuN 16:101. I will discuss the temporalities of the essay 
in the next chapter. However, it is important to emphasise here that this form of actualisation is 
suspended by the logic of capitalism and fascism, for which only the interruption of such logic can 
(momentarily) actualise such possibility. In this way, the productive self-alienation based on mass 
actualisation that Benjamin entertains remains as a counterfactual formulation rather than as a descriptive 
claim that might lead towards a progressivistic account of history and technology, as some interpreters 
assume. This is the case of Adorno’s first response to Benjamin in their correspondence from 1935 and 
the discussion on Benjamin’s alleged progressivism in regard to the essay on reproducibility which had 
lead to Benjamin’s surrender to the method of montage in the Arcades Project. CWB: 495-503; 579-585. 
See also Wolin, An Aesthetic of Redemption: 192.  
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to secure substantive experience. In modern epic narration, this crisis is contested with a 
turn towards memory as basis for experience. 
 
2. Epic Narration 
 
Benjamin’s essays on the works of Gottfried Keller, Franz Hessel and Alfred Döblin, 
written between 1927 and 1930 for the unfinished Collected Essays on Literature, 
develop the affinity between epic narration, memory and the new technologies of 
reproduction. In these works montage is the medium that brings forth the collective 
dimension of the work of art and the mnemonic character that contests both amnesic 
information and the historiographic crisis of modernity. For Benjamin, Hessel’s epic ‘is 
technically close to photomontage’46 while Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz is 
‘governed’ by the ‘stylistic principle of montage’ to which film ‘at its best moments [...] 
has made us accustomed to’.47 Benjamin adds that Döblin’s novel has ‘placed’ montage 
‘at the service of narrative’ for the first time. The affinity between epic and film is also 
confirmed in Benjamin’s writings on Brecht’s epic drama. In the first version of ‘What 
is Epic Theatre?’ (1931) he maintains that ‘[t]he forms of epic theatre correspond to the 
new technical forms of cinema and radio [...] the modern level of technology.’ In its 
second  version (1939) Benjamin reaffirms that epic theatre ‘proceeds by fits and starts, 
in a manner comparable to images film strips’, as ‘intervals’ that ‘destroy illusion’ and 
which  the mirror the ‘dialectical structure of film’.48  
Benjamin attributes a mnemonic character to epic narration, one which counteracts the 
amnestic character of modernity brought about by the shattering of tradition. Although 
this relation is more fully developed in the two essays on Hessel and the review of 
Berlin Alexanderplatz, some elements for the analysis of the epic are first introduced in 
the 1927 essay dedicated to the publication of Keller’s Complete Works. In his reading 
of Keller, Benjamin maintains that the ‘epic setting’ of his stories provides one of their 
critical qualities. This observation points to the ‘unromantic nature’ of his work, which 
                                                            
46 ‘Review of Hessel’s Heimliches Berlin’, SW 2:70. 
47 SW 2: 301. 
48 UB: 6, 21. ‘The formula in which the dialectical structure of film finds expression runs as follows. 
Discontinuous images replace one another in a continuous sequence. A theory of film would need to take 
account of both of these facts.’ (SW 3:95). 
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indeed anticipates Keller’s ‘essential contribution of the post-Romantic age in 
Germany’ and confirms his own exceptionality.49 The epic setting is configured by the 
interpenetration of ‘the narrative and the poetic [Des Erzählerischen und des 
Dichtirischen]’, being the centrality of the narrative element in the literary work what 
Benjamin deems as original.
50
 Two descriptions of this feature highlight its contribution 
to the articulation of the epic setting. Firstly, it is the ‘homesickness for his native 
Switzerland’ and its landscape what animates Keller’s work and produces in turn the 
‘echo’ of a ‘yearning for distant ages’, rendering the Swiss Alps into ‘a distant image’ 
which, like that of ‘Ithaca for Odysseus’, ‘remain[s] beautiful, remote...’.51 Secondly, 
the epic setting is configured by means of describing [Beschreiben]: in the ‘sensuous 
pleasure’ of ‘describing’ ‘the object returns the gaze of the observer’ and captures ‘the 
pleasure with which two gazes seek and find each other.’52 In Keller, the epic is 
informed by the narrative element that, however, remains caught up in the yearning for 
the past. This combination of elements transforms the present Swiss landscape into a 
‘Homeric Switzerland’ which nonetheless incorporates ‘the most mundane activities of 
the characters’ and the ‘rounded, canonical, sensuous reality that they must have had for 
a Roman’.53 The ‘unsentimental’ elements which are distinctive of Keller’s epic remain 
intertwined with the poetic. The subsequent essays on Hessel and Döblin explore the 
narrative element of the epic in terms of an alternative relation to the past in which the 
present is freed from yearning and the past transforms the present lived moment into 
substantive experience. The liberation of the narrative from the poetic is attained by 
means of the radicalisation of the principle of montage.
54
 
Two reviews dedicated to Hessel illustrate the liberation of the narrative element of the 
epic from the yearning that marks Keller’s works. Benjamin explains this in terms of the 
                                                            
49 ‘Gottfried Keller. In Honour of a Critical Edition of His Works’, SW 2: 55, 57. 
50 SW 2:57. Benjamin’s reading of Keller as an exceptional example in the Romantic tradition, one which 
bears the marks of the ‘post-Romantic’ generation, confirms Benjamin’s interest in that which breaks into 
inherited artistic realms and runs the risk of remaining unrecognised in its own epoch and even the 
possibility of not being transmitted to the future. In a similar fashion, Steiner affirms that as Post-
Romantic, Keller is the present’s prehistory and anticipates the works of Döblin, Kafka and Leskov and 
the last surviving examples of the storyteller (Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 99). 
51 SW 2: 55. GS II: 289. Translation amended 
52 SW 2: 56. 
53 SW 2: 55, 57. 
54 Caygill reads this transition in different terms: the late essays explore ‘the consequences of the 
destruction of the experience of the movement of recognition that made up the quality of Keller’s work’ 
(The Colour of Experience, p. 65-66). In this thesis the later essays are read as a variant of the epic, one in 
which narration dominates over the poetic and suspends the equilibrium which maintains the ‘quality’ of 
Keller’s epic setting that is caught up in a nostalgic yearning for the past. 
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transition from historical distance towards the distance of memory. In his 1927 review 
of Heimliches Berlin, Benjamin affirms that the book ‘is technically close to 
photomontage’: ‘housewives, artists, fashionable women, businessmen, scholars are all 
intercut contrastively with the shadowy outlines of Platonic comic masks’.55 Yet the 
source of these images is an ‘unknown’ or ‘secret’ Berlin, one which appears as ‘the 
stage of an Alexandrian Singspiel’ and reveals the narrator’s own ‘mysterious talent for 
investing the tiny territory described in his story with such a sense of spatial and 
temporal distance’.56 The 1929 review of Spazieren in Berlin confirms the modern city 
as the site from which the narrator ‘journeys into the past’.57 Nevertheless, here Berlin is 
the site of the narrator’s childhood rather than the image of a distant epoch for which the 
narrator years. The construction of historical distance in Hessel’s montage-like epic is 
therefore substituted with the distance created by the work of memory in Spazieren in 
Berlin. Thus, the writer moves from Berlin being the stage of an Alexandrian Singspiel 
to the Berlin of his childhood memories: 
The account of a city given by a native will always have something in common with 
memoirs; it is no accident that the writer has spent his childhood there. Just as Franz 
Hessel has spent his childhood in Berlin. And if he now sets out and walks through 
the city, he has nothing of the excited impressionism with which the travel writer 
approaches his subject. Hessel does not describe, he narrates [Hessel beschriebt 
nicht, er erzählt]. Even more, he repeats what he has heard. Spazieren in Berlin is an 
echo of the stories the city has told him ever since he was a child —an epic book 
through and through, a process of memorizing [memorieren] while strolling around, a 
book for which memory [Erinnerung] has acted not as the source but as the Muse. It 
goes along the streets in front of him, and each street is a vertiginous experience. [...] 
The city as a mnemonic [mnemotechnischer] for the lonely walker: it conjures up 
more than his childhood and youth, more than his own history.58 
 
This passage from ‘The Return of the Flâneur’ marks a series of transitions in 
Benjamin’s characterisation of the epic. Firstly, the emphasis on the narrative element 
underlines its liberation from the equilibrium or intertwinement with the poetic in 
Keller’s epic setting. Secondly, Hessel’s epic narration moves from history to memory 
as the grounds for experience. In Hessel’s work, epic narration consists in grasping the 
echo that comes from the past in order to transform the events of the present into 
vertiginous experience, rather than in investing the present with the beautiful 
                                                            
55 ‘Review of Hessel’s Heimliches Berlin’, SW 2: 70. 
56 SW 2: 70. 
57 ‘The Return of the Flâneur’ SW 2:263. 
58 SW 2: 263. My emphasis. 
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appearance of the past for which the writer yearns. Rather than nostalgically mourning 
an irretrievable past, narration makes the past citable and grounds substantive 
experience in memory (Erinnerung).
59
 
The muses from Magdeburger Strasse illustrate the ‘return of the gaze’ as the moment 
in which the objects encountered by the flâneur appear as memory, as something other 
which exceeds the history of the observed physical material.
60
 Benjamin thus introduces 
a critical distinction for his later works: ‘The lived instant [Erlebnis] wants the unique 
and the sensation; experience [Erfahrung] the eternal return’.61 Benjamin’s detour via 
the works of Hessel is therefore marked by the transition from description to narration, 
and from the distance of history to the distance created by the work of memory in 
narration: the return of the past in narration by means of the work of memory transforms 
the present lived moment into experience. It suspends the amnestic relation to the 
present in the lived moment but also contests the reified nostalgic image of the past. In 
epic narration, the past disrupts not as historical distance or as the object for which the 
writer yearns, but as memory (Erinnerung). Experience emerges on the basis of a long-
term form of sensibility in which the ephemeral is related to the past by memory 
without getting caught up in nostalgic yearning. The principle of montage in epic 
narration works then as the mnemotechnic device that contests both amnestic and 
nostalgic relations to the past and the present.
62
 
                                                            
59 See: OSMB: 201-2; GS I: 642. The formulation of experience, as the listening to the echo that comes 
from the past brings this reflection closer to the methodological discussion of the Trauerspiel book, in 
which the task of grasping the resonance of the baroque is the answer to methodologies which have 
subsumed the baroque’s force under particular conceptual schemes. In both cases, experience and critique 
create the conditions which enable the echo (or the force of the past) to reach the present. In the essay on 
Hessel, there is an emphasis on the work of memory rather than on the transmission of tradition, and a 
turn away from looking at history from the standpoint of tradition towards the standpoint of memory 
itself.  
60 SW 2:264-5. 
61 I follow here Caygill’s translation (The Colour of Experience: 68). The original reads: ‘Erlebnis will 
das Einmalige und die Sensation, Erfahrung das Immergleiches’: GS III: 198. 
62 As Brecht recognises, the principle of construction operating in Döblin’s works makes possible the idea 
of an ‘untragic hero’ (my emphasis). Döblin’s synthesised his own method as Kinostil, for which ‘the 
narrator has no place in the novel. One does not tell, but builds.’ See: Heidi Thomann Tewarson ‘Alfred 
Döblin und Bertolt Brecht: Aspekte einer literarischen Beziehung’, in Monatshefte, Vol. 79 No. 2 
(Summer, 1987), pp. 172-185. Tewarson quotes an entry from Brecht’s diary from 1920. Also: Michael 
Jennings, “Of Weimar’s First and Last Things: Montage, Revolution, and Fascism in Alfred Döblin’s 
Berlin Alexanderplatz and November 1918”, Politics in German Literature, ed. by Beth Bjorklund and 
Mark Cory (Columbia, South Carolina: Camden House, 1998); and Jennings, “Walter Benjamin and the 
European Avant-Garde”, in David Ferris, The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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Three main points are critical to this argument. First, in Keller, description brings the 
landscape forward as a distant, auratic image in narration; second, in Hessel, the historic 
distance created through the description of Berlin as the stage of a Singspiel is 
subsequently transformed into the distance created by memory in narration. In 
Spazieren in Berlin, narration juxtaposes the past and the present, working therefore as a 
catalyst which interrupts the lived moment and opens up an opportunity to ground 
experience. Third, although the second review of Hessel intimates the fragmentary 
memory (Gedächtnis) that Benjamin associates with the figure of the epic narrator in 
‘The Crisis of the Novel’ and ‘The Storyteller’, the review still refers to it as 
Erinnerung, which is later defined as the originary memory which grounds the ancient 
epic from which both the novel and epic narration are born. The distinction between 
modern epic and the novel enables us to trace, therefore, the mnemonic character of 
montage in epic narration, firstly introduced as memory (Erinnerung) and later specified 
in the concrete sense of short-lived reminiscence (Gedächtnis).
63
 
‘The Crisis of the Novel’ and ‘The Storyteller’ develop what Osborne calls Benjamin’s 
own ‘novelistic narrative of [the epic] evolving forms’.64 This narrative cannot be 
rearticulated reading Benjamin’s own writings chronologically. While the ‘The Crisis of 
the Novel’ confronts the novel with oral and written narration and reads both as epic 
forms, ‘The Storyteller’ goes one step further and situates both the novel and oral and 
written epic narration under the unity of the ‘original’ epic. According to ‘The 
Storyteller’, the original epic consisted in the unity of remembrance (Eingedenken) and 
reminiscence (Gedächtnis) in an originary memory (Erinnerung). The latter developed 
into two different forms of history-telling (Geschicht-Erzählen) or ‘temporalizations of 
history’ respectively associated with the novel and the modern epic.65 The emergence of 
the novel marks the split of this unit with the novel embodying totalizing remembrance 
(Eingedenken) and the new modern epic embodying fragmentary reminiscence 
(Gedächtnis). For Benjamin, the new epic narration attests to the persistence —however 
                                                            
63 Sigrid Weigel argues that Benjamin’s theory of memory is based on Erinnerung. Although she 
comments on the relevance that Gedächtnis have in ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ and elaborates upon 
the Gedächtnisraum or ‘memory-space of the collective’ which serves her to motivate her ‘topographical 
representation of memory’, she develops her analysis of memory manly from the standpoint of the ‘first 
phase of work on the Passagen’ from 1927- 1929. Her argument is therefore closer to the language of the 
period of the second Hessel review that to the ‘The Crisis of the Novel’ and ‘The Storyteller’. See: Body- 
and Image-Space: Re-Reading Walter Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 109–12; 118–27.  
64 Peter Osborne, ‘Small-scale Victories... ’: 78. 
65 SW 3: 154; Cf: Osborne, ‘Small-scale Victories...’: 77. Also Peter Osborne, Politics of Time: 134–38. 
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weak— of the mnemonic and collective character of the original epic in storytelling. Its 
radical actualisation is the task of materialist critique.  
Thus, the novel and epic narration are both written prose forms that oppose each other 
in terms of totalizing remembrance and fragmentary reminiscence, while storytelling 
and epic narration are two different forms of articulating reminiscence by means of oral 
and written media. The first distinction differentiates two forms of memory; the second 
distinguishes two forms or media configuring one specific form, i.e. reminiscence. By 
means of reminiscence epic written narration then recast the force of epic storytelling 
and opposes both the totalizing remembrance of the novel and the amnestic information 
linked to western, bourgeois journalism. Indeed, epic reminiscence makes apparent that 
totalizing remembrance is a deceptive answer to information as narrative form of 
modernity. Neither of them grounds transmission, being thus marked by different forms 
of  forgetting. With this brief sketch of Benjamin’s history of narrative forms, I will turn 
now to ‘The Crisis of the Novel’ and ‘The Storyteller’ in order to explore the principle 
of montage operating in epic written narration and the fragmentary notion of memory it 
organises.
66
  
 
 
 
                                                            
66 The affinity traced between materialist and immanent critique in the first section of this chapter serves 
to understand the parallelism between the analysis of the temporalities of tragedy and Trauerspiel on the 
one hand, and the temporalities informing the divergent notions of memory in the novel and the epic on 
the other. Both the Trauerspiel and the epic elude any fixed closure or the moment of absolute 
completion, whether in its eschatological form (fulfilled time in Classic tragedy) or in its illusory 
expression in modern tragedy and the novel. Critical to the Trauerspiel and epic narration is that they 
preclude the moment of completion by means of allegory and montage as devices of signification and 
organisation of the work of art. It is on the basis of this affinity that most interpreters read montage as 
allegorically meaningful. Cf: Burkhardt Lindner, ‘Allegorie’ in Michael Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla, 
Benjamins Begriffe I, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000). In ‘The Storyteller’, Benjamin also 
explores the chronicle, which is concerned with history as history of salvation or what Benjamin calls the 
‘drama of salvation’ in the book on the baroque. The complete argument maintains that the different 
narrative forms are rooted in epic storytelling or the original historiographic form. The epic is embedded 
with multiple and divergent forms of narrating history as ‘white light bears to the colors of the spectrum’ 
(SW 3:152). He regards the different forms of presenting historical change as colour spectrums which 
allow for a continuum or gradation of infinite values with neither specific definitions nor fixed ranges. 
Benjamin’s argument thus takes the narrative forms discussed above as reference points which may orient 
us in this subtle gradation, offering no fixed rules or determinate universals under which particular or 
specific cases must be arranged. A further literary form will be discussed in the final section of this 
chapter, i.e. the lyric poetry through which Baudelaire attempts less to suspend than to affirm the 
amnestic lived moment and then ecstatically ground experience by means of its intensification as 
innervation. 
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2.1 Narration, Montage and Reminiscence 
 
In ‘The Crisis of the Novel’ Benjamin reviews Alfred Döblin’s 1929 novel Berlin 
Alexanderplatz, a work which he paradoxically regards as an exemplary piece of epic 
narration and ‘the most extreme, vertiginous, the last and most advanced of the old 
bourgeois Bildungsroman’.67 The tension defining this work is due to two narrative 
elements which oppose each other: it is a novel whose stylistic principle of montage 
counteracts the novel form.
68
 At stake here is the confrontation of the fragmentary 
character of any narrative and the novel’s totalizing attempt to produce meaning by 
means of a structure based on the unity of the subject. The radicalization of the principle 
of montage illuminates the existing tension and precludes the novel’s subjective closure. 
The crisis of the novel emerges, therefore, from the novel’s impossibility to reach 
totality: ‘to write a novel is to take that which is incommensurable in the presentation of 
human existence to the extreme’.69 For Benjamin, the task of the novel is illusionary and 
deceptive: it embodies a notion of memory that aspires to a totalizing and unitary 
closure that is nevertheless unattainable. This is the inner constitutive tension of the 
novel. It cannot be overcome because in touching upon the incommensurability of 
experience the novel is revealed to be a fragmentary literary form.  
If the novel aims to overcome its own fragmentary character, epic narration radicalises 
such fragmentariness by means of the principle of montage and stresses its own limits 
and, therefore, the impossibility of their overcoming. Benjamin follows György Lukács’ 
reading of the novel and Döblin’s own theoretical approach to the epic work. For 
Lukács, the novel is ‘the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life is no 
longer directly given, in which the immanence of life has become a problem, yet which 
still thinks in terms of totality’.70 The ‘transcendental homelessness’ or ‘metaphysical 
homesickness’ of the subject consists in the inability of the novel to attain a ‘closed 
totality’.71 It is unable then to recast what Aristotle called the ‘magnitude’ which 
                                                            
67 SW 2: 301, 304.  
68 Benjamin’s claim about the resistance of the Trauerspiel to inherited schemes might serve to highlight 
the conflict of this novel: ‘[a] major work will either establish a new genre or abolish it. The perfect work 
will do both’: OGT: 44. 
69 SW 2: 299. GS III: 230.  
70 Gyorg Lukács, Theory of the Novel (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1971), p. 56. My 
emphasis. 
71 Lukács, Theory of the Novel: 33, 60, 61.  
 
 
137 
tragedy achieves only by means of its dramatic form and not through its narrative 
element.
72
 
Döblin’s own critique of the book and the novel form in ‘The Structure of the Epic 
Work’ locates Berlin Alexanderplatz under the light of the arguments against literary 
criticism based on the novel and the demand that Benjamin establishes for literary 
criticism to learn from the new technologies of reproduction and film criticism. Döblin 
maintains that the crisis of the novel and the book is advantageous in a double sense: it 
opens the opportunity for the ‘emancipation of the epic from the book’ and gives the 
conditions for the liberation of language which ‘the book spells [to] death’.73 With the 
‘reinstatement of the epic’, Benjamin writes, Döblin ‘hurries ahead’ of the crisis of the 
book and the novel and ‘makes its cause his own’.74 Modern epic writing liberates 
language by recasting the force of oral storytelling, therefore actualising the potentiality 
of collective experience while precluding the novel’s subjective closure. 
In the Döblin review Benjamin regards both the novel and epic narration as fragmentary 
literary forms unable to achieve a closed totality. Both are fragmentary configurations 
incapable of reaching completion. Both are organised as montages in a general sense: 
they are constructions made up of assembles incapable of attaining the totality of human 
existence. However, whereas the novel attempts to overcome the fragmentariness of 
montage, epic narration radicalises its own principle of construction as a method which 
precludes the illusory completion of the novel. Benjamin describes the ‘purely epic 
approach of narration’ operating in Berlin Alexanderplatz in contrast to Gidé’s ‘purely 
novelistic’ writing. It is not a ‘dialogue intérieur’ what operates in this work but 
‘something quite different’: ‘the stylistic principle governing this book is that of 
montage’. It ‘explodes the framework of the novel, bursts its limits and clears the way 
                                                            
72 Cf: Aristotle, Poetics, ed. by John Baxter and Patrick Atherton, trans. by George Whalley (Montreal ; 
London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 1447b27; my emphasis. The inability to achieve unity 
affects the capacity of the modern epic to produce the image of the ‘hero’s life’, which is also necessary 
to attain Aristotelian catharsis. Benjamin expands on this issue in regard to epic drama, which alienates 
(verfremden) the audience from a modern (illusory) recasting of the tragic hero: ‘What is Epic Theatre? 
(Second Version),’ UB: 18. For a discussion on the appearance of unity in Lukács’ understanding of the 
novel, see Cunningham, David, ‘Capitalist and Bourgeois Epic: Lukács, Abstraction and the Novel’, and 
Bewes, Timothy, ‘How to Escape from Literature? Lukács, Cinema and The Theory of the Novel’, in 
Georg Lukács: The Fundamental Dissonance of Existence, ed. by Bewes, Timothy and Hall, Timothy 
(London: Continuum, 2011). 
73 Jahrbuch der Sektion für Dichtkunst (Berlin, 1929), p. 262; quoted in ‘The Crisis of the Novel’: SW 2: 
300. 
74 SW 2: 300.  
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for new epic possibilities’.75 For Benjamin, Döblin’s ‘reinstatement’ or ‘reinforcement 
of radical epic’ recognises the fragmentariness of any narrative to reveal the limits of 
the novel and suspend or destroy any appearance of totality.
76
 The epic, therefore, offers 
an alternative to the shattering of tradition, but also to the illusory response offered to 
this by the novel and the forgetting of information.
77
 
The principle of montage associated with the epic carries a mnemonic function. 
Benjamin explains this character in his comparison of the novel and the epic in which 
he considers their individualistic and collective ‘birthplace’ and the abilities of their 
readers to recount the novel and the narration. These differences forge divergent notions 
of memory. While the birthplace of the novel is the individual who ‘has secluded 
himself from people and their achievements’, ‘the individual in isolation’, narration 
keeps alive the ‘collective dimension’ of ‘the epic at its purest’ which Benjamin 
identifies with the oral tradition of storytelling, in which the chain of transmission that 
passes down stories is created by those who collect and recreate them in the act of 
                                                            
75 SW 2: 301. Just as Aristotle considers that ‘all the parts of the epic are contained in tragedy but those of 
tragedy are not to be found in the epic’ (Poetics, 144b15), the novel includes the essential elements of 
epic narration (montage, fragmentariness, etc.) but epic narration does not include the essential mark of 
the novel (the aspiration to totality). The epic and the Trauerspiel resist to the completion and universality 
that tragedy reaches in its classic form, whereas modern epic narration counteracts the completion which 
the novel aims to bring about as remembrance. To borrow an expression from Darko Štrajn, the function 
of montage is to de-montage the subject position associated with the novel’s organisation. Again, the 
affinity between Trauerspiel and modern epic becomes apparent in their devices of signification and 
construction: like allegory, montage destroys the appearance of totality, not of the symbol but of the 
subject-based closure of remembrance. A more complex dynamics can be set up following the de-prefix 
upon which Štrajn elaborates: the novel resists the fragmentariness of montage while producing an 
artificial totality to which epic narration in turn resists and, then, de-mounts. This parallels the logic of the 
distortion of distortion within which Benjamin’s writings are inscribed, as I explained in Chapters 1 and 
2. See: Darko Štrajn, ‘The Principle of Montage and Literature: Fragmented Subjectivity and as the 
Subject-Matter in the Novel, Film and in Digital Forms of Narration’, Primerjalna Književnost 
(Ljubljana), 37.2 (2014), p. 43. It is worth notice that John J. White refers to the early mention of 
montieren in Brecht’s Mann ist Mann (1926) in a negative way as unmontieren. Although Benjamin did 
not discuss this in his writings on Brecht, this negative use brings into consideration a critical element of 
montage as de-mounting the fetishist montage that aims to represent reality. See: Bertolt Brecht, ‘On 
Experimental Theatre’, tr. by Carl Richard Mueller, The Tulane Drama Review, Vo. 6, No. 1 (Sept. 
1961), p. 8; also: White, Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory, (New York: Camden House, 2004), p. 56. 
76 SW 2: 300.  
77 Benjamin’s presentation of narration runs counter to that offered by Lukács in ‘Narrate or Describe?’ 
(1936). Lukács opposes these principles in terms of their contribution to the unity of the novel (however 
unattainable this might be in its ‘pure form’): the former offers coherence to the ‘destines of the 
characters’ while the latter only depicts facts that remain unarticulated and are therefore inessential to the 
‘whole’ of the novel. For Benjamin, narration precludes the novel’s closure. It operates from within the 
novel to suspend or interrupt the illusory devices which produce its appearance of unity: Lukács, Writer 
and Critic, ed. & trans. by Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin Press, 1971), pp. 110–12. With regards to 
Brecht and Döblin, Richard John Murphy affirms that their opposition to Lukács’s concept of narration 
suspends the ‘organic whole’ of the work by ‘defusing... linear organisation’ and the plot’s ‘aura of 
indispensability’: Theorizing the Avant-Garde, Modernism and, Expressionism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 21.  
 
 
139 
telling them to others.
78
 Thus, while the novelist is a solitary writer, the epic writer 
embodies some sort of communality inherited from the ancient art of storytelling. If the 
former ‘dissociates’ meaning from the social character of the original epic,79 the latter 
negotiates ‘the confines of the human subject’ in opposition to a purely nostalgic, 
individualistic absorption.
80
 
In ‘The Storyteller’ (1936) Benjamin relates the divergent characteristics of the novel 
and the epic to contrasting notions of memory. The aim for a totalizing closure of the 
novel is grounded in remembrance or Eingedenken, while the fragmentary principle of 
the epic embodies reminiscence or Gedächtnis. Benjamin argues that, originally, both 
the novel and the epic were united in their primal epic form before diverging and 
heading off in different directions. Such original unity was the unity of memory, 
Erinnerung which encompassed Eingedenken and Gedächtnis.
81
 The shattering of 
tradition witness to the split of this unity and the emergence of the novel on the basis of 
Eingedenken, thereby revealing a form of memory associated with the subject’s 
solitude. In light of the crisis of transmissibility grounded in tradition, the collective 
dimension of the original epic which receded into Gedächtnis is kept alive by the oral 
tradition of storytelling and by epic written narration. In this way, the epic is reinstated 
yet no longer in its original form. The central question is whether the stylistic principle 
of montage organising epic narration is able to recast the collective dimension of 
storytelling in light of the absence of tradition, or whether modern epic may make the 
‘voice of the born storyteller’ resonate.82 
For Benjamin, the storyteller has his roots in the experiences accumulated by travellers 
who learnt from other’s experiences and in those who stayed home and were familiar 
with local tales and traditions. The aforementioned travellers and ‘people of the tribe’ 
were originally ‘seamen and peasants’ for whom the artisan class ‘was their university.’ 
With their inclination ‘towards practical matters’ storytellers were also able to give 
‘practical advice.’83 This double emphasis on the practical dimension of storytelling —
with its roots in craftsmanship and the transmission of counsel— constitutes the core of 
                                                            
78 SW 3: 144, 154.  
79 McCole, The Antinomies of Tradition: 277. 
80 Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 162. Hanssen also relates this non-nostalgic 
approach to the ethical dimension of memory in Benjamin (5-7, 103).  
81 SW 3: 154. 
82 SW 2: 300.  
83 SW 3: 145.   
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Benjamin’s characterisation of this narrative form. Storytelling offers practical advice in 
the act of telling the story to others or in the experience of passing it ‘from mouth to 
mouth’: ‘After all, counsel is less an answer to a question than a proposal concerning 
the continuation of a story which is in the process of unfolding. To seek this counsel one 
would first have to be able to tell the story’.84 The experience of listening to the story is 
complete only until the story is recalled and told to others; until it is reproduced. Once 
the story claims a ‘place in the memory of the listener’ (einem Platz im Gedächtnis des 
Hörenden) it can be transmitted: ‘the more completely the story is integrated into the 
latter’s own experience, the greater will be its inclination to repeat it to someone else 
someday, sooner or later’.85 This process of transmission articulates what Benjamin 
calls the fabric of real or lived life: ‘Counsel woven into the fabric of real life [gelebten 
Lebens] is wisdom’.86 In relation to storytelling it is, therefore, the act of transmission 
what substantiates experience or what gives an experiential element to life. The 
actualisation of the story occurs in its own reproducibility, in the conditions of 
possibility for it to be recollected and told: the presence of a community of listeners that 
will transmit the story and which, in turn, dissolves the distinction between storytellers 
and listeners. Here, reproducibility and transmissibility are two different ways of 
naming the conditions of possibility for storytelling. It is precisely in relation to the 
existence of the community of listeners and their ‘interest in retaining what [they are] 
told’ that Benjamin claims that ‘memory [Gedächtnis] is the epic faculty par 
excellence’.87 It is in the possibility of recalling and telling the story that the ephemeral 
moment of listening to the story is related to the tradition weaved by multiple 
generations passing down the story. When the listener transforms her or himself into a 
storyteller she or him is waving the fabric of real life, making the ephemeral lived 
moment absorb the totality of history concentrated in the story. Like the baroque 
Trauerspiel, the epic excludes ‘transcendence by incorporating it’.88 Yet at the same 
time, waving the fabric of real life transforms the story into a collective assemble made 
up by different generations, blurring the difference between storytellers and listeners. 
                                                            
84 SW 3: 145-6. By contrast, the Döblin review affirms that the novelist ‘himself lacks counsel and can 
give none’ (SW 2:300). As Andrew Benjamin notes: ‘the novel neither articulates nor continues tradition’: 
Andrew Benjamin, ‘Tradition and Experience in ‘‘Some Motifs of Baudelaire’’’ Andrew Benjamin, The 
Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 125. 
85 SW 3: 149; GS II: 446.  
86 SW 3: 146; GS II: 442.  
87 SW 3: 153; GS II: 453. 
88 As commented in Chapter 1, Weber uses this expression to describe the baroque attitude towards 
sovereign, divine transcendence: Benjamin’s -abilities: 187. 
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Here, the fabric of real life and tradition are two different forms of naming the 
transmissibility of the story or the conditions of possibility for substantive experience. 
In contrast, the crisis of tradition brings about the possibility of having reproducibility 
without transmissibility, i.e. to bring forth a form of reproducibility marked by 
forgetting as it is the case of information.
89
 
‘The Crisis of the Novel’ opposes the rupture between the novel and the original epic in 
order to maintain the continuity between oral storytelling and epic written narration. 
Benjamin first distinguishes the birthplace of each literary form and then compares the 
readers of the novel and the epic. Firstly: ‘what distinguishes the novel from all other 
forms of prose is that it neither originates in the oral tradition nor flows back into it’. 
Secondly, while the reader of the novel recedes into the ‘inner human being’, ‘duration 
is the criterion of epic writing far more than of other types of literature. Duration not in 
time, but in the reader’.90 The reader of the novel does not ground  tradition, the reader 
of epic narration weaves the fabric of real life. The mnemonic character of narration 
configures experience on the basis of fragmentary memory, thereby grounding 
Erfahrung in Gedächtnis. This in turn forces Erinnerung to recede into an expression of 
Erlebnis. Paradoxically, the latter remains in a relation to the present marked by 
forgetting.
91
  
                                                            
89 A critical element of storytelling is that the story is open to multiple transformations in the process of 
being recollected and told again. Nonetheless, its ‘narrative form’ remains, as Andrew Benjamin explains. 
It is also critical to stress the affinities between the model of transmissibility of tradition in relation to the 
art of storytelling and the passages discussed in Chapter 1 on the transmissibility of doctrine and the 
model of religious teachings that continuously transforms educators into students when they transmit the 
contents of tradition anew. Like religious teachings, the story is always anew when it is recollected and 
told again. A critical contribution of Andrew Benjamin for an interpretation of the Leskov essay is the 
emphasis on the relation between the fabric of life and the ‘community of listeners’ which keeps tradition 
alive and, by extension, maintain the ‘living efficacy’ of the storyteller. From this perspective, the decline 
of storytelling marks the decline of collective experience. (A. Benjamin, ‘Tradition and Experience... ’:  
123-4; 127). In a further development of the Benjaminian concept of the fabric of life, Andrew Benjamin 
formulates the notion of the fabric of existence which defines the ‘human being in terms of modes of 
relationality rather than isolated subjectivity’. Although this project does not revolve around the Leskov 
essay, the relationship between tradition and community informs the negotiated or contested subjectivity 
and the ‘creation of subject positions’ in favour of relationality. See: Andrew Benjamin, Working with 
Walter Benjamin: 4–5, 20, 95; 110–12.  
90 SW 2: 299, 303. 
91 A totalising model of memory, whether based on Eingedenken or Erinnerung as characterised in ‘The 
Storyteller’, may lead to what Martin Jay describes as a ‘notion of memory as a ‘‘re-membering’’ of that 
which has been dismembered’, an ‘anamnestic totalizing of the detotalized’ or what might be understood 
as an anamnestic memory. This totalising strategy looks for a ‘new symbolic equilibrium through a 
process of collective mourning, which would ‘‘work through’’ the grief’ even when the conditions for 
collective mourning had been annihilated.’ Jay also returns to the Leskov essay in order to illustrate the 
anti-Hegelian, ‘paradoxical call’ for ‘unforgettable, immortal life’ yet ‘without monument, without 
memory.’ See: Jay, Martin, ‘Walter Benjamin, Remembrance and the First World War’, in Perception 
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However weak, the mnemonic character of narration that the principle of montage 
organises in epic narration makes the voice of the storyteller resonate: it avoids both the 
reader growing silent in the pure present of information and the illusory overcoming the 
limits of presentation by means of remembrance.
92
 The mnemonic character of 
narration also grounds the possibility of transmission in the light of the shattering of 
tradition. As Steiner writes, this notion of epic narration bodies forth the ‘rhythm’ ‘not 
of individual but of collective life’, one which exceeds the limits of death established by 
the novel and negotiates the limits of the subject.
93
 What the essays on modern epic 
narration bring to the fore is the actualisation of epic storytelling by means of the 
principle of montage. Through the radicalisation of montage as the principle of 
construction of any narrative form, modern epic precludes the totalising closure of the 
novel, leaving the work open to the discovery of new meanings through the 
juxtaposition of fragments from the present with the past that appears as reminiscence. 
In this sense, rather than the totalizing configuration of remembrance, the principle of 
montage which operates in epic narration acts as a catalyst for the work of involuntary, 
fragmentary reminiscence or Gedächtnis. 
Two different lines of argumentation are opened up in the discussion on the relation 
between experience, the work of memory and the principle of montage. The first one is 
the further development of the relation between experience and memory in the specific 
sense of reminiscence, which counteracts both the temporality of the lived moment and 
its illusory overcoming in the novel. The second one follows the characterisation of the 
principle of montage which organises the work of art and provides the basis for an 
alternative historiographic form that counteracts the historiographic crisis of modernity. 
The first argument is indirectly elaborated in the 1939 essay ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’ by means of the analysis of Baudelaire’s lyric poetry and his unsuccessful 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and Experience in Modernity, ed. by Helga Geyer-Ryan, Benjamin Studies / Studien 1 (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi Series, 2002), pp. 185–208 (190–91). Following Wohlfarth, Osborne examines this particular 
problem through the lens of Eingedenken to which film had offered its ‘equivalent historiographic form’ 
(‘Small-scale Victories...’: 78, 101-2). See also: Irving Wohlfarth, ‘On the Messianic Structure of 
Benjamin’s Last Reflections’, in Walter Benjamin. Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. by Peter 
Osborne (New York: Routledge, 2005), Vol. I. The argument pursued in this thesis in relation to memory 
is closer to that of Andrew Benjamin since he emphasises the relevance of the notion of Gedächtnis in the 
Leskov essay and the process of ‘Nietzschean repetition’ embodied in episches Gedächtnis, which 
‘involves the always different’. Following the English version of ‘The Storyteller’, A. Benjamin refers 
nonetheless to this specific case of episches Gedächtnis as epic remembrance. (A. Benjamin, ‘Tradition 
and Experience...’: 124-6, 128). 
92 As Steiner remarks, it is for this reason that Benjamin understood Krauss’ journalistic work as ‘stuck in 
a hopeless position, fighting a lost ‘‘battle against the press’’’ (Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 83). 
93 Steiner, Walter Benjamin: 130. 
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attempt to attain experience on the basis of the lived moment, which I will explore in 
more depth in the next section. The second part of the argument is explored in ‘Small 
History of Photography’ (1931), Benjamin’s essays on Brecht (1931-1939), ‘The 
Author as Producer’ (1934) and in the Artwork essay (1935-9), which will be discussed 
in the next chapter.  
 
 
3. Baudelaire and the Shock-Event 
 
In a further development of the relationship between experience and reminiscence 
(Gedächtnis) or ‘the epic faculty par excellence’,94 Benjamin echoes Bergson’s 
Matièrie et Mémoire  and the affirmation that ‘the structure of memory [Gedächtnis]’ is 
decisive for the ‘philosophical structure of experience [Erfahrung]’.95 Benjamin 
describes this structure in the following terms: ‘Experience is indeed a matter of 
tradition in collective existence as well as in private life. It is the product less of facts 
firmly anchored in memory [Erinnerung] than of accumulated and frequently 
unconscious data that flow together in memory [Gedächtnis]’.96 It is in the context 
delineated by the relationship between experience and unconscious, short-lived 
Gedächtnis or reminiscence that Benjamin addresses the tension which informs the lyric 
poetry of Baudelaire.  
For Benjamin, Baudelaire aims to ground substantive experience in the lived moment 
yet ultimately establishes a ‘crisis-proof form’ of experience by means of 
correspondences, a specific form of sensibility based on memory or recollection 
(Eingedenken). Baudelaire’s introduction of a mnemonic medium for the configuration 
of experience reveals, against his own attempt, that experience cannot be grounded 
exclusively on the basis of the lived moment. In this sense, the essay on Baudelaire 
confirms the relationship between experience and memory established earlier in the 
                                                            
94 SW 3: 153; GS II: 453. 
95 OSMB: 172. On the poverty of experience in Bergson, see specially: Matter and Memory, tr., N.M. 
Paul and W.S. Palmer, (New York: Zone Books, 1994) pp. 208–209. 
96 OSMB: 172. On the positive relationship between the unconscious and memory, and the incomplete or 
unfulfilled consciousness, see Bergson, Matter and Memory: 30–32. 
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essays on epic narration. Experience reclaims a mnemonic basis which is excluded from 
the lived moment.  
Critical to this discussion is the strategy which Benjamin undertakes in his analysis of 
Baudelaire. Following the opening of the essay and the claim that experience is related 
to Gedächtnis (short, fragmentary memory or reminiscence), the lived moment is 
consequently characterised as a form of forgetting. Indeed, Benjamin affirms that the 
gambler and the passer-by to whom Baudelaire paid homage resemble characters who 
have seen their ‘memories liquidated’.97 In his final analysis, however, Benjamin 
maintains that Baudelaire’s correspondences are related to the work of involuntary 
memory, albeit veiled by ‘tears of homesickness’ and, therefore, marked by ‘past-
experiencing’ and ‘nostalgia’.98 From this perspective, Baudelaire’s mnemonic basis for 
experience does not suspend the lived moment but complements it instead. Being 
unable to break through that deceptive veil it excludes the possibility of vindicating 
experience. 
In his communication with Max Horkheimer on his plan of writing a book on 
Baudelaire Benjamin argues that the relevance of the French poet resides in him being 
the first writer to understand the ‘productive energy of the individual alienated from 
himself’. To some extent, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939), written as exposé of 
the unfinished book, explores this productive energy as the central topic of Fleurs du 
Mal (1857).
99
 This is particularly clear in the first part of the essay, where Benjamin 
follows Baudelaire’s interest in the crowd, the passer-by and the rhythm of the city. The 
second part of the essay relates to Baudelaire’s recognition of the limits of the lived 
moment and the characterisation of correspondance as the medium by which to 
confront the almost ecstatic rhythm of the urban life. In this way the essay oscillates 
from the energy of the lived moment to its insufficiency to sustain experience.  
 
 
 
                                                            
97 OSMB: 193-4. 
98 OSMB: 198, 200. 
99 CWB: 557. 
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3.1 Innervation and Recollection. 
 
In the opening sections of the 1939 essay on Baudelaire Benjamin introduces different 
formulations of an unconscious, short-lived memory in order to show that, in principle, 
Baudelaire’s project consists in the search for other basis for experience than that of 
memory. Benjamin frames the notion of memory in terms of Gedächtnis, articulating 
the relation between the fragmentary and unconscious elements of memory by means of 
Proust’s involuntary memory and Freud’s memory traces. Both forms of memory are 
confronted with the work of voluntary, conscious acts of memory which, on the basis of 
Erinnerung, are unable to produce substantive experience. Critical to Benjamin’s essay 
is the double mechanism of consciousness and memory established by Freud in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920). According to this those events which are consciously 
registered by the psyche leave no memory traces for which they cannot be recollected 
by the intellect. It is these events which force the psyche to mobilise energy for the 
protection against excessive stimuli emerging from the environment, namely, shocks 
which in the process of being confronted and registered by the psyche are transformed 
into conscious events or ‘isolated experience’ (Erlebnis).100  
To some extent, the protection against stimuli reduces or undermines the possibility of 
producing experience (Erfahrung) in different ways. First, it forces the system of 
consciousness to react against excessive stimuli and mobilise resources or energy of 
other systems, thereby exhausting their capabilities for certain periods of time. 
Benjamin’s references to Freud omit this specific part of the mechanism of protection, 
in which shock forces the psyche to spend its energy in parrying the stimuli at the cost 
of other functions.
101
 The first association established by Benjamin between Proust and 
Freud is the general thesis that substantive experience is related to those events which 
have not been consciously confronted, thereby leaving their imprint on other parts of the 
                                                            
100 OSMB: 176-7.  
101 Benjamin quotes mainly from section IV of Beyond the Pleasure Principle to describe the process of 
innervation or the ‘charge of energy’ that is produced by an excess of stimuli and the assumption that 
‘emerging consciousness takes the place of a memory trace’ (OSMB: 175). Nevertheless, he does not 
include references to the effects of the ‘counter-charge’ of energy which paralyses other functions of the 
system. On the complementary process of ‘counter-charge’, or anticathexis, Freud writes: ‘Cathectic 
energy is summoned from all sides to provide sufficiently high cathexes of energy in the environs of the 
breach. An ‘anticathexis’ on a grand scale is set up, for whose benefit all the other psychical systems are 
impoverished, so that the remaining psychical functions are extensively paralysed or reduced’. See: 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud (London: Hogarth Press), XVIII, pp. 30–31. 
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system, for which they are able to return in subsequent moments as reminiscences or 
involuntary memories. Here, there is a dialectic of shock and innervation that explains 
the energy of the alienated man: shock innervates the body by forcing it to respond with 
the mechanism of protection albeit at the same time consumes or exhausts the energy 
required to complete other functions. Shocks innervate and debilitate the body at the 
same time. They trigger the operations that parry the excessive stimuli which impact the 
sensibility while at the same time anaesthetise the latter.   
There is a third notion of memory which Benjamin associates with involuntary, 
unconscious work and the shock-event or Chockerlebnis: the time for ‘recollection’ or 
‘time for organizing ‘‘the reception of stimuli’’’ produced by the shock.102 What these 
three concepts of memory (i.e involuntary memory, memory traces and recollection) 
have in common is the momentary suspension of the temporality of the lived moment 
which opens up the possibility of relating the ephemeral present to the past. These 
concepts serve to establish the limits of Baudelaire’s project. In his immersion into the  
‘large-scale consciousness’ of the amnestic the lived moment in order to secure an 
alternative notion experience (different from experience associated with the 
transmissibility of tradition and memory), ‘Baudelaire made it his business to parry the 
shocks, no matter what their source, with his spiritual and physical self’.103 In this sense, 
the exposé is initially concerned with Baudelaire’s paradoxical movement of 
recognising the crisis of experience and confronting it on the basis of the lived moment.  
As Friedlander notes, Baudelaire’s ‘poetic task’ consists in ‘facing the transformation of 
the structure of experience in modernity, with the possibility of making that 
transformation affirmable’.104 Benjamin articulates this tension by making explicit the 
fact that the conditions for the reception of lyric poetry have been unsettled in 
modernity: Baudelaire ‘envisaged readers to whom the reading of lyric poetry would 
present difficulties. The introductory poem of Les Fleurs du mal is addressed to these 
readers’.105 Having established the affinity between Baudelaire and his readers in terms 
of the crisis of experience marked by the dominance of shock, in which ‘only in rare 
                                                            
102 OSMB: 177. 
103 OSMB: 178. Harry Zohn’s observation that the Gedächtnis/Erinnerung distinction ‘is roughly 
paralleled by the one between Erfahrung and Erlebnis’ does not justify the stronger connection between 
experience and reminiscence already established by Benjamin in his essays on epic narration, and which 
is now confirmed in the exposé. Erfahrung is grounded in Gedächtnis while Erinnerung recedes into 
Erlebnis. Cf: The Writer of Modern Life p. 275 (fn. 7). 
104 Friedlander, A Philosophical Portrait: 157. 
105 OSMB: 170. 
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instances does lyric poetry accord with the experience of its readers’, Benjamin then 
goes on to describe the change in ‘the structure of experience’ that undermines the 
position of the reader of lyric poetry in terms of the effects of the ‘shock experience 
[Chockerfahrung]’ which Baudelaire situates ‘at the centre of his art’.106 In this context 
Baudelaire’s reason of State is to transform Chockerlebnis into Chockerfahrung.  
For Benjamin, as for Baudelaire, the lived moment corresponds to the perception 
formed on the basis of shock and its double effect of innervating and exhausting 
different mechanisms in the sensibility. Elaborating on the reduced experience of the 
passer-by in the city and the phenomenon of the crowd, Benjamin writes: 
Moving through this traffic involves the individual in a series of shocks and 
collisions. At dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow through him in rapid 
succession, like the energy from a battery. Baudelaire speaks of a man who 
plunges into the crowd as into a reservoir of electric energy. Circumscribing the 
experience of the shock, he calls this man ‘‘a kaleidoscope endowed with 
consciousness’’. Whereas Poe’s passers-by cast glances in all directions, 
seemingly without cause, today’s pedestrians are obliged to look about them so 
that they can be aware of traffic signals. This, technology has subjected the human 
sensorium to a complex kind of conditioning [Dressur]. There came a day when a 
new and urgent need for stimuli was met by film. In a film, perception conditioned 
by shock [Chockförmige Wahrnehmung] was established as a formal principle. 
What determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the same thing 
that underlies the rhythm of reception in the film.107 
 
Here, Benjamin traces the double effect of shock. While the first part of the passage is 
dedicated to process of innervation or the triggering of nervous impulses by the energy 
coming from the urban environment, the second part moves to the conditioning that this 
constant flow of energy produces on the human sensorium. Although the passer-by is 
energised or innervated by the urban crowds and the constant flux of the city, the effects 
of shock are ultimately compared to those that the conveyor belt has on its operators. 
The passage marks the transition from the ecstatic presentation of shock-based 
perception to the enervative results concentrated in the technical conditioning to which 
the human sensorium has been subjected.  
Benjamin discloses the effects of shock by distinguishing between conditioning 
(Dressur) and training or long-term practice (Übung). In quoting Marx’s Capital 
Benjamin explains shock-based perception in terms of the submission of the worker to 
                                                            
106 OSMB: 178. 
107 OSMB: 191. My emphasis. 
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the machinery, which stands as the ‘technologically concrete form’ of the 
transformation from handicraft practice or training (Übung) to unskilled work 
(Dressur).
108
 Whereas the former finds ‘its proper technical form in experience and 
slowly perfects it’, the latter has been ‘sealed off from experience’.109 Perception 
configured by shock is thus antithetic to experience. It remains within the sphere of the 
lived moment or the shock-event illustrated by the image of the worker and the city-
dweller whose movement is determined by the rhythm of the conveyor belt and the 
crowd. The rhythm captured by these images is concentrated in the dominance of the 
reflex movement demanded by the machine over long-term practice or training. In the 
reflex movement, which resembles the gambler’s desire to ‘start all over again’, each 
moment is reduced to quick movements deprived of value. Shock, as Tim Armstrong 
argues, becomes the mark or sign of alienation.
110
 It is in the accumulation of single 
moments ‘devoid from substance’ that Benjamin identifies the common ground which 
workers, passers-by and gamblers share with those ‘fictitious characters who have 
completely liquidated their memories’.111  
It is this dimension of shock what Baudelaire confronts by means of correspondences, 
the relationships established between different realms of perception which transform the 
lived moment into the recognition of meaningful involuntary associations, in which 
‘scents, colors and sounds respond to one another’.112 As Benjamin emphasises, 
correspondences cannot be explained in terms of empirical psychology or mysticism, 
but only in terms of the structure of memory. Thus, in spite of Baudelaire’s homage to 
the rhythm of the lived moment and the shock-event Benjamin finds in Les Fleurs du 
mal an alternative temporality, one whose ‘substance’ is ‘defined in the notion of 
                                                            
108 Karl Marx, Das Kapital (Berlin, 1932), p. 404. Quoted in OSMB: 191.  
109 OSMB: 192.  
110 Tim Armstrong, ‘Two Types of Shock in Modernity’, Critical Quarterly, 42.1 (2000), 60–73 (pp. 66–
67). Armstrong provides a reading which relates Baudelaire’s correspondences directly to Freud’s theory 
of shock. For Armstrong, ‘‘‘[t]he acceptance of shocks is facilitated by training in coping with stimuli’’ 
which eventually produces correspondences, ‘‘an experience which seeks to establish itself in crisis-proof 
form’’’. In this context correspondences act as counter-charge, for which an explanation of the 
exhaustion of other functions must be offered. If correspondences are auratic, marked by past-
experiencing and homesickness, then they do not counteract the stimuli or shocks but complement them 
by turning them into the point of entry for an auratic form of perception. Considering correspondences as 
auratic forms of perception, they are unable to interrupt the lived moment, thereby remaining caught in 
illusory forms of confronting the shattering of tradition. It is rather Baudelaire’s allegorical insight what 
counter-acts the lived moment, as Friedlander suggests (A Philosophical Portrait: 152-6). 
111 OSMB: 193-4. The relation established above serves to dissociate shock from experience and thus turn 
Benjamin’s initial formulation of experience based on shock or Chockerfahrung meaningless, so that only 
shock event or Chockerlebnis remains meaningful in Benjamin’s scheme. 
112 OSMB: 198. 
 
 
149 
correspondences’.113 Correspondences enable Baudelaire ‘to fathom the full meaning of 
the breakdown which he, as modern man, was witnessing’, and therefore give the 
conditions for a kind of ‘experience which seeks to establish itself in crisis-proof 
form’.114 For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s correspondences relate the lived moment to the 
past in the form of ritual. Baudelaire thus affirms the crisis of experience in which the 
lived moment becomes the dominant form of sensibility yet at the same time reclaims a 
ritualistic structure which is able to confront it and sustain experience. Unlike the 
symbol which in one single moment relates the eternal and the ephemeral, 
correspondences let the ‘past murmur’ by recognising the passing of time concentrated 
in the present. With this characterisation of correspondences, Baudelaire ecstatic 
affirmation of the lived moment is no longer dissociated from the work of memory. Yet 
in doing so he basically charges the lived moment with a meaningful relation to the past 
which contradicts his initial characterisation of the shock-event.
115
  
In the transition from the analysis of the lived moment to the discussion of 
correspondences, Benjamin relates the lyric poetry of Baudelaire to the work of 
                                                            
113 OSMB: 197. 
114 OSMB: 197, 198. 
115 As Michael Levine notes, the ‘very defence that was supposed to intercept the shocks of urban life 
itself turns out to be something that must be defended against’: Michael Levin, Writings Through 
Repression: Literature, Censorship, Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
pp. 108–9. On this point, Jay also emphasises the difference between reading Benjamin’s interpretation of 
Baudelaire as the ‘endorsing of the poet’s heroic stance’ and Benjamin’s own warning ‘against the risk of 
such defensiveness’ (Jay, ‘Remembrance and the First World War’: 91). In this thesis I argue for the latter 
by showing the limits of the former. Considering both sides of Benjamin’s arguments, Jennings argues 
against those readings that charge Benjamin’s Baudelaire with a nostalgic aura, and for the need to 
‘bracket’ the nostalgic insights into the concept of aura as a way to remind the reader that the ‘great’ 
aspect of Baudelaire’s poetry does not lie in this insight but in his poetry, which is ‘marked by the 
disintegration of aura’ (Jennings, The Writer of Modern Life, pp. 21-24). By bracketing rather than 
confronting the nostalgic element of the argument as the medium through which Baudelaire establishes 
his ‘crisis-proof’ form of experience leads, however, to a sympathetic reading or endorsement of the 
mechanism of innervation of shock despite its enervative effects. The reading of Baudelaire offered in 
this section is closer to Jay than to Jennings. Stressing the function of correspondences points out the 
limits of the lived moment. In a complementary move, in emphasising the auratic character of 
Baudelaire’s correspondences it is also noted that the lived moment is interrupted only by non-auratic 
configurations of sensibility, thereby attaining experience. To some extent, the antinomy between the 
liquidation of tradition (and, therefore, the affirmation of shock/innervation) and the conservation of 
tradition (and, therefore, the affirmation of a nostalgic mourning for the past) is more evident in the 
readings of the Baudelaire essay. To note that neither of these convincingly ground experience means to 
recognise that an alternative ground for experience is necessary, one which neither affirms the shock-
event nor mourns irretrievable times (McCole). The concept of anaesthetics, developed by Buck-Morss, 
names what Jay calls the ‘risk’ of the shock or the enervative reversal of innervation. Buck-Morss affirms 
that in the crisis of experience the ‘cognitive system of synaesthetics has become, rather, one of 
anaesthetics’, for which the ‘system reverses its role’ by ‘repressing memory’. In this context, the task of 
the theory of experience is to ‘restore’ the conditions for ‘perceptibility’ (‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics...’, 
p. 18). In this way, auratic correspondences complement (rather than suspend) the temporality of the lived 
moment. They operate as compensatory functions which are, nevertheless, unable to ground experience. 
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involuntary memory from which Baudelaire was initially dissociated. The ‘restorative 
will’ which informs Baudelaire’s correspondences is marked, therefore, by the tension 
between voluntary and involuntary memory.
116
 If correspondences are involuntary 
relations established between different realms of perception (the past and the present; 
the lived moment and the time of ritual), Baudelaire seeks or pursues these 
relationships, consequently filling his work with nostalgia for that which is lost. 
Benjamin makes precisely this point by quoting Proust’s characterisation of 
correspondences: writing about his own experiences being aroused by the taste of a 
madeleine, Proust adds that for Baudelaire ‘these reminiscences are even more 
numerous. It is obvious that they do not occur by chance, and this, to my mind, is what 
gives them crucial importance. No one else pursues the interconnected correspondances 
with such leisurely care, fastidiously yet nonchalantly...’.117 Following Proust’s 
reflections Benjamin distinguishes between, first, those acts of involuntary memory 
which occur to Proust and, second, Baudelaire’s intentional search for correspondences 
between what is immediately experienced and that which has been lost. What 
Baudelaire searches for is the sensation that triggers the relationship between the present 
and the past: ‘Spring, the beloved, has lost its scent’. To some extent, Baudelaire 
pursues what may trigger a bodily innervation. However, the innervation which was 
originally aroused by the flow of energy of the lived moment is now reversed, being the 
innervation process what triggers the correspondence with that which is lost: 
innervation thus leads to past-experiencing and eludes the pure transience of the lived 
moment.  
Benjamin thus underlines the passing of time concentrated in Baudelaire’s 
correspondences: ‘the word perdu (lost) acknowledges that the experience [Baudelaire] 
once shared is now collapsed into itself. The scent is the inaccessible refuge of mémoire 
involontaire’.118 In the ephemeral, Baudelaire searches for opportunities to produce 
meaningful relations between present and past. The emphasis now turns towards the 
loss which ‘imparts a sense of boundless consolation’ and transforms Baudelaire’s 
restorative will into nostalgic ‘past-experiencing’. The failure of this restorative will to 
grasp what is lost is the origin of what Benjamin describes as rage, and which ‘explodes 
                                                            
116 OSMB: 199. 
117 Marcel Proust, A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu (Le Temps retrouvé), VIII, pp. 82–83; quoted in 
OSMB: 199.  
118 OSMB: 200. 
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in time to the ticking of the seconds that enslaves the melancholic man’.119 It is critical 
to emphasise that Benjamin returns to the lived moment yet from a different 
perspective. If the first part of his analysis of Baudelaire focuses on the energy and the 
innervation infused by the lived moment, the second part looks at the lived moment 
from the perspective of its inability to ground substantive experience. The relation 
between rage and melancholy marks the recognition, as Friedlander suggests, of the 
‘incapacity to have (significant) experience’, which is ‘implied in the primacy of 
Erlebnis’.120 On the basis of this incapacity Baudelaire ‘exposes the isolated experience 
[Erlebnis] in all its nakedness’ and watches the ‘earth revert to a mere state of nature’. 
The recognition of the limits of the lived moment ultimately grounds the possibility for 
the allegorical conception of modernity in Baudelaire: the objects of isolated experience 
may be imbued with different meanings which negatively reveal the absence of any 
intrinsic capacity for expression in the world of commodities. These appear in 
Baudelaire’s gaze as transient, modern relics.121 
The critical contribution of this specific reading of the exposé consists of two main 
conclusions in regard to Benjamin’s analysis of Baudelaire’s project of securing 
experience on the basis of the lived moment. In showing that this project ultimately  
recurs to correspondences and recollection this chapter argues, first, that in Benjamin’s 
                                                            
119 OSMB: 200. 
120 Friedlander, A Philosophical Portrait: 152. 
121 As Tara Forrest suggests, in spite of Benjamin’s criticism of Baudelaire, he is able to identify in 
correspondences the ‘political significance’ which he attributes to ‘auratic experience’. ‘The opening up 
of time provoked by involuntary memory’ provides a space within which the remembering subject is able 
to envision the possibility of a different kind of existence’ enacting what the ‘Theses on the Concept of 
History’ call the ‘revolutionary chance’ that every moment carries with it. Forrest continues: ‘It is 
precisely these moments —in which the ‘‘empty passage’’ of time as Erlebnis’ is torn to asunder by the 
experience of the past in the present— that the political significance of Benjamin’s delineation of auratic 
experience manifests itself’. Forrest, ‘The Politics of Aura and Imagination in Benjamin’s Writings on 
Hashish’ in Dag Petersson and Erik Steinskog, Actualities of Aura. Twelve Studies of Walter Benjamin, 
(Svanesund: Nordic University Press, 2005), pp. 26-48 (39). Although I agree with the political 
significance that Benjamin attributes to correspondences (and more broadly to the work of memory), it is 
critical to underline that in the passage quoted above Benjamin precisely constrains such a significance in 
Baudelaire by pointing out the ‘voluntary’ character that still permeates the involuntary memory of his 
correspondences, and for which Baudelaire’s project remains constrained to nostalgic, past-experiencing. 
In the same collection, see also: David Kelman, ‘The Inactuality of Aura: Figural Relations in Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’’’, pp. 123-151. On the differences between the forms of 
memory operating in Baudelaire, Proust and Benjamin see: Peter Szondi, ‘Hope in the Past’, Critical 
Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1978), pp. 491-506. With a different argument, one which focuses on the 
limits of Baudelaire’s lyric poetry to convey the fragmentariness of modern experience and therefore 
produces a sort of belated aestheticism, Peter Osborne also points out the limits that Benjamin identifies 
in the work of the French poet. Although Osborne does not discuss the mnemonic force of 
correspondences and the divergent formulations of memory in Benjamin, I consider this argument to be 
compatible his discussion of Benjamin's Baudelaire in ‘Small-Scale Victories, Large-Scale Defeats: 
Walter Benjamin’s Politics of Time’, in Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: 59-109. 
 
 
152 
account it was necessary for Baudelaire to deny the energy of the amnestic and 
innervating shock-event to make room for experience. This analysis then contributes to 
an understanding of memory as condition of possibility for experience. Second, this 
analysis has also stressed that although recollection has a mnemonic function it is 
ultimately defined by a nostalgic yearning for the past. Thus, the exposé serves to 
contrast recollection to the notion of reminiscence advanced in the previous sections of 
this chapter. Reminiscence consists of a short-lived, fragmentary memory which 
suspends the lived moment without introducing an auratic or nostalgic element. Then, 
both recollection and reminiscence show the relevance that Benjamin attributes to 
memory in light of the crisis of tradition, yet only the latter is able to secure experience 
by counteracting the amnestic lived moment and nostalgic recollection.
122
 
                                                            
122 Following the more technical terms that Benjamin uses in the exposé, the first conclusion of this 
passage might be recast by affirming that the shock-event (Chockerlebnis) is unable to ground shock-
experience (Chockerfahrung) for which shock is only related to Erlebnis while Erfahrung is related to 
memory. The second conclusion might also be detailed by saying that experience or Erfahrung has its 
basis in a specific form of memory, namely, fragmentary and involuntary reminiscence or Gedächtnis, 
and not in others, such as totalising remembrance or Erinnerung and voluntary recollection or 
Eingedenken, both of which acquire a nostalgic, auratic veil in the analyses of the novel and lyric poetry 
respectively. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
Montage as Übungsinstrument of Sensibility 
 
 
The previous chapter explored two different yet interrelated problems in Benjamin’s 
writings on experience. It addressed the essays on modern epic narration, storytelling 
and lyric poetry in order to examine the mnemonic character which montage has in epic 
narration and its capacity to interrupt the temporality of the lived moment in order to 
sustain experience. The previous chapter thus argued for memory, in the specific sense 
of reminiscence or Gedächtnis, as necessary condition for experience. This condition is 
produced by the work organised according to the principle of montage. With this 
conclusion, epic narration comes to the fore of Benjamin analysis of both the crisis of 
tradition and the historiographic crisis it effects, and of the possibilities of counteracting 
it by means of specific narrative forms or divergent temporalizations of history. The 
final section of Chapter III, dedicated to Baudelaire’s lyric poetry, made the case for the 
relationship between experience and memory in the specific sense of Gedächtnis by 
showing the limits of Baudelaire’s attempt to ground experience in the amnestic lived 
moment. His recourse to nostalgic correspondences marked by past-experiencing 
(which roughly parallel Proust’s own totalizing recollections) make those limits 
apparent. Thus, Benjamin elucidates the ways in which recollections (Proust) and 
correspondences (Baudelaire) produce a realm of perception marked by an auratic 
nostalgia for the past that undermines the very conditions of possibility for attaining 
experience.  
This chapter approaches a further development of the tension which informs 
Baudelaire’s work in the 1939 exposé. This tension is related to Baudelaire’s position on 
aura and his critique of modern technology in general and of film and photography in 
particular. The revision of this problem serves to examine the notion of experience and 
 
 
154 
its relation to the technical reproducibility. The question which orientates this chapter is 
whether technical reproducibility gives the conditions for securing substantive 
experience under the crisis of tradition or not. In the light of the crisis of tradition which 
subject-based narrative forms and regimes of presentation fail to contest (the novel, 
lyric poetry and information), the question of whether photography, film and technical 
reproducibility offer an alternative basis for experience rises.  
In the next sections I will return to the two notions of montage which ‘The Crisis of the 
Novel’ discerns and argue that the principle of montage which organises the technically 
reproducible work of art opens up the possibilities for grounding experience. However, 
these possibilities remain suspended in the subordination of technology to the logic of 
capitalism and fascism. It is in this context that the radicalisation of such a principle 
may momentarily sustain experience.
1
 In the context of Benjamin’s account of 
Baudelaire’s attempt to attain a ‘crisis-proof’ form of experience, the 1939 exposé 
relates the notions of practice and memory to the concept of aura and argues that with 
the decline of long-term practice and involuntary memory produced by the dominance 
of the lived moment the experience of aura is also in decline. Associated with the 
realms of long-term practice and involuntary memory, aura is constitutive of substantive 
experience (i.e. there is no experience that does not have an auratic character). Its 
further disintegration concentrates the transformation in the structure of experience in 
modernity: 
If we think of the associations which, at home in the mémoire involontaire, seek to 
cluster around an object of perception, and if we call those associations the aura of 
that object, then the aura attaching to the object of perception corresponds precisely 
to the experience [Erfahrung] which, in the case of an object of use, inscribes itself 
as long practice. The techniques inspired by the camera and subsequent analogous 
types of apparatus extend the range of the mémoire volontaire; these techniques 
make it possible at any time to retain an event -as image and sound- through the 
apparatus. They thus represent important achievements of a society in which long 
practice is in decline.2 
  
                                                            
1 This illuminates the dynamic of resistance and counter-resistance which marks both the subordination of 
reproducibility and montage to capitalism and fascism, and the possibility of the momentary interruption 
of this subordination. It might be said that capitalism and fascism constrain or resist to the potentiality 
with which the new technologies emerge, for which the latter's actualisation consists in a counter-
resistance. As I will discuss below, unlike restoration (Susan Buck-Morss) and undoing (Miriam Bratu 
Hansen), counter-resistance might convey a more precise meaning in relation to the effects or possibilities 
which Benjamin ascribes to the destructive character of experience and the process encompassed by 
interruption, innvervation and interplay. The notion of counter-resistance is developed by Caygill in the 
first chapter of  On Resistance. A Philosophy of Defiance, (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).  
2 OSMB: 200. 
 
 
155 
The definition of aura as a cluster of associations attached to different objects of 
perception encompasses two distinct elements. First, aura consists of the associations 
attached to those objects that produce or trigger an involuntary memory. In other words, 
aura is a set of associations that relate the present ephemeral moment to the past by 
means of involuntary memory or recollection. Proust’s ‘madeleine’ experience and 
Baudelaire’s correspondences illustrate this aspect of aura. Yet aura also refers to those 
associations inscribed in objects which are mastered by means of long-term practice and 
which have thus become an habitual and unconscious second nature. The artisan or 
craftsman who Benjamin opposes to the operator of the conveyor belt illustrates this 
sense of aura. Aura thus names the origin of such associations in fragmentary, short-
lived memory and long-term practice. The aura surrounding the object consists of the 
mnemonic and bodily associations which the object of perception triggers. The object 
can only be seen as having an aura if it had already left a memory trace. The presence of 
the aura marks the return of the object as recollection or correspondence, which exceeds 
the object’s own materiality. In this process recollections and correspondences fill the 
present with a meaning or signification that exceeds the lived moment. For the 1939 
exposé, experience is, therefore, identical with auratic experience. The associations 
referred to as the object’s aura relate the present moment of perception to the past when 
they return as a cluster of bodily reactions.
3
  
According to the 1939 exposé of the unfinished book on Baudelaire the emergence of 
technical reproducibility interrupts or suspends the conditions of possibility for the 
production of these associations. As Benjamin had previously explained in terms of 
Freud’s theory of shock, technical reproducibility enlarges the realm of consciousness 
by triggering a continuous display of energy which manifests in mechanical or reflex 
movements. The body focus on parrying stimuli coming from the urban life, which is in 
turn determined by the rhythm of the conveyor belt and deprives the city-dweller from 
                                                            
3As Fabrizio Desideri suggests, Benjamin’s notion of second nature is marked by the equilibrium 
between sensibility and technology and contests the concept of second nature of the ‘automatism’ of the 
technological paradigm of innovation: Desideri, ‘The Mimetic Bond: Benjamin and the Question of 
Technology’, in Walter Benjamin and Art, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 110. 
Second nature therefore acquires a positive meaning in Benjamin. It names the counterfactual situation in 
which sensibility and technology stand in a productive equilibrium which expands the human sensorium 
in the same logic as in ‘The Planetarium’ in One Way Street. This understanding of second nature 
opposes Lukács’ Hegelian formulation in the Theory of the Novel, for which second nature refers to the 
‘conventional’ or ‘external’ social institutions to which individuals relate in alienated ways. See, Theory 
of the Novel: pp. 62-64, 112. Also Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. by Livingston, 
Rodney (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 88–89, 100. 
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the time that the organisation of stimuli demands. What I want to emphasise is the 
opposition that Benjamin stages between substantive experience (structured here by 
involuntary memory, long-term practice and aura) and the technologies of reproduction: 
‘Technology has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of conditioning 
[Dressur]. There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was met by film. 
In film, perception conditioned by shock was established as formal principle. What 
determines the rhythm of production on a conveyor belt is the same thing that underlies 
the rhythm of reception in the film’.4 In associating film with a form of perception 
conditioned by the conveyor belt the technologies of reproduction are understood as 
undermining the conditions for substantive experience, reducing practice (Übung) to 
reflex movement or conditioning (Dressur). Eroding the conditions of possibility for 
long-term associations (whether as recollections or correspondences) the ‘space for 
action of fantasy’ (Spielraum der Phantasie) is also constrained.5 Under these 
conditions Baudelaire argues that correspondences and long-term associations can only 
be produced in the ‘realm of the intangible and the imaginative’, in ‘the realm of art’ 
and in the illusions provided by the early technologies of reproduction seen from the 
standpoint of ‘the pleasure of [their] degradation’.6  
Although the opposition between (auratic) experience and the technologies of 
reproduction is also drawn in other writings (reproducibility annihilates the medium in 
which aura emerges: memory, practice, tradition, imagination, habits, etc.), Benjamin 
had not dissociated cinematographic and photographic presentations of reality from the 
possibility of producing substantive experience. On the contrary, film is regarded in 
various moments as the Übungsinstrument of non-auratic perception on which 
experience is produced.
7
 Benjamin thus conceives of the technologies of reproduction as 
the medium through which the annihilation of auratic perception occurs, yet also as the 
medium for the configuration of substantive, non-auratic experience. The annihilation of 
aura undermines a specific form of perception (nostalgic past-experiencing) without 
denying experience. For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s position towards photography and film 
leads to an either/or problem in which the technologies of reproduction affect 
involuntary memory and long-term practice without giving the conditions for new, 
                                                            
4 OSMB: 191. 
5 Baudelaire, ‘Salon de 1859: Le Public moderne et la photographie’. Quoted in ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’, p. 204. 
6 OSMB: 207. 
7 SW 3:121; WuN:138.  
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alternative forms of experience. The essay on reproducibility and other writings 
recognise, however, the possibility for securing experience in spite of the crisis of 
tradition and the changes it effects on memory and practice. The distinction between 
auratic perception and experience becomes therefore critical in Benjamin’s theory of 
experience.
8
 
In the essay on reproducibility and other writings the potentiality of technical 
reproducibility to produce experience is framed in the dynamics of innervation and 
enervation, or the dynamics of shock and anaesthetics. From the perspective of this 
dynamics the technologies of reproduction have the capacity to suspend, although 
momentarily, the anaesthetic, enervative and amnestic effects of shock. This suspension 
opens the possibility of securing experience. As Susan Buck-Morss and Miriam Bratu 
Hansen have pointed out, the notions of shock and the process of innervation-enervation 
might be read as giving the conditions on which experience can be restored,
9
 or the 
conditions under which the destructive effects of modernity may be undone.
10
 It is in 
this context that Hansen conceives of innervation as a two-ways process which 
                                                            
8 This distinction roughly maps the distinction between shock-event (Chockerlebnis) and shock-
experience (Chockerfahrung) discussed in the final section of the previous chapter. If Baudelaire initially 
attempted to attain the latter on the basis of the former, Benjamin’s conclusion that correspondences 
articulate a crisis-proof form of experience might be read as suggesting that shock-experience is 
meaningless, i.e. there is no experience based on the shock intrinsically associated with the lived moment. 
In the same way, if for Baudelaire every experience is auratic experience, Benjamin’s distinction may 
suggests that auratic experience is a contradictory term. What exists is auratic perception (auratische 
Wahrnehmung) which undermines the conditions for experience (Erfahrung). In emphasasing this 
distinction I ultimately argue against the traditional identification of aura with experience, or with the 
possibility of having auratic experience which most of the literature does not problematise: Hansen offers 
the most detailed and updated account of the multiple genealogies of aura in Benjamin’s writings in the 
fourth chapter of Cinema and Experience. I comment upon her account later in this chapter (fn. 46). See 
also: Hansen, ‘Benjamin’s Aura’, Critical Inquiry ,Vol. 34, No. 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 336-375. Also: Josef 
Fürnkäs, ‘Aura’ for a detailed of aura in Benjamin’s writings prior to the essay on reproducibility and the 
1939 exposé, Benjamins Begriffe I, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000). Also, Sam Webber, 
Massmedia Auras-Form, Technique, Media, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 76-106; 
Eduardo Cadava, Words of Light. Theses on the Photography of History, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), pp. 73-77.  
9 Buck-Morss, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered’: 18. 
10 Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street’, Critical Inquiry, 25.2 (1999), 
306–43 (p. 317). Although Hansen tries to distance herself from Buck-Morss by affirming that her own 
reading does not aim to ‘restore’ ‘the power of the senses’, she finally understands the therapeutic 
potential of cinema as its capacity ‘to counter, if not undo, the sensory alienation inflicted by industrial-
capitalist modernity’: Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 132, 137, 146, 195. My emphasis. Although 
undoing is not identical to restoring, it opens the way for entertaining the possibility of recovering that 
which has been alienated if the conditions that make such alienation possible are annihilated. Hansen’s 
own warning (marked by the if- clause) might serve to distance herself from Buck-Morss, yet she 
certainly remains close to the logic of restoration she criticises. 
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suspends the negative effects of shock and produces a ‘motoric stimulation’ that 
reactivates the anaesthetised human sensorium.
11
   
Critical to Benjamin’s theory of experience is to show that experience is possible 
insofar as it is grounded on the basis of a non-auratic form of perception, for which it is 
necessary then to elucidate how involuntary memory and long-term practice might be 
recast without their auratic dimension. What is needed is a form of memory distinct 
from recollection and its parallel in correspondences. An argument of this kind was 
offered before in Chapter III in relation to modern epic narration. Modern epic opens up 
the opportunity for the disruption of involuntary act of memory in the habitual relation 
with the city. This form of memory is neither caught up in yearning nor marked by past-
experiencing. It is less concerned with nostalgically contemplating that which has been 
lost than with illuminating alternative presents or futures which history did not follow. 
What I want to emphasise here is that the essays on epic narration and reproducibility 
present the relationship between experience and technology through a more complex 
dynamics that the one presented in the 1939 exposé. In this context the technologies of 
reproduction are able to produce experience without its auratic dimension. In terms of 
the scheme used in the exposé it can be said that the essay on reproducibility secures 
experience while simultaneously interrupting the process of innervation-enervation 
triggered by the lived moment.  
In the same way that Benjamin offers a narrative of the historical transformation of 
narrative forms, he also offers a narrative of the dynamics of the potentiality of 
technology. According to this reproducibility emerges with new possibilities to ground 
experience that nevertheless remain suspended by the logic of capitalism and fascism 
(the identification of film and the conveyor belt). Experience consists less of the 
                                                            
11 Hansen expands on the Benjaminian term of innervation and refers to the undoing of sensory alienation 
as mimetic innervation. With this notion, as I will comment later, she brings together Benjamin’s mimetic 
faculty and the process of innervation which, according to her, undoes the shock-effect of industrial 
capitalism. In this thesis I have preferred the counter- prefix to recast what Wohlfarth calls Benjamin’s 
‘distortion of distortion’, or what I referred to a second-order suspension or interruption: the suspension 
of the suspended or distorted possibilities which are latent in modernity. Critical to this counter-
resistance, second-order suspension, or distortion of distortion is that what is initially resisted, suspended 
or distorted by capitalist modernity cannot be retrospectively recovered but only partially actualised. This 
principle is also evident in the presentation of Umweg (digression) as method of investigation in the book 
on the baroque: more than recovering the emergence-material (Entstehungsmaterial) as it initially was, 
digression suspends inherited views on the baroque to make its force resonate in the present by mapping 
and juxtaposing its multiple conceptualisations. The distortion of distortion is a counter-resistance 
(Caygill) to capitalism and its negative effects on the human sensorium, yet only offers a destructive 
moment which does not advances a positive, determinated content. 
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recovery of forms of sensibility prior to the emergence of technical reproducibility than 
with the actualisation of the potentiality that remains latent yet suspended in technical 
reproducibility.  
This argument, absent in the 1939 exposé, is developed in the works on photography, 
film and epic drama. In the third version of the essay on reproducibility Benjamin 
argues for the possibility of attaining an equilibrium (Gleichgewicht) or interplay 
(Zusammenspiel) between the human sensorium and technology. Against the 
subordination of technology to the logic of capitalism and fascism, he explains this 
interplay in terms of the space for action or play (Spielraum) that is opened up by 
means of revolution as a process of innervation.
12
 This reference to innervation is 
nonetheless broader than the one which Benjamin discusses in the 1939 exposé. In this 
context revolutions aim to accelerate the ‘adaptation’ to technology. They are 
‘innervations of the collective’ or experiments which catalyse the ‘new, historically 
unique collective which has its organs in the new technology’.13 The link between 
interruption and the liberating, revolutionary potential of technology is thus given by 
innervation but is demarcated by their adaptation to technology. 
Critical to the interruption produced by revolution as collective innervation is that is 
leads less to the automatic actualisation of the potentiality of technology than to the 
liberation of its concealed presence. In this way, if Benjamin is seen to be developing a 
‘politics of innervation’, as Hansen rightly affirms,14 this must be framed within a 
broader process of adaptation to technology and the reactivation of its distorted 
potentiality. As Benjamin writes, ‘[n]o sooner has the second technology secured its 
initial revolutionary gains than vital questions affecting the individual —questions of 
love and death which had been buried by the first technology— once again press for 
solutions’.15 The revolutionary process which innervation catalyses opens up 
humanity’s space of action only to reveal the fact that it does not know yet its ‘way 
around this space’.16 Innervation and interruption does not answer the questions which 
emerge in the process of adaptation. These can only be addressed in the long-term 
process of mastering technology by means of play, habits, tests, practice and repetition 
                                                            
12 SW 3:107; WuN 16:108.  
13 SW 3:124; WuN 16:109.  
14 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 80-82; 111-112.  
15 SW 3:124; WuN 16:109.   
16 SW 3:124; WuN 16:109.  
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to which interruption only offers access. Revolution as collective innervation liberates 
the suspended potentiality of technology yet is not sufficient to produce substantive 
experience. It has a destructive character which ‘clears the way’ and catalyses the 
transition from a technology subordinated to the logic of capital to other in which it 
stands in an equilibrium with the human sensorium —from first to second technology.
17
 
Innervation refers then to the re-activation of sensibility against the background of 
urban life’s anaesthetics and the impoverished sensibility associated with the cumulus 
of lived moments. Adaptation brings about substantive (non-auratic) experience in 
forms yet to be elucidated. 
Delimited as it is by adaptation, innervation is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for attaining substantive experience. It opens opportunities for experience to emerge, yet 
the space for action remains open to multiple outcomes. Innervation as interruption of 
second-order concentrates the temporality of Benjamin’s theory of experience. It 
operates within the broader framework which relates the effects of shock on the human 
sensorium not only to the shock derived from the urban context, but also to the structure 
of the work of art. In this way, innervation is framed within the characterisation of the 
reproducibility and mountability of the work of art. The essay characterises the work of 
art as a construct (Gebilde) whose principle of organisation or law (Gesetz) is that of 
montage.
18
 The technically reproducible work of art is thus organised according to its 
technical reproducibility and mountability. In this context innervation operates to make 
transparent the mountability of the work of art and to show that any image of total unity 
or completion is artificially constructed. The mastering of this form of presentation of 
reality dissociated from alienated perception is the mark of adaptation, or the 
equilibrium between technology and the human sensorium. 
Understanding montage as the principle which organises the work of art Benjamin 
generalises the concept of montage and its concrete use in avant-garde practices. To 
some extent, this generalisation had already been anticipated in the discussion on 
montage in epic narration and the fragmentary character of any narrative form, 
including both the novel and information. The essays on film, photography and epic 
theatre discerned two specific notions of montage: montage as the general principle or 
law organising the work of art, and montage as the specific practice or method 
                                                            
17 ‘The Destructive Character’, SW 2: 441-2. 
18 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128. 
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radicalising such a law by making it transparent or visible against those practices which 
aim to overcome it (i.e. the novel form and Schmitz-like criticism). While the second 
approach to montage has received more attention in discussions on Benjamin (showing 
his indebtedness to avant-garde practices), the following sections emphasise the general 
principle of montage as the background against which the more specific method of 
montage actualises the potentiality of technical reproducibility. The first section 
introduces the Artwork essay from the perspective of the concept of montage in order to 
characterise what Benjamin calls the ‘new understanding’ for which cinematographic 
montage ‘is the most suitable vehicle’. I explain this in terms of the capacity to confront 
the cinematographic presentation of reality as an ‘illusory nature of second degree’.19 
This underlines the contribution of montage towards the configuration of a new 
sensibility marked by the equilibrium or interplay with the technical presentation of 
reality. I will argue, however, that such a sensibility remains suspended by the logic of 
capitalism and fascism, for which the politicisation of art is necessary. This 
consequently elicits the radicalisation of the principle of montage, which I discuss in 
sections two and three in relation to photography and Brecht’s epic theatre. Critical to 
the presentation of the interplay between technology and the human sensorium is the 
distinction of two temporalities through which Benjamin problematically oscillates and 
which we must discern to differentiate what is conceivable and attainable in capitalism 
and what remains out of capitalism. Although Benjamin entertains the idea that the 
equilibrium between human sensibility and technology is virtually embedded in 
technical reproducibility, he also maintains that its actualisation in capitalism is 
achievable only in momentary and fragmentary ways. 
  
                                                            
19 SW 3:107; WuN 16:108. 
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1. The Law of Montage 
 
The third version of the essay on reproducibility regards the technically reproducible 
work of art as a construct (Gebilde) organised according to a new law (Gesetz), that of 
montage. Benjamin introduces these remarks in sections VI and XIV in order to 
characterise the changes produced on the structure of experience by technical 
reproducibility. He writes that the artwork has become a construct able to produce a 
'new understanding’ for which film is the ‘most serviceable vehicle’.20 The essay 
discloses the characteristics of this construction in three main moments. Firstly, 
Benjamin emphasizes the relationship between reproducibility and montage in terms of 
film’s capacity for improvement which, grounded in the principle of montage, 
counteracts the uniqueness of traditional art: ‘In the age of the assembled [montierbar] 
artwork, the decline of sculpture is inevitable’ (VIII).  Secondly, while distinguishing 
between different forms of reproducibility associated with photography and film, 
Benjamin affirms that unlike photography film does not reproduce objects or actions but 
multiple tests. The point that I want to stress here is that, for Benjamin, film ‘emerges 
on the basis of the montage’ of multiple tests (X),21 generalising then the principle of 
montage normally associated with his interest in Soviet montage cinema and Brecht’s 
epic theatre. Finally, in paragraphs XI and XIV Benjamin introduces two comparisons 
that illustrate the fragmentary and artificial character of the image on the screen 
produced by principle of montage. In contrast to the stage actor, the film interpreter is 
denied the opportunity to ‘identify himself with a role’ and is thus denied a ‘unified 
whole’. His performance ‘is assembled [montiert] from many individual performances’, 
or ‘a series of mountable episodes’ (XI).22 Similarly, opposed to the painter’s ‘total 
image’, the image produced by the cinematographer is ‘widely fragmented [vielfältig 
zerstückeltes]’ and its parts are ‘put together according to a new law [Gesetz]’.23 
Throughout these comparisons montage appears in different formulations as the 
principle or law of configuration or construction of film, bearing the fragmentary 
character of experience: the experience of the actor in front of the apparatus is 
                                                            
20 SW 3:107; WuN 16:108. 
21 SW 3:110; WuN 16:114: ‘Das Kunstwerk [ent]steht hier auf Grund der Montage’. 
22 SW 3:111; WuN 16:116, ‘... eine Reihe montierbarer Episoden zerfällen’. My emphasis 
23 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128. 
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constantly interrupted, the recording of this interpretation cut into parts and then 
organised or construed in a sequence which juxtaposes multiple episodes or shoots.  
This process is presented in terms of a confrontation between the actor and the audience 
with an apparatus whose technical conditions demand the segmentation of the 
performance and its reorganisation into a sequence which produces the semblance or 
appearance of unity. That this unity is technically constructed or conditioned only 
proves that the ‘free-equipment aspect of reality’ produced by the cutter is all but 
illusory.
24
 To some extent, the logic of the confrontation with the apparatus by means of 
tests reproduces the relation of the worker with the conveyor belt or the assembly line as 
the model for the construction of the ‘cinematic presentation of reality’. This proves the 
latter to be the result of ‘the most intensive interpenetration of reality with the 
apparatus’.25 In this context, the essay on reproducibility stages the transformation of 
the work of art not only in terms of the massive appearance of the work which brings it 
closer to broader audiences (i.e. its reproducibility), but also in terms of its mountability 
and the effects it has on the production of a new form of understanding. As Caygill 
notes, opposed to traditional art and its allegedly ‘manifestation of the eternal in time’, 
the law of montage consists of ‘continual movement and transformation’.26 This 
contrast recast the opposition between symbol and allegory drawn in the book on the 
baroque, thereby characterising montage as an allegorical device. More importantly, it 
illuminates the perfectionability of montage, which gives the conditions for the 
cinematographic presentation of reality to attain the illusion of being independent from 
the apparatus.
27
  
                                                            
24 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128. 
25 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128. 
26 Caygill, The Colour of Experience, pp. 100–101. 
27 The dynamic produced by montage as principle or law of construction is supported by what Miriam 
Bratu Hansen and Tom Gunning call (borrowing from Eisenstein) ‘cinema of attractions’. This term 
refers to the modes of perception forged by early cinema ‘feeding on attractions such as the magical and 
illusionist power of filmic representation, its kinetic and temporal manipulations (not yet subordinated to 
character movement and the chronological momentum of linear narrative)’. Benjamin’s conception of 
film understands avant-garde art in terms of its capacity to reorganise perception against later 
developments of linear narratives and the unity articulated by subject-centred modes of storytelling, 
thereby recasting the originary potential of early cinema and its capacity to transform the perception of 
reality. Miriam Bratu Hansen, ‘The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology’, New German Critique, 
34.Winter (2008), 336–75 (pp. 180–81). See also: Tom Gunning, ‘Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its 
Spectator and the Avant-Garde’, in Early Cinema: Space-Frame-Narrative, ed. by Tom Gunning, 
Thomas Elsaesser and Adam Barker (London: BFI Publishing, 1990), pp. 56–63. In this context, 
Koepnick argues that fascist cinema is a further development of subject-centred positions articulated in 
reference to the figure of the dictator in a compensatory logic that unleashed aestheticising presentations 
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By generalising the concept of montage Benjamin brings the arguments of the Artwork 
essay closer to the problem of the dynamics of resistance and the subordination of the 
fragmentariness of narration to the closure or totalizing structure of the novel, as 
discussed in Chapter III. In section XIV of the Artwork essay Benjamin writes: ‘Hence, 
the cinematographic presentation of reality is incomparably the most significant for 
people today, since it provides the equipment-free aspect of reality they are entitled to 
demand from a work of art, and does so precisely on the basis of the most intensive 
interpenetration of reality with the equipment’.28 In the same section, Benjamin refers to 
this intensive interpenetration as a ‘special procedure’ which consists of the assembling 
(Montierung) of multiple shoots and the making of an equipment-free aspect of reality. 
The latter is not only the ‘highest artifice’ of technology but also an ‘illusory nature of 
second-degree’.29 To some extent, the new understanding to which film is the most 
suitable vehicle is intrinsically related to the artwork's reproducibility and mass 
circulation but also to its illusory character governed by the law of montage.
30
  
The question is how the new understanding that film produces relates to the double 
interpenetration between reality and the apparatus on the one hand, and between the 
cinematographic presentation of reality and human sensibility on the other. In this 
double interpenetration Benjamin discerns both the revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary potential of contemporary sensibility. While the former turns the 
interpenetration of the apparatus and sensibility into an equilibrium or interplay in 
which humanity’s space for action or play is enlarged, the latter reduces this 
relationship to the anaesthetization of sensibility by means of the enervative effects of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of power: Lutz Peter Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1999), pp. 126–29. 
28 SW 3:116; WuN 16:128.  
29 SW 3:115; WuN 16:127.  
30 On this point, Koepnick offers an account of the transformation of montage and its capacity to produce 
two forms of shock which problematise Benjamin’s ‘rendition of montage as cinema’s exclusively 
emancipatory and empowering principle’. Comparing Walter Ruttman’s Berlin: Symphony of a Great 
City (1927) to Dziga Vertov’s experiment with Man with a Movie Camera (1929), Koepnick argues for 
the ability of montage to adapt itself to uses which ‘anesthetize the viewer’s critical activity’ and thus 
reveal the ‘deterministic elements’ of Benjamin’s interpretation of avant-garde montage. This 
deterministic element appears, however, only when montage is denied the ‘correctibility’ which Benjamin 
ascribes to it. It is precisely its ability to be corrected which interrupts the illusory nature of second degree 
constructed by montage. What the law of montage reveals is that its revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary potential are open to further transformation. Neglecting the possibility that montage may 
also be subordinated to the logic of capital produces a progressivistic reading of Benjamin and the 
Artwork essay, consequently obscuring its critical potential to contest such subordination. See: Walter 
Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power: 113, 132–33. On the ‘correctibility’ of montage, see Beatrice 
Hanssen, ‘Benjamin or Heidegger: Aesthetics and Politics in an Age of Technology’, in Walter Benjamin 
and Art, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London and NY: Continuum, 2005), pp. 80–81. 
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shock, producing then a reflex conditioning rather than long-term practice which may 
transforms technology into second nature. In the Artwork essay, the equilibrium or 
interplay between sensibility and technology remains suspended or subordinated to the 
anaesthetization of sensibility, for which only its momentary actualisation is possible by 
means of what Benjamin calls the 'politicization of art'. In light of the suspended 
interplay between technology and sensibility, the illusion of second degree produced by 
cinematographic presentation appears as reality. Its interruption illuminates, therefore, 
the technical character and the fragmentariness of the presentation of reality in film.  
Reading the Artwork essay from the perspective of the concept of montage contributes 
to the analysis of the changes in the structure of experience produced by the 
reproducibility of the work of art. Miriam Bratu Hansen summarises the effects of 
reproducibility in an scheme organised around two axes: the axis of temporal and spatial 
nearness and distance, and the axis of sameness and uniqueness or repetition and 
singularity.
31
 What this scheme brings together is an interpretation of the essay from the 
perspective of the sense for the sameness grounded in reproducibility, according to 
which the potentiality of the new technologies resides in their capacity to produce ‘a 
collective and playful (non fatal) innervation of the technologically transformed 
physis’.32 As organising principle, montage brings another axis into play, that of 
fragmentariness and totality, or mountability and unity. From this perspective, the work 
of art in the age of its technical reproducibility not only produces the sense for the 
sameness by means of its mass circulation in contemporary urban contexts; it also 
charges this sense for sameness with an illusory nature to which sensibility responds in 
divergent ways according to its capacity to contest such an illusion of ‘second degree’.  
What this presentation of the Artwork essay clarifies is that both mechanical repetition 
and Benjamin’s notions of tests, practice, and training find in the model of the film strip 
an opportunity for the realisation of two different forms of sensibility, both of which are 
configured according to the law of montage. If film is the ‘battleground’ or the ‘larger 
‘‘force field’’’ in Benjamin’s aesthetics, as Hansen rightly affirms,33 this is organised 
according to the dynamics of resistance and counter-resistance in which the force or 
potentiality of the principle of montage is permanently negotiated so as to either 
                                                            
31 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 93.  
32 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 80.  
33 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 79, 85.  
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maintain its fragmentariness open or to produce a false presentation of an ‘equipment-
free’ reality. It is in the negotiation of the openness of montage that the interplay or 
equilibrium between sensibility and technology can be actualised, thereby producing a 
new form of understanding.  
 
2. The Interplay Between Sensibility and Technology 
 
The new understanding which Benjamin associates with modern technology, and for 
which film is its most suitable vehicle, becomes apparent in the equilibrium or interplay 
between human sensibility and technology. This new understanding consists less in a 
theoretical comprehension of the new technologies and media than in their mastery by 
means of a long-term practice which critically appropriates their potential and turns 
technology into humanity’s second nature. Two critical features of the interplay 
between humanity and technology are addressed in this section. First, the place this 
interplay occupies in the discussion on different temporalities with regard to what is 
attainable in capitalism and what remains out of capitalism. Second, the relationship 
between this interplay and the politicisation of art which Benjamin defends in the final 
section of the essay and which came to be seen as his critical contribution towards a 
Marxist, materialist aesthetics. On these topics I suggest that the interplay between 
humanity and technology (and consequently the new understanding it bodies forth) is 
unattainable in capitalism for which it can only be momentarily actualised. This 
momentary, fragmentary actualisation is what I suggest must be understood as the 
politicisation of art.  
The interplay between humanity and technology appears under two different guises in 
the essay on reproducibility. These map out the temporalities that Benjamin outlines in 
the methodological opening of essay, where he delimits the conditions within which it is 
possible to elaborate a prognosis on the future of art, technology and experience. 
Benjamin distinguishes between discussing the ‘proletarian society after its seizure of 
power’ and the critique of the ‘developmental tendencies’ of society in capitalism.34 
Following this distinction which Marx traces in his Critique of Political Economy 
(1859), Benjamin locates his investigation within the limits of the tendencies of art, 
                                                            
34 SW 3: 101; WuN: 96. 
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technology and experience which are discernible in capitalism, thereby rejecting the 
possibility of offering an account of what a post-capitalist society might look like, 
thereby eluding a lapse into dogmatism.  
Peter Fenves explains this distinction in terms of Benjamin’s own reference to Marx, 
but also in terms of the metaphysical questions for which Kantian philosophy defers 
ultimate answers. For Fenves, the temporalities outlined by Benjamin correspond to the 
tasks which humanity gives itself according to what it ‘is able to solve’ (Marx) and 
those questions which burden human reason and nonetheless ‘cannot be answered, for 
they overstep all power of human reason’ (Kant).35 For Fenves, the distinction drawn by 
Benjamin makes of the task of actualising the potentiality of technology an unavoidable 
yet unsolvable task. This consists in humanity’s infinite task of adapting itself to ‘the 
absence of a world independent of its ‘‘perceptual apparatus’’36 —an apparatus that is 
technically conditioned. By considering the question of the state of art, technology and 
experience in a post-capitalist society to be a metaphysical question, Fenves underlines 
the limits of both Benjamin’s research and the possibility of attaining the equilibrium or 
interplay between sensibility and technology. At the same time, this argument 
transforms such an interplay into a principle orientating action.  
For Fenves, the problems raised by the subordination of the potentiality of technology 
to capitalism ‘can be answered —but not by us: not us engaged in contemplation, still 
less by ‘‘human reason’’, and not even by ‘‘humanity’ at large’’’.37 Although he rightly 
points out the limits within which Benjamin situates his own investigation, it is critical 
to stress the historical dimension which undermines the conditions for attaining the 
interplay between technology and humanity, which Benjamin associates with both the 
subordination of the potentiality of technology to the logic of capitalism and the 
suspended transition from first to second technology.
38
 Then, although Benjamin’s 
project remains an unsolvable, infinite task, it may be momentarily actualised in 
capitalism by means of the interruption of the conditions that make such subordination 
possible in the first place, i.e. the conditions which make possible the identification of 
politics with its aesthetic, technologically organised presentation. In this context, 
                                                            
35 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason: (Avii - ix) and Peter Fenves, ‘Is There an Answer to the 
Aestheticization of the Political?’, in Actualities of Aura, ed. by Dag Petersson and Erik Steinskog 
(Svanesund: SUN Press, 2005), pp. 152–69 (pp. 152–54). 
36 Fenves, ‘Is there an Answer...?’: 168.  
37 Fenves, ‘Is there an Answer...?’: 164. 
38 SW 3:115-6; WuN 16:126-8. 
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Benjamin’s project is concerned less with effectively solving this infinite task than with 
understanding the different forms in which this task presents itself in the history of the 
relationship between technology and sensibility. It is on the basis of this understanding 
that it is possible then to break through the conditions that made possible the 
subordination of technology to the logic of capital in the first place. The temporalities 
demarcated in the methodological preface serve to stress the historical transformation of 
both the aestheticisation of politics in capitalism and the multiple answers which, albeit 
fragmentary, can be given to contest its logic in specific contexts. Thus, in denying the 
possibility of solving such an infinite task, Benjamin makes room for partial, 
fragmentary ways of contesting the logic of capitalism in concrete historical contexts.  
By exploring the ‘tendencies of the development of art under the present conditions of 
production’ rather than the art of a ‘classless society’,39 Benjamin’s project is thus 
concerned with the production of concrete revolutionary configurations of experience. 
Its aim is not to explain how the completion of such a revolutionary transformation of 
the present can be fully attained. His theory of experience is then a theory on 
revolutionary gestures of resistance and counter-resistance rather than a theory of 
revolution. In restricting the scope of his own investigation he secures a more solid 
ground for the critique of experience in capitalism. Benjamin then secures what Caygill 
calls the ‘openness of the future’ by means of a critique of the given historiographic 
presentations of reality (for instance, in historicism), but also by means of restricting the 
scope of his own investigation while recognising the value of the exceptional and the 
indeterminate which cannot be anticipated.
40
  
Although the temporalities sketched out in the opening of the essay on reproducibility 
are critical for the characterisation of the interplay between technology and the human 
sensorium, there are some passages which blur their differences. The first reference to 
the notions of interplay and equilibrium appears in the sixth paragraph of the essay. 
This associates first technology to magic and the ‘mastery’ of nature by humanity and 
second technology to modern technique and the interplay between humanity and 
                                                            
39 SW 3:102. 
40 Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 94. For Caygill, in this notion of experience ‘the future subsists in 
the present as a contingency which, if realized, will retrospectively change the present’. Critical to this 
formulation is that for him ‘the weave of space and time’ captured by contingency is ‘anything but 
auratic’.  
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nature.
41
 Benjamin then illustrates the interplay of the technological organisation of 
experience through the photographic work of Eugène Atget and through film 
production: while the former announces the dominance of exhibition over cult value 
(VII), the latter reveals the possibility of improvement of technically reproducible 
artworks by means of its mountable character, which contests the eternal value of 
traditional art (VIII). The following sections of the essay develop the effects on 
perception produced by the transition from a form of production oriented towards cult 
and eternity towards another oriented towards exhibition, transitoriness and 
perfectibility. The essay thus presents the political character of art in terms of the 
Spielraum and the optical unconscious opened up by cinema and the interrelated work 
of the law of montage and the collective dimension of experience it forges.
42
 Although 
this notion of politics is formulated with excessive confidence in regards to the masses, 
it is however questioned in paragraphs XII and XIII, in which Benjamin maintains that 
the ‘expropriation of film capital’ is ‘an urgent demand for the proletariat’.43 This 
demand signals both the interruption of the interplay or equilibrium between humanity 
and technology in capitalism and the masses’ need to act in order to actualise its 
potentiality, introducing what Fenves calls the ‘imperative’ dimension of the 
politicisation of art. 
Paragraph XVI finally states that ‘the most important function of film is to establish the 
equilibrium between human beings and the apparatus’,44 explaining it by means of two 
different yet complimentary processes: 1) the outbreak of mass psychosis which is 
offered by technology to human beings (XVI), and 2) the development of the tactile 
[taktish] quality of perception (XVII) or a form of reception in distraction [Zerstreuung] 
which opposes to optical, contemplative reception (XVIII). For Benjamin, these forms 
of perception and reception had marked the interplay or equilibrium with technology. 
However, as the well-known epilogue concludes, Marinetti’s celebratory interpretation 
                                                            
41 SW 3:107. 
42 In XVI, Benjamin affirms that the camera and its capacity to alter both time and space ‘manages to 
assure us of a vast and unusual field of action [Spielraum]’. On the optical unconscious, he writes: ‘film 
furthers insights into the necessities governing our lives by its use of close-ups’ and by its ‘accentuation 
of hidden details in familiar objects’, thereby expanding time and space by means of slow motion and 
close-ups (SW 3:117). 
43 SW 3:115. In X, Benjamin had first affirmed: ‘For the majority of city dwellers, throughout the 
workday in offices and factories, have to relinquish their humanity in the face of an apparatus. In the 
evening these same masses fill the cinemas, to witness the film actor taking revenge on their behalf not 
only by asserting his humanity (or what appears to them as such) against the apparatus, but by placing 
that apparatus in the service of his triumph’ (SW 3:111; WuN 16:117-8).  
44 SW 3:117. 
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of colonial war shows this new realm of experience could never truly be realised as 
humanity ‘was not mature enough to make technology its organ’.45  
What the concepts of montage and interplay reveal is the tension between two different 
dimensions in Benjamin’s political thought. On the one hand, the transition from 
traditional to technically reproducible art is explained in terms of the possibilities 
inaugurated within the realm of experience by technical reproducibility and 
mountability. The complete realisation of this realm of experience had marked the 
transition from first to second technology, from cult to politics, from optical-
contemplative to tactile-distracted perception. On the other hand, however, the essay 
highlights the interruption of such a process by capitalism. It is an interruption that 
manifests itself as the aestheticization of politics and which grounds the need for the 
politicisation of art as an interruption of second order. Benjamin’s call for the 
politicisation of art emerges, therefore, from the diagnosis of the suspended transition 
from first to second technology, from cult to politics, and from contemplation to 
participation.  
The equilibrium between humanity and technology appears then as a discrete 
configuration of a future which nevertheless remains unrealisable under the present 
conditions. While this equilibrium remains an infinite task whose completion can only 
mean a total rupture with capitalism, the politicisation of art aims to actualise it in the 
present. Benjamin’s prognosis on the future of art, technology and experience can do no 
more than maintain the openness of the conflict between two different poles, the 
subordination of the potentiality of technology to capitalism, and the counter-resistance 
of humanity to liberate such potentiality by means of different practices. The concepts 
of montage and interplay serve then to emphasise the dynamics which informs the 
conflict around the openness of the fragmentary presentation of reality.  
The relation between montage and interplay is further developed in section XI. In this 
Benjamin affirms that on the basis of the ‘most obvious effects of montage’ and its most 
‘paradoxical cases’, art has escaped the realm of the ‘beautiful semblance’. In these 
dynamics two different yet interrelated lines of argumentation are opened. The first line 
discloses the process of interruption produced by the new law of montage, bringing the 
essay closer to the insights on recognition based on the concept of construction which 
                                                            
45 SW 3:121-2. 
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Benjamin offers in the ‘Small History of Photography’ and in the essays on Brecht. The 
second argumentative line explores the new realm of experience opened by this 
interruption and develops the notions of space for action and optical unconscious in the 
Artwork essay. These two sub-arguments can be discerned in section XI, which opposes 
the law of montage to what Benjamin calls the beautiful semblance and its ground in 
auratic perception, and in sections XVI-XVIII, which explore the concepts of space for 
play and optical unconscious as two features of the new realm of experience which 
remains virtually concentrated (and undeveloped) in the current relation to technology. 
Considering that this realm of experience is unattainable in capitalism, the essay can 
only obliquely illuminate it. There are some fragments of the essay which nonetheless 
entertain the possibility of film giving complete access to this space, therefore blurring 
the temporalities demarcated in the methodological opening of the essay. The two sub-
arguments finally converge when Benjamin problematically affirms that film has 
already liberated the potential of play. With this assertion not only he conflates the two 
temporalities outlined in the opening of the essay, but also declares the future which 
was previously intimated as a possibility to have arrived. 
 
2.2 Auratic perception  
 
The first line of argumentation regards auratic perception as the ground for experience 
(Erfahrungsgrund) of traditional beautiful art which, however, has become unable to 
sustain experience for a contemporary sensibility formed according to technical 
reproducibility and the law of montage. Critical to this presentation is that the ground 
for experience transforms itself historically, moving away from auratic perception in 
relation to traditional art to play in the age of technical reproducibility organised by the 
law of montage. In this context, Benjamin does not argue for the impossibility of auratic 
perception in contemporary contexts. Rather, he argues that in the age of the technical 
reproducibility and mountability of the work of art, auratic perception cannot ground 
substantive experience but only that which is a reduced form of sensibility, i.e. the lived 
moment. The centrality attributed to film as Übungsinstrument in contemporary 
perception can be rephrased, therefore, in terms of the capacity of film to either train 
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perception to ground experience or to solely produce an auratic perception that leads to 
the cluster of lived moments which provide no further relation to history.
 46
   
The opposition between the totality or ‘unified whole’ of the stage actor and the 
fragmented (zerstückeltes) image of the film actor introduces the notions of beautiful 
semblance and auratic perception. The constructed image of the actor, organised 
according to the necessities of the machinery that splits his performance into mountable 
episodes (montierbarer Episoden) and assembles them with the ‘more radical forms of 
montage’,47 is the sign of art having ‘escaped the realm of ‘‘beautiful semblance’’ 
[schöner Schein] which for so long was regarded as the only sphere in which it could 
thrive’.48 Having stated the opposition between montage as construct and the beautiful 
semblance, it is critical to note that the tension between play and semblance emerges 
only in the context of contemporary sensibility. Although he considers Hegel’s 
aesthetics to be an exemplary account of the beautiful semblance, Benjamin also 
maintains that for Hegel aura was not the experiential basis of art since the ‘truth 
content of phenomena’ was stripped from the ‘semblance and deception of this false, 
transient world’. 49 If Hegel’s aesthetics liberated the opportunities for play from the 
coming-to-end equilibrium between play and semblance, Benjamin understands 
Goethe’s conception of beauty (‘the object in its veil’) as its artificial recasting, one in 
                                                            
46 In the fourth chapter of Cinema and Experience, Hansen offers a detailed account of the genealogy of 
aura paying special attention to its uses in Benjamin’s essays on hashish. She emphasises that aura 
exceeds the meaning traditionally associated with it as a mere ‘aesthetic’ notion, referring to the qualities 
of the work of art (104). She then aims to show that Benjamin ‘was able to think salient features of the 
notion of auratic experience as asymmetrically entwined rather than simply incompatible with 
technological reproducibility and collective reception’ (113). Although I largely agree with the argument 
that aura names a ‘temporal disjunction, the shock-like confrontation with an alien self’ which Hansen 
attributes to the mnemonic (and ‘daemonic’) character of aura, by omitting the distinction between 
auratic perception and experience in the discussion on ‘beautiful semblance’ (113-8) she reproduces the 
traditional and problematic notion of auratic experience that undermines the very possibility of 
radicalising the possibility of producing such a temporal disjunction on the basis of substantive 
experience being opposed to forms of (auratic) perception which ultimately respond to belated forms of 
aestheticism. I agree then with the interpretation of Benjamin’s writings on reproducibility as a novel 
search for the conditions which may produce such a disjunction without necessarily accepting that 
(against Benjamin himself) they implicitly suppose or argue for the recreation of aura but, rather, for the 
renewal or even the introduction of new mnemonic capacities. As I suggested in the previous chapter, 
montage (which remains largely omitted in Hansen’s discussion due to its Brechtian inflection) embodies 
this new mnemonic function and gives the conditions for the temporal disjunction which is necessary in 
order to sustain experience. As I commented above, montage brings another axis to Hansen’s two axes 
scheme (see fn 31 above). The shock-like confrontation with the self which montage catalyses is 
ultimately based on memory and, specifically, on remembrance. On this point it is important to remember 
the ‘Copernican revolution of remembrance’ (Eingedenken) Benjamin calls for in the Arcades Project 
(this call is formulated in a language which partially anticipates the development of the distinction 
between Erinnerung, Eingedenken and Gedächtnis discussed in Chapter III). 
47 SW 3:113; WuN 16:119. Translation amended. 
48 SW 3:112-3; WuN 16:118-9. 
49 SW 3:127; WuN 16:119-20. 
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which semblance or appearance determines the reception of the work of art. Thus, 
Benjamin affirms that Goethe’s work is still ‘entirely imbued with beautiful semblance 
as auratic reality’.50 In this perspective, technological reproducibility and its law of 
montage re-opens the opportunity for play being liberated from its artificial relation to 
semblance, which would in turn extend or amplify humanity’s space for play or action. 
In this context, the process of production and reception of the work of art is not directed 
towards the final configuration of the artwork but towards the training or unfolding of 
new forms of sensibility in its very process of production. Benjamin then contrasts two 
notions of equilibrium and the transition from the i) equilibrium between play and 
semblance in traditional art to the ii) equilibrium between technology and sensibility 
based on the liberated potentiality of play. The former comes to its own end with the 
emergence of technical reproducibility and the principle of montage which open up the 
space for play.  
Critical to this argument is the fact that the expansion of the space for play does not 
define a linear transition from one moment to another. Indeed, the potentiality for play 
is subsumed under the logic of semblance and produces an artificial and distorted 
reorganisation of the equilibrium between play and semblance. Once the conditions for 
this equilibrium are no longer operative, its artificial reorganisation produces a belated 
aestheticism capable of subsuming the law of montage to illusory presentations of 
history and authenticity. It is in the context of this aestheticism that fascism constructs 
its own mythology. To some extent, the opening up of the space for play or action  —on 
which the equilibrium between technology and sensibility is grounded— contests the 
artificial reinstatement of the equilibrium between play and semblance: 
Neither the concept of semblance nor that of play is foreign to traditional 
aesthetics; and to the extent that the two concepts of cult value and exhibition are 
latent in the other pair of concepts at issue here, they say nothing new. But this 
abruptly changes as soon as these concepts lose their indifference toward history. 
They then lead to a practical insight -namely, that what is lost in the withering of 
semblance and the decay of aura in works of art is matched by a huge gain in the 
scope for play [Spielraum]. This space for play is widest in film. In film, the 
element of semblance has been entirely displaced by the element of play. The 
positions which photography had occupied at the expense of cult value have thus 
been massively fortified. In film, the element of semblance has yielded its place to 
the element of play, which is allied to the second technology.51   
 
                                                            
50 SW 3:127; WuN 16:119-20. 
51 SW 3:127; WuN 16:119-20. 
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For Benjamin, the conflict between semblance and play continuously remerges in 
contemporary sensibility. This position mirrors his previous arguments regarding the 
conflict between the fragmentariness of any narrative form and the attempt to attain 
completion and unity in the novel. Understood from the general concept of construction 
rather than from the specific practices of montage, this problem reveals the conflictive 
rhythm that informs the history of the relationship between technology and sensibility. 
However, the above passage is problematic: although it is critical for the 
characterisation of the space for play opened up by film, it conflates the two 
temporalities discerned in the methodological opening of the essay. While the first part 
of the passage affirms the possibilities for play to be opened up by film (the age coming 
to an end... / ...where the space for play is widest), the second suggests that such space 
has effectively arrived and entirely displaced the value of semblance. The future, latent 
yet suspended in film, is suddenly declared as having arrived, conflating then the total 
overcoming of the tension between semblance and play with what may be attained in 
capitalism.
52
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
52 It is in this sense that Wolin affirms in his classic study that, for Benjamin, film ‘effectively abolishes 
the previous ritual or cultic basis of art and paves the way for the predominance of the political function 
of art’, introducing then a progressivitic reading of Benjamin. On the same issue, Koepnick comments on 
the Benjamin's allegedly ‘rendition’ to montage as revolutionary technique as intrinsically revolutionary. 
See respectively, Richard Wolin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption (University of California 
Press, 1994), pp. 188–90, and Lutz Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power pp. 132–33. 
To some extent, Wolin and Koepnick reproduce Adorno’s interpretation of the Artwork essay, attributing 
to Benjamin a Brechtian ‘blind faith on the powers of technique’ (An Aesthetic of Redemption, 190-1, 
196). This reading is partially reproduced by Hansen in her attempt to constrain the Brechtian motifs 
operating in Benjamin as a way of rejecting the progressivistic elements of the essay, which lead to the 
liquidationist readings of the problem of tradition and the purely negative characterisation of aura, both of 
which she contests. In the following sections I will argue that although some of these Brechtian motifs 
must be constrained, especially those developed in ‘The Author as Producer’ (interruption, innovation 
and progressive techniques), this can be done by reading the 1935 conference within the broader 
discussion on Brecht in the two versions of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (1931, 1939), which in turn 
emphasises the centrality that the epic has for Benjamin. 
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2.3 The Politicisation of Art as Infinite Task. 
 
Following the methodological distinctions traced in the opening of the essay Benjamin 
presents the problem of technical reproducibility in terms of the possibilities 
inaugurated by photography and film in contrast to other forms of manual 
reproducibility. Once the problem is demarcated in terms of the technical 
reproducibility which photography makes possible, sections III to VI present the 
liberating effects of reproducibility in terms of the works’ authenticity. Benjamin 
returns here to the concept of authenticity that he previously introduced in the 
Trauerspiel book, for which the authenticity of the object is given by the configuration 
of its uniqueness in the process of being handed down by tradition (despite its 
transformations in the process of transmission):  ‘passing the object down as the same, 
identical thing to the present day’.53 Technical reproducibility, by contrast, ‘detaches the 
object from the sphere of tradition’ and takes the work out of the original context for 
which it was produced, dissociating it from the conditions in which it was intended to 
be experienced.
54
 Detached from its original conditions of production, the work reaches 
new viewers in their ‘own situation’ or context.  
The question is whether the work is actualised or not when it is detached from its 
original context. If the experience of the work was dependant on its transmission by 
means of tradition, in the context of its technical reproducibility its authenticity is also 
unsettled. This, however, does not mean that the work cannot be actualised or 
experienced in a substantive way but, rather, that the conditions for its actualisation 
have changed: ‘In permitting the reproduction to reach the recipient in his or her own 
situation, it actualizes that which is reproduced’.55 With this formulation Benjamin 
identifies the conditions for reproducibility with the conditions for the actualisation or 
the substantive experience of the work. Again, he reaches a paradoxical conclusion 
                                                            
53 SW 3: 103.  
54 SW 3:104. 
55 SW 3:104; As Friedlander notes, like origin authenticity ‘is not judged in relation to the point in time in 
which the work comes into existence’ or the moment of production of the object, but from ‘the point of 
view of the experience’ of the work. This point serves to emphasise that Benjamin is concerned with the 
conditions for the substantive experience or actualisation of the work in light of the shattering of tradition 
and the unsettling of experience associated with its transmissibility. Friedlander, A Philosophical 
Portrait: 148. 
 
 
176 
according to which the potentiality of technical reproducibility is completely liberated 
from its subordination to the logic of capitalism and fascism. 
There are three key moments which bring into question the identity between the 
conditions for reproducibility and those for substantive experience. In section V 
Benjamin writes: ‘as soon as the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applied to artistic 
production, the whole social function of art is revolutionized. Instead of being founded 
on ritual, it has to be based on a different practice: politics’.56 Fenves offers two 
remarks on this passage which help to characterise the political foundation of art in the 
age of its technical reproducibility (and mountability). First, the formulation of this 
passage in the imperative form (it has to...) stresses the need of politics to step in as the 
foundation of the work, in opposition to the authenticity forged by tradition. With this 
formulation, Benjamin dissociates technical reproducibility from the conditions for the 
actualisation of the work. A political foundation has to be articulated for the work being 
actualised or experienced. Technical reproducibility does not offer the foundation which 
the imperative character of Benjamin’s argument elicits. Thus, technical reproducibility 
shatters the conditions for experience which tradition provides without offering other 
elements to sustain it.
57
  
Fenves’ second remark relates the imperative foundation of art in politics to the task of 
communism which Benjamin affirms in the final section of the essay. If humanity was 
once ‘an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods it has now become one for 
itself. Its self alienation has reached the point where it can live through [erleben läßt] its 
                                                            
56 SW 3:106.  
57 The English translation in SW 3 transforms the imperative form into the passive form of the simple 
present. The original reads: ‘In dem Augenblick aber, da der Maßstab der Echtheit an der 
Kunstproduktion versagt, hat sich die gesamte soziale Funktion der Kunst umgewälzt. An die Stelle ihrer 
Fundierung auf Ritual hat ihre Fundierung auf eine andere Praxis zu treten: nämlich ihre Fundierung auf 
Politik.’ (GS VII:357/WuN 16:108). Two comments must be made about this passage. Firstly, as Fenves 
notes, the formulation of the transition from ritual to politics varies in grammatical forms across the 
versions of the essay. While the now so-called third version expresses this transition in the imperative 
form —another ‘funding has to step in’/‘hat... zu treten’ (GS VII: 357/WuN 16:108)—, the second version 
formulates it using the past tense —another funding stepped in/ist getreten (GS I, p. 442/WuN 16:61). The 
fifth version uses the present: steps/tritt (GS I, p. 482/ WuN 16:219). Secondly, missing the imperative 
dimension of this formulation, the English translation of the third version of the essay blurs the 
differences between this and the fifth version. Two problems arise here. The first is that either this 
transition is already completed in Benjamin’s immediate past or it is taking place in his own present, 
being therefore open to be completed or interrupted. If the latter is the case, the difference between the 
present simple and the imperative form distinguishes whether the process is automatically happening or 
whether it is conceived of as a project to be undertaken, i.e. a new task. Here, we need to return to the 
temporalities which structure the central argument of the essay, which clarify that he politicisation of art 
is an open process which can only be momentarily actualised under the present conditions of production.  
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own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure. Such is the aestheticization of politics, 
as practiced by fascism. Communism replies by politicizing art’.58 It is on the basis of a 
reduced form of sensibility (marked by the verb erleben) that humanity has reached the 
point in which the politicization of art becomes a task. Fenves’ remark points out the 
negative character of this task, which is twofold. Firstly, it is negative since it consists 
of the suspension of the aestheticisation of politics or the identity between aesthetics 
and politics. Secondly, in stressing the temporal, ephemeral character that Benjamin 
associates with the political foundation of art (in the instant... /in dem Augenblick), 
Fenves underlines that the suspension of the aestheticisation of politics consists in a 
momentary gesture, one which is marked by what is understood as form of 
indeterminacy in which art —and specifically film— ‘can be seen to consist in a 
massive groping in the dark’.59  
The politicisation of art consists less in a political programme with specific contents 
than in the gesture which interrupts the suspension of the potentiality of technology in 
capitalism. For Fenves, however, this consists of an infinite task for which there is no 
answer.
60
 Although this conclusion may be asserted from the perspective of the 
temporalities discerned in the opening of the essay, Benjamin emphasises the dynamics 
in which this infinite task transforms itself, thereby characterising both the 
aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of art in terms of the ways they present 
themselves in different historical moments. The question is then how the momentary 
equilibrium between technology and humanity can be attained or produced. The 
question for the political and collective dimension of experience must be reconstructed, 
therefore, from the articulation of the interrupted transition from  actualisation by means 
of tradition to actualisation in the age of the technically reproducible work of art 
organised by the law of montage. 
 
 
 
                                                            
58 SW 3:122; WuN 141. Translation amended. 
59 Fenves, ‘Is there an Answer...?’: 168.  
60 Fenves, ‘Is there an Answer...?’: 168. 
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3. Non-Auratic Configurations  
 
As Miriam Bratu Hansen argues, the essay on reproducibility is marked by different 
gestures of progressivism which support the liquidationist readings of Benjamin’s 
theory of film. According to these Benjamin had maintained a purely negative 
conception of aura and semblance and an emphatic affirmation of the technologies of 
technical reproducibility leading to a certain progressivism. Hansen identifies the 
progressivism of the essay in two main elements. Firstly, in the negative 
characterisation of aura developed through the opposition between reproducibility on 
the one hand, and the beautiful semblance and appearance on the other. Secondly, in the 
opposition staged in terms of the Brechtian model of interruption which, associated with 
reproducibility, confronts the illusory nature of the beautiful semblance.
61
   
In the previous sections I have argued that the concepts of montage and interplay serve 
to highlight that the opposition between interruption and appearance creates the 
conditions for experience but only if this interruption is understood as an interruption of 
second order, one which suspends the illusory nature of the free-equipment aspect of 
reality. In this reading, I identified the progressivistic moments of the essay with those 
passages which conflate the two temporalities outlined in the opening of the essay and 
then blur the distinction which is in turn critical for understanding the politicisation of 
art and its imperative character. In other words, the progressivistic moments of the essay 
make the project of politicising art inoperative.  
As Fenves suggests, this is an unavoidable yet unsolvable task which may momentarily 
be solved by suspending the artificial reorganisation of the equilibrium between play 
and semblance. In emphasising the dynamics of the suspended transition from first to 
second technology, this infinite task is located in the historical transformation of the 
aestheticisation of politics, to which the politicisation of art responds. In this reading, 
the politicisation of art works as a counter- concept: it consists of an interruption of 
second-order which in turn suspends the subordination of the potentiality of technology 
to the logic of capitalism and fascism. By presenting the politicisation of art in these 
                                                            
61 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 113-15. See also: Miriam Hansen, ‘Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s 
Gamble with Cinema’, Revue Canadienne d’Études Cinématographiques / Canadian Journal of Film 
Studies, 13.1 (2004), 2–27, pp. 4–6). 
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terms, this chapter has emphasised the irregular rhythm that marks the development of 
the relationship between technology and sensibility.  
In this context, montage opens up the opportunity for a new form of understanding 
which confronts the work of art as having an illusory nature of second degree and is, 
therefore, able to determine its technical conditioning. By contrast, this illusory nature is 
neither contested nor addressed by the reduced sensibility produced by shock but, 
rather, affirmed or lived through as an object of aesthetic contemplation. This is what 
the aestheticisation of politics reveals. Benjamin’s prognosis on art, technology and 
experience anticipates both the resistance of capitalism to the liberating potential of 
technology and sensibility, and illuminates the conditions under which some practices 
momentarily counteract such a subordination. 
In the third version of the essay on reproducibility, Benjamin’s presentation of the law 
of montage plays a critical role in bringing together both the decline of auratic 
perception and the liberation or expansion of the space for play. What remains 
undetermined, however, is what the new ground for experience consists of in light of the 
suspended transition from first to second technology. While the essays on epic narration 
attribute a mnemonic function to montage which suspends the mere accumulation of 
lived moments and then relates the present to the past by means of memory, an 
alternative ground for experience is largely absent in the Artwork essay. The concepts 
of innervation, space for play and optical unconscious refer to the realm of experience 
that is latent yet suspended in the age of the technical reproducibility of the work of art. 
Both the space for action and an alternative form of experience are obliquely 
illuminated according to the characteristics attributed to play as a non-auratic 
configuration of perception which, on the basis of repetition of tests and experiments, 
may produce long-term experience. Critical to this argument is then the distinction 
between auratic perception and experience, a distinction which serves to contest the 
traditional association between aura and experience according to which Benjamin’s 
views on the decline of aura automatically undermine any possibility for attaining 
substantive experience. 
The attempt to bring together repetition and shock, distraction and absorption on the 
one hand, and habit formation and innervation on the other, may be one of the central 
problems of Benjamin’s essays on reproducibility. These notions are interrelated in the 
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reception in distraction which Benjamin regards to be antithetic to contemplation based 
on auratic perception. This chapter will conclude with an examination of two central 
elements of Benjamin’s concept of experience as it is intimated in the essay on 
reproducibility. The first element is the model of experience based on long-term 
practice or habit-formation that Benjamin associates with tactile perception. The second 
one is the radicalisation of the principle of montage in different practices or models of 
experience in photography and epic theatre. Here, tactile perception serves to demarcate 
the work of innervation. If innervation reactivates the sensibility anestheticised by 
modern urban life (Hansen), it offers no ground for experience unless it is 
complemented by the process of adaptation to reproducibility. On the basis of the 
interrelated work of innervation and adaptation or training the illusory nature of 
presentation produced on the basis of montage is contested. The next sections introduce 
the tactile quality of perception as the complement to innervation in order to explore the 
interrelated work of interruption and repetition in photography and epic theatre.  
The tension in Benjamin’s account of the reception in distraction may be better 
appreciated by bringing together the figures or images that exemplify its main 
characteristics in sections XVII and XVIII. Dadaism, for example, ‘guaranteed a quite 
vehement distraction by making artworks the centre of scandal’, producing ‘the outrage 
of the public’. Architecture, on the other hand, is ‘the prototype of an artwork that is 
received in a state of distraction and through the collective’.62 Both forms of distraction 
are based on the tactile quality of perception which Benjamin opposes to the optical 
quality that he associates with contemplation: Dadaism seeks for the ‘uselessness’ of the 
work as ‘objects of contemplative immersion’ and turns ‘the artwork into a missile’; the 
reception of architecture ‘cannot be understood in terms of the concentrated attention of 
the traveller’ but ‘by way of habit’.63 Thus, while Dadaism anticipated the shock effect 
that avant-garde film later exploited, architecture, ‘since primeval times’, has formed 
habits by means of dwelling.  
Although both Dadaism and architecture contest contemplation based on auratic 
distance, they mark different aspects in the creation and actualisation of new 
opportunities to act. Dadaism embodies the moment of interruption that suspends 
contemplation and breaks through the lived moment. It operates like the fissure that 
                                                            
62 SW 3:119-20. 
63 SW 3:120-1.  
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breaks through rock strata in the reply to Schmitz’ commentary of Eisenstein’s 
Potemkin. Architecture offers the model for the formation of habits. i.e. the constructive 
moment in which humanity learns to orient itself in the new, extended space for play or 
action, which remains suspended in capitalism and wherein humanity had mastered 
certain tasks in a state of distraction.
64
 Dadaism enacts the destructive moment of the 
suspension of the temporality of the lived moment; architecture embodies the 
constructive moment of habit-formation in which humanity critically inhabits the space 
inaugurated by reproducibility. Both moments are concentrated in film:  
 
Reception in distraction -the sort of perception which is increasingly noticeable in 
all areas of art and is a symptom of profound changes in apperception- finds in 
film its authentic training device [eigentliches Uebungsinstrument]. Film by virtue 
of its shock effects, is predisposed to this form of reception. In this respect, too, it 
proves to be the most important subject matter, at present, for the theory of 
perception which the Greeks called aesthetics.65  
 
By means of its shock effect, film trains the reception both in the reception in distraction 
which becomes dominant with technical reproducibility and in the mastering of the 
principle of montage structuring the work of art and daily life. It creates a fissure in the 
realm of experience by shattering the qualities of traditional experience and steps in as 
the medium by which to produce a new, non-auratic reception of the work. As 
previously mentioned, film becomes the critical object for aesthetics since its capacity 
to train humanity in non auratic perception might either foster or suspend the transition 
to second technology. However, if the moment of interruption is not accompanied by 
the model of habit formation experience cannot be attained. This marks the limit of the 
notion of innervation which —as I argued in the first section of this chapter— is 
demarcated by adaptation and, more specifically, by tactile perception.  
                                                            
64 While this topic divides interpretations into those who privilege one model over the other, they name 
two different moments in the process of —momentarily— attaining experience. Fenves and Caygill offer 
different interpretations based on the tactile quality of perception in ‘There is an answer...?’ and The 
Colour of Experience (specially Chapter 4, dedicated to the ‘porosity of the city’). Margaret Cohen 
stresses the surrealist features of Benjamin’s Marxism, thereby emphasising the disruptive or destructive 
character of experience. See especially the second chapter of Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and 
the Paris of Surrealist Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). As I mentioned above, 
Hansen highlights the relevance of innervation in Benjamin’s theory of experience, although she 
contextualises innervation within the broader discussion on the mimetic faculty and formulates the notion 
of mimetic innervation. With this term she emphasises that innervation undoes the effects which modern 
shock has on sensibility, then restoring or reactivating its mimetic potential: Cinema and Experience, 135-
46.  
65 SW 3:121; WuN:138. Translation amended.  
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The tactile quality of perception comes to occupy the forefront of Benjamin’s argument 
in the essay on reproducibility: ‘The tasks that are posed to the human perceptual 
apparatus at historical turning points simply cannot be solved by way of mere optics, 
thus by contemplation. Under the guidance of tactile reception, they are gradually 
mastered by habituation’.66 Here, Benjamin reformulates the concept of immersive 
perception as developed in his 1933 short review ‘The Rigorous Study of Art’. In this 
work, he compares the pictorial mode of experiencing architecture with the immersive 
form of constructing the architectonic space.
67
 These two forms of perception are 
considered in regard to the architectural drawings of Carl Linfert. While the former is 
determined by the distance given in the act of ‘seeing’ the building or its presentation in 
the image, the latter is fully articulated by entering the building and being surrounded 
by the space that that same building configures. Experience appears less as the distant 
image of the architectonic space (an image-space or Bildraum) than the process through 
which the body ultimately immerses itself in the architectonic, surrounding-space 
(Umraum). The tactile quality of experience is then concentrated in the bodily 
configuration of space.
68
  
This form of immersion or interpenetration recasts the tactile or haptic perception which 
Alois Riegl and Heinrich Wölfflin formulated in their accounts of aesthetic 
experience.
69
 While Riegl and Wölfflin understand the tactile dimension of perception 
as a critical element towards the configuration of its optical dimension (with the 
physical relation to the object contributing to the completion of the image of the object 
of perception),
70
 Benjamin conceives of the tactile as the medium which produces the 
habituation in which the object of perception is ultimately integrated to human 
                                                            
66 SW3; GS VII 381 
67 SW 2:670; GS III:369. Benjamin refers to this form of perception with the verb durchspüren, which can 
be translated as feeling through or tactily-perceiving. 
68 SW 2:670; GS III:369.   
69 Alois Riegl, ‘Late Roman Art Industry’, in Art History and Its Methods: A Critical Anthology, ed. by 
Fernie, E. (London: Phaidon, 1995), pp. 106–26; Heinrich Wölfflin, ‘Linear and Painterly’, in The Visual 
Turn: Classical Film Theory and Art History, ed. by Vacche, A. D. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2003), pp. 51–56; and Wölfflin, Prolegomena to a Psychology of Architecture, ed. & trans. by 
Michael Selzer (Architectural Theory Texts, 2016), pp. 4–8.   
70 By inverting the relationship between these two forms of perception Benjamin also reverses the 
relationship between distance and nearness mapping the distinction between optical and tactile or haptic 
perception: if the tactile contributes to the optical then nearness is critical for the possibility of articulating 
the final form of what is seen, or the total configuration of the object (which drives the Kunstwollen in its 
continuous ‘endeavour’ to ‘sustain order’ in perception). On the notion of Wollen as endeavour in the 
work of Riegl, see: Adi Efal, ‘Reality as the Cause of Art: Riegl and Neo-Kantian Realism’, Journal of 
Art Historiography, Issue 3 (2010), p. 16. Also: Mark Paterson, ‘More than Visual Approaches to 
Architecture: Vision, Touch, Technique’, Social and Cultural Geography, 12 (2011), pp. 263–81.  
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sensibility. Dwelling or inhabiting based on bodily organisation offers the model of the 
constructive character of perception and of the medium through which humanity can 
adapt itself to new, exceptional conditions. Critical to the model of tactile perception is 
that the organisation of experience is continuously articulated in the process of 
immersion, as previously examined in Benjamin’s arguments on the immersion required 
to experience the mosaic in his methodological discussion on immanent critique, 
examined in Chapter II. As Alina Payne notes, the tactile character of experience 
develops ‘cumulatively, over time, in an endless sequence’ and ultimately denies any 
sense of ‘completeness to the apprehension of architecture’.71 It is according to the 
model of habit-formation based on dwelling that the body may master the exceptionality 
to which it is exposed in the age of technical reproducibility. Tactile perception opens 
the path to produce the interplay between technology and sensibility. It complements 
the process of innervation which interrupts the temporality of the lived moment and 
enlarges the space for play or action within which humanity must learn to orient itself.  
To this extent, tactile perception transforms the space for play or action (Spielraum) into 
an immersive space (Umraum) in which sensibility may dwell. To momentarily attain 
this means to counteract the auratic configuration of perception. 
 
 
3.1 Photography: Construction and Recognition 
 
In the ‘Small History of Photography’ (1931) Benjamin understands the persistence of 
aura as a symptom of the suspension of the revolutionary potential of the new 
technologies. To make this potential visible against the grain of new auratic practices 
requires, however, a revision of those conditions that motivate its persistence as 
simulacrum. It is at this point that Benjamin’s own views can be turned into a nostalgic 
interpretation of the history of perception mourning the decline of aura. With the 
simulation of aura appearing as a protest against the conditions of capitalism, its 
persistence might convey a moment of truth which, nevertheless, obscures the fact that 
                                                            
71 On the basis of Wölfflin’s notion of architecture’s corporeality (Körperlichkeit), Payne characterises 
architecture as ‘Janus-faced’. For her, Benjamin’s concept of distraction is an endless but also 
fragmentary experience, opposed to the completeness required by contemplation (based on the image 
quality of architecture): Alicia Payne, ‘Architecture: Image, Icon or Kunst Der Zertstreuung?’, in Das 
Auge Der Architektur. Zu Frage Der Bildlichkeit in Der Baukunst, ed. by Beyer, A., Burioni, M., and 
Grave, J. (München: Vilhem Fink, 2011), pp. 60–61.  
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it does not provide the necessary conditions for experience. Indeed, the risk of turning 
the recovery of the originary potential of technology into a mourning for a mythical, 
non industrialised world is illustrated in Benjamin’s closing remarks in the essay. 
Writing on his own investigation into the constructive character of pre-industrial 
photography, Benjamin affirms that with ‘the illumination of these sparks the first 
photographs step forward so beautifully and unapproachably from the darkness of our 
grandfather’s days’.72 Paradoxically, Benjamin’s own investigation into the non-auratic 
conditions which photography is able to produce acquires an auratic veil. However, 
rather than providing an account of the enlightening features of an almost mythical 
phenomenon against the darkness of its afterlife, Benjamin illuminates the continuous 
tension between the critical potential of photography and its regressive subordination to 
a belated auratic perception. Thus, he explores the alternative paths that history did not 
follow in the dynamics produced by the creative and constructive dimensions of 
photography. The task of his history of photography is to give the conditions for the 
recognition of those opportunities that went lost.
73
  
Although the text does not refer to the equilibrium or interplay between sensibility and 
technology, it does make use of a vocabulary which points towards the development of 
these notions. Benjamin maintains, for example, that ‘Bernard von Brentano was right 
to suspect ‘‘that a photographer from 1850 ranks equally with his instrument’’— for the 
first time and, for quite a long period, the last’; or that in ‘those early days, object and 
technology correspond just as precisely as they diverge in the following period of 
decline’.74 The essay on photography explains the decline of photography in terms of 
the appearance of aura. The aura surrounding the image witness to the interruption of 
the correspondence which existed between the photographer and the camera in relation 
with earlier (proto-)photographic practices. The emergence of aura then witness to the 
subordination the photographer’s technique to a fetishist notion of art which obscures 
the space inaugurated by the experimentation with photo-sensitive materials. What is 
noticeable is that aura is not a property of the first photographic plates and 
                                                            
72 ‘Small History of Photography’, p. 94. Hereafter SHP. My emphasis.  
73 On the belated aestheticism of aura, see: Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 104-113. Also: Graeme 
Gilloch, ‘Fabricating Aura: The Face in Film’, Catherine D. Dharvernas, ‘The Aura in Photography and 
the Task of the Historian’, and Erik Steinskog ‘The Decay of Aura / The Aura of Decay’, collected in Dag 
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Benjamin and Art, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 179–80.   
74 SHP: 59, 72, 80. My emphasis.  
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daguerreotypes but, rather, the technical construction produced by more advanced 
techniques in both pre-industrial and industrial photography. The regressive character of 
this simulation is therefore double, with the more advanced pre-industrial photography 
imitating the ‘old tradition of portrait’ in painting by means of producing a pictorialist 
atmosphere and, later, with industrial photography imitating the already regressive 
effects of pre-industrial photographic pictorialism. This twofold process of 
subordination outlines the ‘decline of photography’ against the background of the 
original potential it had for expanding the photographer's space for action.  
It is within this framework that non-auratic configurations of the image appear under the 
rubrics of Eugène Atget and August Sander. These non-auratic configurations are 
delimited in Benjamin’s account by the notions of creativity and innovation introduced 
by László Moholy-Nagy (quoted towards the end of the essay). For Benjamin, the work 
produced by Atget in the early twentieth century was the first which ‘fumigate[d] the 
stifling atmosphere that conventional portrait photography of the epoch of decline had 
propagated’, producing then ‘the liberation of the object from the aura’.75 The discovery 
of Atget in the mid 1920s was more than a mere anticipation of Surrealist photography, 
which Atget indeed made look like a ‘literary refinement’ of the motifs that he had 
earlier discovered while wandering around Paris, encountering that which ‘had gone 
missing or was cast off’ and then sucking ‘the aura of reality like water from a sinking 
ship’.76 So it is that in the ‘Small History of Photography’ Atget represents both the 
annihilation of the aura that had artificially suffused the photographic image and the 
intimation of new forms of perception. The latter are marked by an inclination towards 
similarity that contests the beautiful semblance of what seems to be unique: ‘[s]tripping 
the object of its husk, the disintegration of the aura is the hallmark of a perception 
whose inclination towards similarity in the world has grown such that it even takes 
pleasure in the singular by means of reproduction’.77 Ultimately, Benjamin relates 
Atget’s images (‘empty’, ‘lonely’, ‘without atmosphere’) with the space of an apartment 
in a city that ‘has not yet found a new tenant’,78 which offers an image of the space for 
play and immersion (Umraum) in which humanity must learn to orient itself or inhabit 
by means of tactile perception.  
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77 SHP: 84. 
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In regards to the work of August Sander, Benjamin explores the construction of non-
auratic configurations of the human image. In opposition to Atget’s empty space, 
Sander’s work is composed of a series of images that capture the human face —‘like the 
films of Eisenstein and Pudovkin’— with ‘a new and immense significance’ as if the 
image on the plate ‘was not a portrait any longer’.79 Rather than lending ‘fullness and 
certainty’ to the gaze, Sander’s book is ‘an atlas of exercises’.80 Benjamin’s views on 
Atget and Sander bring together a general notion of productive space opened up by non-
auratic perception. In Atget the liquidation of aura opens a new space for sensibility 
which tends towards similarity rather than uniqueness, while Sander offers a series of 
exercises with which humanity may become accustomed to new opportunities in the 
representation of the human face offered by the new technologies.  
The relationship between pre-industrial photography and the practices of Atget and 
Sander enables Benjamin’s critique to acquire a new dimension, one that is framed in 
his essay by a passage cited from László Moholy-Nagy’s Malerai, Fotografie und Film 
(1925): ‘The creative possibilities of the new are in the main only slowly disclosed by 
these old forms, old instruments and fields of creativity which burst into euphoric 
flowering when the innovation which has been in preparation emerges at last’.81 
Although Benjamin explicitly rejects the language of ‘creative’ art and photography, the 
words from Moholy-Nagy substantiate his own views on the veiled potentiality of 
photography that is retrospectively discovered in the past, or the process of recognising  
an originary force that becomes legible with the passing of time. Benjamin is closer to 
the distinction established by Moholy-Nagy between the ‘reproductive’ and 
‘productive’ capacities of photography and new media, i.e., the re-production of the 
given conditions for artistic production on the one hand, and their renewal in order to 
actively engage human perception in new tasks.
82
  
The notion of recognition is briefly presented in opposition to the saleability of ‘The 
World is Beautiful’ —the motto of Albert Renger Patzsch’s New Objectivity. Benjamin 
affirms that the New Objectivity ‘can fit any tin can into the universe but can grasp none 
of the human relationships in which it appears, and which thereby, even in its most 
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82 László Moholy-Nagy, ‘Production-Reproduction’, in Photography in the Modern Era, ed. by 
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dreamlike subjects is merely a harbinger of its saleability rather than its recognition 
[Erkentnnis]’.83 To the subordination of technology to aesthetic principles Benjamin 
opposes the ‘exposure or construction’ of photography, which catalyses the recognition 
of the relations concealed in the technical configuration of the image.
84
 Benjamin thus 
follows the remarks offered by Brecht in his Threepenny Trial (1931), for whom ‘less 
than ever ‘‘the reproduction of reality’’ expresses something about reality’ and thus 
reduces the presentation of ‘actual reality’ to its ‘functional’, instrumental dimension, 
thereby concealing and reifying the human relations that produce it. Reification 
becomes a form of oblivion. In order to produce the recognition of reality rather than its 
illusory, amnestic reproduction, Brecht affirms that something ‘artificial’ needs ‘to be 
built up’. Benjamin then goes on to present two models which illustrate the interrelated 
work of construction and recognition, contesting then what he calls ‘creative 
photography’. They are Surrealist photography and Soviet montage film on the one 
hand, and the ‘strident resistance’ of Antoine Wiertz and Baudelaire to the usurpation of 
photography by ‘artistic photography’ on the other.85  
Although Esther Leslie and other interpreters have rightly emphasised the link between 
the artificial object, which must be constructed, and the practices of montage in Brecht’s 
epic theatre and John Heartfield’s practice of photomontage, it is critical to note that the 
contest between the creative and constructive dimensions of photography appears as the 
result of a continuous conflict of resistance and counter-resistance between two poles 
which are historically represented by different movements and practices.
86
 Wiertz and 
Baudelaire serve here to illustrate the confrontation between the constructive character 
of photography and the alleged capacity of early photography for the ‘reproduction of 
Nature’. If Brecht contested the illusory and aestheticised ‘reproduction of reality’ in the 
industrial world, Wiertz and Baudelaire had already contested the capacity of 
photography to represent nature in any direct, transparent way. The constructive 
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character of photography is not reduced to specific practices which contest the capacity 
of this medium to re-present reality (whether as nature or as industrial, urban life). On 
the contrary, it also undermines those specific practices which maintain any aspirations 
to provide a legitimate, immediate access to reality. What Brecht’s and Heartfield’s 
montages enact is the radicalisation of this constructive dimension in order to ‘conjure 
up’ ‘clichés’ that transform themselves historically and maintain the aspiration of 
becoming ways to reproduce reality (whether nature or industrialised life). Conjuring up 
a representation of reality which conceals the technical conditioning of the image, the 
radicalisation of the constructive character of photography brings the ‘viewer’s 
association mechanism’ to a standstill.87 By contextualizing recognition within a 
broader interpretation of ‘construction’ as the principle that organises the work, it may 
be appreciated that though recognition might interrupt the fetishistic presentation which 
conceals the human relations that produce the object, it does not offer any direct access 
to those relationships (i.e. the reality free from the apparatus, as Benjamin affirms in the 
Artwork essay).
88
 Rather, recognition illuminates the technical organisation of 
experience, or the technical conditioning of the photographic presentation of reality.  
For Benjamin, Brecht’s principle of construction unfolds what Moholy-Nagy calls the 
critical possibilities of the new. What I want to stress here is Benjamin’s emphasis on 
the critical possibilities of construction as something that is constantly negotiated in the 
irregular rhythm of the history of photography. Understanding the artificiality of the 
work of art in a broader sense than montage as stylistic method, it is possible to 
recognise the constructive character of those photographs which step forward so 
beautifully and unapproachably from the darkness of our grandfather’s days (as 
Benjamin claims in the opening of the essay on photography).
89
 The recognition 
produced by construction illuminates, first, the history that is concentrated in relation to 
technology, one which is marked by the discontinuous rhythm of its resistance and 
subordination to the concepts of art, creativity, beauty, singularity and appearance. It is 
in this context that Benjamin later claims in ‘The Author as Producer’ that in Brecht’s 
‘use of the method of montage’, montage itself ‘ceases to be a modish technique and 
becomes a human event’.90 This claim reveals i) the subordination of the principle of 
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montage to regressive practices aiming to attain singularity at the cost of a reified, 
amnestic image of reality, and ii) the need for the further radicalisation of montage as 
specific method or stylistic device. This need is a necessary condition for making sense 
of the imperative character of the politicisation of art.   
In ‘The Author as Producer’ Brechtian montage is presented as an example of the 
Umfunktionierung or refunctionalisation of technique. The notion of re-
functionalisation emphasises the interruption of the distorted relation to technology 
presented in ‘Small History of Photography’ by means of the Um- prefix (which 
alternatively plays a critical role in the method of Umweg or digression in the book on 
the baroque). Although ‘The Author as Producer’ famously calls for technical 
innovations and the development of progressive techniques, these are characterised in 
terms of the refunctionalisation of the system of production. These consist of techniques 
which are directed towards the suspension of given functions, concepts and distinctions 
which make the current use of technology operable or functional. Benjamin writes that 
by refunctionalising the conditions of theatre, epic theatre ‘succeed in altering the 
functional relationship between stage and audience, text and production, producer and 
actor’.91 Refunctionalisation constrains then the affirmation of innovation and progress 
in Benjamin’s reading of Brecht, therefore precluding a lapse into progressivism.  
It is by means of the refunctionalisation of theatre that Brecht’s plays ‘enter in a 
dialogue’ with the ‘new means of communication’, ‘matching the present development 
of film and radio’ and their technique of montage. However, it is through this dialogue 
that Brecht also ‘went back to the most fundamental and original elements of theatre’.92 
Furthermore, it is the process of interruption associated with montage which ‘entitles 
Brecht to describe his theatre as epic, always working against creating an illusion in the 
audience’.93 What this notion of interruption emphasises is that innovation and 
progress, associated with the refunctionalisation of technique, are not orientated 
towards the new but towards the suspension of the current relation to technology. This 
interruption then allows the originary potential of technique to re-emerge. In this 
context, refunctionalisation consists less in the aim to produce new developments in 
technique and technology than in liberating their concealed potentiality. 
                                                            
91 AaP: 99. 
92AaP: 99. 
93AaP: 99. My emphasis. 
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3.2 Epic Theatre: Interruption and Repetition 
 
In underlining the epic character of Brecht’s theatre and the centrality which the epic 
has for Benjamin’s understanding of montage, this characterisation of interruption 
precludes the identification of refunctionalisation with a progressivistic programme. The 
emphasis on the epic character of interruption also avoids what Hansen understands to 
be Benjamin’s dissociation of Brechtian motifs from ‘distraction’ and other forms of 
‘perceptual engagement drawing on unconscious or at very least subconscious 
energies’.94 For Hansen, these Brechtian motifs must be restricted in order to allow a 
proper theory of distraction and perception be formulated. She argues that the Brechtian 
elements informing the Artwork essay (especially its version from 1939) contribute to 
the ‘liquidationist agenda’ which brings the function of cinema closer to an enlightened 
Barbarism than to forms of innervation that emerge from the space for play opened up 
by the technologies of reproduction. On the basis of the opposition between those 
Brechtian motifs and the enlightened barbarism, on the one hand, and innervation and 
the space for play on the other, Hansen constructs a further opposition between the 
masses and aura which reveals what she calls the ‘conservative strand’ in Benjamin’s 
thinking: ‘with the undialectical surrender of the auratic image in favour of 
reproduction, it could be argued, Benjamin denies the masses the possibility of aesthetic 
experience, in whatever form or medium.’95  
Even if the Brechtian elements that Benjamin appropriates are essentially anti-auratic, 
as Bratu Hansen rightly claims, they do not produce the effects she argues they have in 
Benjamin’s scheme. (i.e. denying the masses the possibility of substantive experience). 
On the contrary, experience is intimated in the interruption of what Benjamin calls 
auratic perception, for which ‘critical distance and reflection’ produced by means of 
interruption are not at odds with distraction and play, as Hansen seems to suggest. 
Refunctionalisation may be but one strategy to produce the space for action in which 
distraction and play intervene to orient humanity’s task by means of tactile perception.  
                                                            
94 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 101-3.  
95 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 103. By conservative Hansen refers here to the ‘segregation of the 
critical intellectual from the masses as object of formation’. This position ‘like the communist cultural 
politics [Benjamin] opposed, risks leaving sensory-affective needs to be exploited by the right’.  
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It is at this point that Hansen’s argument serves to relate a series of concepts which are 
more fully developed in the two versions of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (1931- 1939). 
Contextualising the remarks on Brecht offered by Benjamin in ‘The Author as 
Producer’ within the reflection on the epic in the two versions of ‘What is Epic 
Theatre?’, refunctionalisation may be understood as an interruption of second order 
rather than as the ecstatic interest in the new technological configuration of sensibility. 
Refunctionalisation operates by means of a double movement: it suspends the current 
relation to theatre and the given regime of presentation, yet allows for the originary 
elements of theatre to emerge. Paradoxically, the dialogue to which epic theatre enters 
with the most advanced techniques in film and radio allows epic theatre to recover the 
fundamental elements of theatre. Refunctionalisation, therefore, innovates by bringing 
the present state of technique and technology to a halt and by allowing the force of the 
epic resonate in the present. It is less a transformation of technology oriented towards 
the future than a transformation which allows for the subordinated potentiality of 
technology to come to the surface.  
Brecht’s refunctionalisation is thus directly related to the principle of construction 
previously examined in relation to photography: it radicalises the artificiality of the 
medium of presentation in order to reveal all forms of presentation as technically 
conditioned. Just as the constructive character of photography is not constrained to 
avant-garde practices but to the whole realm of photography (i.e. including preindustrial 
proto-photography), refunctionalisation shows the artificiality of any form of theatrical 
presentation. This section will conclude with a brief examination of the epic character of 
Brecht’s theatre as a way to provide a broader context for the presentation of the 
interruption enacted by the technique or method of montage. Critical to this presentation 
is the relation between interruption and repetition, citation and habit-formation as a way 
of proving the relation between interruption and tactile perception established in the 
previous sections.  
The first version of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (1931) opens with a discussion on the 
differences between the organising functions of the stage in traditional and epic theatre. 
The former is marked by the distance of the orchestra pitch which separates the public 
from the actors and creates a ‘magic space’ (Baumraum) which has nevertheless ‘lost its 
sacral function’. While traditional theatre aims to maintain this function, epic theatre 
assumes the task of transforming the stage into an ‘space for exhibition’ 
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(Austellungsraum) in which the illusionistic effects of both commercial and political 
theatre created for bourgeois audiences and proletarian masses are revealed to be 
technically conditioned.
 96
   
It is in this way that traditional and epic theatre diverge in the configuration of space. In 
regard to the presentation of time, ‘epic theatre is gestural’: ‘this strict, frame-like, 
enclosed nature of each moment of an attitude which, after all, is a whole in a state of 
living flux, is one of the basic dialectical characteristics of the gesture’. One of the 
characteristics of epic theatre is the constant process of interruption: ‘the more 
frequently we interrupt someone engaged in an action, the more gestures we obtain’. 
Finally: ‘[i]t is the retarding quality of this interruptions and the episodic quality of this 
framing of action which allows gestural theatre to become epic theatre’. Episodic time is 
therefore opposed to the ‘entirely illusionistic’ unfolding or developing of actions 
through which naturalist theatre attempts to ‘portray reality’.97 It is because of its 
‘episodic quality’ —the value attributed to each moment ‘besides the value it has for the 
whole’— that epic theatre has no ‘latecomers’.98 It is through its episodic value (not of 
the ‘sequence of scenes in time’) that the dialectic of epic theatre is enacted.99 
The gesture as unity with value is, at the same time, the basis for the sequence and the 
medium for its interruption. It produces the ‘dialectic at standstill’: ‘[f]or just as, in 
Hegel, the sequence of time is not the mother of the dialectic but only the medium in 
which the dialectic manifests itself, so in epic theatre the dialectic is not born of the 
contradiction between the successive statements or ways of behaving, but of the gesture 
itself’. The gesture, therefore, is constitutive of the dialectic which Benjamin explains 
by means of Brecht’s notion of recognition (Erkenntnis):  
Yet the process of recognizing [Erkenntnis] of which we speak [the gesture] is itself 
a pleasurable act. The simple fact that man can be recognized in a certain way 
creates a sense of triumph, and the fact, too, that he can never be recognized 
completely, never once and for all, that he is not so easily exhaustible, that he holds 
and conceals so many possibilities within himself (hence his capacity for 
development) is a pleasurable recognition [Erkenntnis] [....] Not of course is man 
viewed as something mechanical, something that can be put in a slot, something 
                                                            
96 ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (First Version), Understanding Brecht (New Edition), ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, 
trans. by Ana Bostock (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 1-2.  Hereafter EP(I). 
97 EP(I): 3-4. 
98 EP(I): 6. Frederic Jameson calls this episodic value ‘autonomization’, in which each part has value in 
itself and can ‘descend into the smallest unities of the narrative, potentially making the individual 
sentences autonomous as well’: Jameson, pp. 55–56. 
99 EP(I): 12. 
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lacking resistance, as happens today under the weight of certain social conditions. 
Astonishment, which must here be inserted into the Aristotelian formula of the 
effects of tragedy, should be considered entirely a capacity. It can be learned.100  
 
The dialectic at standstill is a process of Brechtian recognition. If the gesture brings the 
sequence to a standstill in order to give proper value to each component, its value then 
resides in the process by which it is recognised that every component conceals discrete 
possibilities in itself and that these are inexhaustible. Recognition thus enacts the 
interruption of the temporality of the lived moment. Contrasting the epic value of 
Brecht’s theatre to the temporality of tragedy which modern theatre unsuccessfully 
imitates, Benjamin illuminates the multiplicity of futures contained in each gesture as 
opportunities to act. The ‘stream of life’ is now open to multiple futures which are 
virtually embedded in each moment of the episodic structure.
101
 Benjamin’s 
characterisation of dialectics and recognition (in terms of standstill, detention, and 
retarding effects, or in unities with multiple yet inexhaustible possibilities, not to 
mention the image of the river or the flux) echoes the discontinuous rhythm of origin in 
the book on the baroque (which patterns the total yet incomplete history of the work of 
art making the work absorb its idea).  
According to the ‘Prologue’ to The Origin of the German Mourning-Play, the 
determination of the idea of the work of art suspends the operative efficacy of given 
interpretations of the work, opening it up to new configurations. In a similar fashion, 
recognition interrupts the play and illuminates divergent courses of action virtually 
embedded in each episode. The episodic quality is therefore marked by the relationship 
between sequence, continuity and unfolding on the one hand, and unity, discontinuity 
and interruption on the other. With its emphasis on the latter epic theatre precludes the 
illusion of pure continuity and development associated with traditional theatre. If the 
latter brings history as a continuous chain of events, epic theatre illuminates alternative 
paths in each episode. What this rhythm of discontinuous transitions brings about is the 
experience of the interruption of the plot which Benjamin extrapolates to the 
interruption of history, in which actors and audience become producers of historical 
change. The fact that this process of interruption might be learnt is critical for 
Benjamin: its pedagogical character consists not in the transmission of knowledge but in 
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training forms of sensibility which negotiate the limits of the subject in favour of the 
collective. The pedagogical character of montage consists then in the ‘alienation effect’ 
which dissociates the play from the mere production of stimuli.
102
 
The second version of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ is composed of eight brief sections 
dedicated to the main features of epic theatre. It eludes, however, any reference to the 
dialectic at standstill and recognition and omits the images of rivers, fluxes and streams 
which made echo of the book on the baroque. By contrast, more emphasis is given to 
the centrality of the episodic structure. This version dedicates the first two sections to 
the elements that bring epic theatre closer to epic narration and the art of storytelling, in 
opposition to the unity of the novel and tragedy. The opening of the 1931 version 
dedicated to the configuration of space is considerably abbreviated, appearing only in 
the final section of the new version essay (section VIII). This in turn gives more weight 
to the articulation of time than to the configuration of space, stressing then interruption 
and repetition (IV), and the citability of the gesture (V).  
The 1939 version explains interruption against the background of Aristotelian catharsis 
and the ‘purging of emotions through identification [Einfühlung]’.103 Arousing 
astonishment by means of the uncovering of conditions, epic theatre defamiliarises the 
audience from the process unfolding on the stage. This uncovering interrupts the 
sequence of the play by means of gestures. A novel element of the second version of the 
essay is the way in which this interruption is linked to the temporality of the lived 
moment and to the possibility of producing substantive experience. In regards to the two 
versions of Brecht’s The Flight of the Lindberghs (1929 and 1930), Benjamin elaborates 
upon the transition from a glorified articulation of the hero to an alternative presentation 
which breaks down ‘the spectrum of the event (Erlebnis) in order to extract the colors of 
experience (Erfahrung)’.104 For Benjamin, these can only be drawn from ‘Lindbergh’s 
work’ and be given back to the real Lindberghs: the workers. In the second version of 
The Flight of the Lindberghs, Brecht refuses ‘the effect of empathy to which modern 
audiences are so accustomed’. Benjamin then refers to this empathy as the ‘usual drug 
of passive identification’ with the stories and victories of others that move the audience 
                                                            
102 Howard Eiland, ‘Reception in Distraction’, in Walter Benjamin and Art, ed. by Andrew Benjamin 
(London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 4–5.  
103 ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ (Second Version), Understanding Brecht (New Edition), ed. by Rolf 
Tiedemann, trans. by Bostock, Ana (London: Verso, 2003), p. 18. Hereafter EP(II). 
104 EP(II):18. 
 
 
195 
to illusory perceptions which only produce ‘vague memories’ (Erinnerung) and ‘vague 
hopes’.105 The second version of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ thus relates the interruption of 
the temporality of traditional theatre to the interruption of the lived moment which 
characterises late capitalism. This interruption opens the opportunity to produce 
experience. The central element of this presentation of the process of interruption is the 
mnemonic gesture which it implies, echoing now both ‘The Storyteller’ and the essays 
on epic narration and Baudelaire’s lyric poetry. Although positive references to memory 
do not appear in Benjamin’s writings on Brecht, interruption is associated with 
repetition, experiments and tests which create new ways of occupying the empty space, 
breaking with the false memories and hopes produced by traditional forms of 
presentation.  
In this reading of Benjamin, the notion of montage as technique or method for the 
refunctionalisation of the system of production (as it is formulated in ‘The Author as 
Producer’) is framed within the dialectic of interruption and repetition formulated in the 
two versions of ‘What is Epic Theatre?’. Epic theatre interrupts the lived moment but is 
able to produce experience only by means of repetition and cites of other’s actions, in a 
sort of mnemotechnic device which nonetheless contests the form of memory associated 
to Erinnerung or remembrance. Its destructive character does not offer the conditions 
for experience, which elicits repetition and reclaims for the public to be trained or 
educated in forms of repetition other than mechanic or reflex movement.  
The most progressivistic moment of Benjamin (the affirmation of innovation and 
progressive technique) is thus delimited by the epic quality of Brecht’s theatre, allowing 
for an interruption that recasts a collective yet undeveloped form of experience based on 
practice and habit formation, or the slowly-perfectioned experience which the 1939 
exposé of the unfinished book on Baudelaire opposes to the reflex movement 
conditioned by the conveyor belt. Relating some of the concepts discussed in the 
previous sections and chapters, it may be suggested that, unlike the lived moment, 
experience demands the repetition of the same (Erlebnis will das Einmalige und die 
Sensation, Erfahrung das Immergleiches),
106
 whether the same appears by means of 
tradition, history, and reminiscence (Gedächtnis) in the essays on literature, or as 
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practice in tactile perception and repetition in the essays on reproducibility and epic 
theatre.  
Contextualizing the model of interruption associated with the procedure of montage 
within the horizon of the epic allows for a proper understanding of its role in the theory 
of experience. As a feature of the episodic character of the epic, montage both suspends 
the amnesic temporality of the lived moment and allows for an opportunity in which 
experience may be attained. The principle of montage has a double function in Brecht’s 
epic theatre: it interrupts the sequence of events but at the same time reproduces 
gestures and actions by means of cites or quotes. Its disruptive character is therefore 
complemented by repetition. This model ultimately serves to conclude this chapter by 
establishing the relationship between destruction, innervation and interruption —as the 
opening up of humanity’s space for action rather than the ‘restoring’ of the sensible 
(Buck-Morss) and the ‘undoing’ of the negative effects of shock (Hansen)—, and the 
constructive character of montage, repetition and long-term practice. This relation trains 
human sensibility in the process of adaptation to the exceptional conditions opened up 
by technical reproducibility. In this argument, destruction, innervation and interruption 
can only create a space which remains open to multiple outcomes, whether 
revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. Habit-formation and training by means of 
repetition thus enable humanity to orient itself in this new space and to produce an 
understanding which may contest the illusory nature of montage as technical artifice. 
The inflection on the possible outcomes of this process sustains both the imperative 
character of the politicisation of art (Fenves) and the rejection of the alleged 
progressivism of Benjamin’s prognosis on the course of art and technology (contra 
Hansen). 
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Conclusion 
 
Tradition and Reproducibility 
 
 
I 
 
In a letter to Werner Kraft from 1935 Benjamin describes the essay on technical 
reproducibility as an investigation concerned with ‘the fate of art’ and the features it 
‘will manifest in a future liberated from magic’.1 The methodological remarks of the 
essay discussed in the previous chapter constrain the possibility of attaining such a 
future and argue for its fragmentary actualisation: the liberation of art from the 
dynamics determined by its subordination to the logic of capitalism, in which the 
productive forces of humanity are turned into a ‘fetish of doom’ subordinated to the 
‘bungled [verunglückte] reception of technology’, as Benjamin respectively writes in 
‘Theories of German Fascism’2 and ‘Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian’.3 The 
possibility of interrupting the aestheticisation of politics depends on understanding, 
first, what is lost in the subordination of the potential equilibrium between technology 
and sensibility to its alienated form and, second, the conditions in which substantive 
experience may be attained or produced. This thesis has examined different 
formulations of that which is lost. Chapters I and II were dedicated to the interrelated 
work of doctrine and tradition as the medium for the transmissibility of experience. 
Chapter III addressed the work of different forms of memory as basis for experience, 
while Chapter IV examined the corporeal associations that allow sensibility to organise 
the continuous flux of stimulus in industrial capitalism. With the shattering of tradition 
and the effects that shock has on memory and the body what is ultimately lost is the 
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ability to relate the ephemeral, lived moment to the past so that the present may be 
contextualised and gain substantial meaning. What is lost therefore is the capacity to 
interrupt the mnemonic effect of modern shock by relating the present to the past.  
Benjamin’s writings explore different ways of recasting the temporal juxtaposition 
originally associated with the work of tradition and memory. Although the method of 
montage associated with avant-garde practices (in Dadaism, Surrealism, Soviet montage 
cinema, epic narration and theatre) is the exemplary model of interruption in the realm 
of art, the third version of the essay on reproducibility provides elements for the 
characterisation of montage as the principle or law that organises the work of art in the 
age of its technical reproducibility, to include film but also the constructive character of 
photography and narration in general. This law is the medium that, for Benjamin, makes 
possible the development of a new sensibility, one which by means of long-term 
practice or training may reach an equilibrium with the illusory nature which the new 
technologies produce. This illusory nature, the ‘highest artifice’ produced by 
technology, had thus become second nature in a state of distraction.  
In the light of the suspension of this possibility and the subsequent deferral of the 
equilibrium between technology and humanity, the radicalisation of the principle of 
montage as method or stylistic device in the work of art aims to interrupt the further 
anaesthetisation of sensibility. In the essays on epic narration and epic theatre, 
photography and reproducibility discussed in chapters three and four of this thesis, the 
method of montage enacts the temporal disjunction that is originally associated with the 
transmissibility of tradition and the work of memory.   
Critical to the method of montage is its capacity to disrupt the present by means of the 
juxtaposition of divergent elements but, also, its ability to produce a new relation to 
technology based on long-term practice. The function of montage has normally been 
discussed from the perspective of its disruptive or destructive character, or its affinities 
with the dialectical image. However, it also necessary to emphasise that the 
opportunities it opens for human sensibility are not enough to ground experience if they 
remain within the sphere of an ecstatic moment of suspension or innervation. If 
cinematic montage, as Hansen writes, ‘offered a temporal dynamics that allowed 
Benjamin to think against and beyond the overwhelming facticity of the present 
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situation’,4 it has to offer conditions for the interruption of this situation but also for the 
creation of an alternative relation to technology. It is in this way that repetition, training 
and citation become central for the characterisation of the principle of montage, as 
Brecht’s epic theatre shows. Repetition, adaptation and practice supplement the 
ballistic or the ecstatic character associated with interruption. Although innervation and 
interruption open the space for play or action they do not ground experience unless 
long-term practice or training catalyse the interplay between sensibility and technology 
by means of habit and play.  
The question of whether the dynamics prompted by innervation and interruption leads to 
the restoration or undoing of the negative effects of technology, or the creation of a new 
ground for sensibility might be answered by pointing out the relationship between the 
total or complete equilibrium between sensibility and technology and its fragmentary, 
partial actualisation in capitalism. This equilibrium is virtually embedded in the 
technologies of reproduction. Although the lost opportunities to develop it are 
irretrievable, this virtual equilibrium is found anew in divergent contexts. 
Understanding the present as being embedded with such potentiality creates what 
Caygill refers to as ‘the openness to the future’.5 The emphasis that Benjamin gives to 
montage as law allows for an understanding of the transformation of the ‘illusory 
nature’ which the new technologies produce and the corresponding transformation of 
the methods that may contest and reveal its artificiality. The openness to the future is 
thus marked by the irregular rhythm of the development of both tendencies in 
Benjamin’s narrative. The aestheticisation of politics and the politicisation of art unfold 
in an irregular rhythm of resistance and counter-resistance. The politicisation of art is 
unable to give a definite answer to the endless task posited by the aestheticisation of 
politics. Thus, Benjamin’s analysis is not concerned with making ‘predictions 
concerning the status of art in a technologically transformed environment’, as Hansen 
maintains.
6
 Rather, technical reproducibility and the law of montage provide the basis 
for understanding the transformability of both the illusory nature which technology 
produces and the conditions for its interruption. It is the perfectionability of the illusory 
nature produced by technology which grounds (and renews) the need for the 
politicisation of art and its imperative character. The openness to the future is not 
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5 Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 5, 76, 94, 114. 
6 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 90. 
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grounded in the predictability of concrete facts in history but in the ‘counterfactual 
imagination’ configuring Benjamin’s narrative.7  
If Benjamin’s theory of distraction may be seen as ‘mild politics’ in comparison to the 
eschatological dimension that the epilogue of the essay reaches (the either/or decision 
between barbarism and revolution, fascism and communism),
8
 its weakness responds 
however to the materialist assumptions of his own diagnosis of modernity. It avoids 
both the progressivistic conception of technology and the romantic affirmation of 
proletarian culture for which, according to Hansen, such a mild politics needs a 
correction.
9
 Hansen responds to the weakness (and ambiguity) of Benjamin’s politics 
with the concept of ‘mimetic innervation’, bringing together both the destructive 
character of innervation and the positive basis of the mimetic faculty for the articulation 
of new forms of sensibility. Hansen’s further development of the mimetic faculty as 
mimetic innervation highlights the role that mimesis plays in Benjamin’s works, yet 
paradoxically radicalises the gesture of interruption that she associates with the 
Brechtian motifs in the essay on reproducibility and which she rightly aims to constrain. 
Thus, rather than downplaying the effects of Brechtian interruption, I suggest that these 
may be understood in a different way by noticing their contribution towards the epic 
character of Brecht’s theatre. Framing Brechtian interruption within the broader context 
of the pedagogic function that the epic acquires only by means of repetition, rehearsals, 
and long-term practice, the affinities between the two versions of ‘What is Epic 
Theatre?’ and the transmissibility of storytelling can be illuminated. This strategy thus 
weakens the strong opposition between the Artwork essay and ‘The Author as Producer’ 
on the one hand, and the essays on Leskov, memory and literature on the other. In 
emphasising the epic character of Brecht’s theatre not only is interruption 
contextualised in the broader pedagogic function attributed to the epic in general; the 
concepts of innovation and progressive technique deployed in ‘The Author as Producer’ 
also acquire a new (non-progressivistic) meaning: innovation renews the concealed 
potentiality of the system of production subordinated to concepts and practices that are 
momentarily made inoperable. As Benjamin suggests in the two versions of ‘What is 
Epic Theatre?’, Brecht’s gesture renews the most basic and fundamental elements of 
                                                            
7 Caygill, The Colour of Experience: 119, 144. 
8 Gillian Rose, ‘Walter Benjamin —Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism’, in The Actuality of Walter 
Benjamin, ed. by Marcus, Laura and Nead, Lynda (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), p. 104. 
9 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 91.  
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theatre, suspending the lived moment and its capacity to produce just ‘vague memories’ 
and ‘hopes’ in the audience. 
Benjamin thus discerns different models of interpenetration between sensibility and 
technology. To argue that innervation, Brechtian interruption and other forms of 
suspension or interruption only provide an entry into (but not total access to) substantive 
experience means that the space for action or play they inaugurate is opened up to 
multiple outcomes or unknown futures. Here, the repetition originally associated with 
the transmissibility of tradition and memory is displaced towards the body and its 
sensory capacity. While the destructive character of interruption enacts the ‘distortion of 
distortion’,10 experience requires the repetition of this gesture in order not to annihilate 
the illusory nature which the law of montage produces but, rather, to transform it into a 
productive second nature that humanity can master in a state of distraction. Such a 
mastery had responded to Benjamin’s search for that ‘productive self-alienation’ which 
never came into being.
11
  
 
II 
 
In a footnote to the third version of the essay on reproducibility Benjamin writes that the 
proletariat ‘is preparing for a society in which neither the objective nor the subjective 
conditions for the formation of masses will any longer exist’.12 He does not explain this 
process of preparation. Rather, he offers the conditions for thinking the momentary 
realisation of this project in a productive interpenetration with technology on the basis 
of play. What this passage illustrates is the difference between the masses and the 
alternative collective, society or humanity that is counterfactually defined. This 
difference is critical for an understanding of the suspended transition to the relation to 
technology as second nature. This difference also serves to dissociate the masses from 
the alternative collective that Benjamin conceives, and to dissolve the false opposition 
between the masses and the concept of aura that different interpreters attribute to the 
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essay on reproducibility. Although Hansen explains in an exceptional manner the 
antinomic character that the masses have in the Artwork essay, for example, she reads in 
Benjamin a further surrender to one side of this characterisation which ultimately ‘elides 
the masses as a collective subject’.13 This further identification of the masses and the 
collective subject is, according to her, the cost of Benjamin’s ‘tactical dichotomization 
of the terms aura and masses with regard to cinema’ and of his understanding of the 
‘relationship between cinema and masses in terms of a structural affinity based in a non-
auratic perceptual regime’.14 The consequence of opposing the masses to aura on the 
one hand, and of equating the masses and cinema on the other, is double: the ‘surrender 
of the auratic image in favor of reproduction’ and the masses being neglected ‘the 
possibility of aesthetic experience’.15 For Hansen, aesthetic experience means auratic 
experience. What is at stake in this argument is the definition of aura as being either the 
hallmark of substantive experience or the residue of a belated aestheticism which 
grounds no experience. 
Benjamin’s distinction between perception and experience provides the elements for 
contesting the allegedly undialectical identification of the masses with cinema and the 
opposition between aura and the masses. As examined in the previous chapter, 
Benjamin distinguishes between ‘auratic perception’ as the ‘basis for experience’ 
(Erfahrungsgrund) in relation to traditional art, and auratic perception as the basis for a 
distorted form of sensibility in the age of technical reproducibility, one which grounds 
no experience. This confirms the structural affinity between cinema and the increasing 
movement of the masses, but does not deny the persistence of auratic perception in the 
age of technical reproducibility. What the distinction eludes is the possibility of 
understanding auratic perception as the ground for substantive experience in the age of 
technical reproducibility. This distinction then provides the conditions for understanding 
the persistence of auratic perception and its relation to contemporary masses. It is 
indeed on the basis of the auratic perception embodied by the masses that the 
ambivalence of the masses emerge in Benjamin’s account: the double movement of the 
masses’ ‘desire to get closer to things’ in reproduction (thereby annihilating cult) and 
the auratic reception of the new realm of reproduction and the illusory nature that the 
latter produces (thereby renewing cult). It is also on the basis of auratic perception that 
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humanity can live through (erleben läßt) its annihilation with aesthetic pleasure. 
Benjamin emphasises that this renewed form of cult suspends the potentiality of play 
which is virtually embedded in the new technologies of reproduction. In this situation, 
rather than artificially recreating aura (as Benjamin entertains in the essay on 
photography), the essay on reproducibility gives the conditions for a more nuanced 
characterisation of the persistence of aura: it is a specific form of perception which 
constrains the potentiality for play and is therefore unable to ground experience.  
Rather than opposing aura to the masses and identifying the masses with cinema, 
Benjamin offers a characterisation of auratic perception in terms of its capacity to either 
ground experience in relation to traditional art or to produce only a reduced form of 
sensibility (i.e. Erlebnis) in relation to the technically reproducible work of art which 
has liberated the potentiality for play. If there is an opposition determining Benjamin’s 
argument in the essay on reproducibility, this is the opposition between auratic 
perception and play in relation to the potential inaugurated by technology and the law of 
montage. Rather than neglecting the possibility of aesthetic experience to the masses, 
Benjamin understood this potentiality as the ability to give form to a new collective 
physis in an equilibrium or interplay with technology. 
The critical contribution of the opposition between aura and play in the Artwork essay is 
the characterisation of different forms of sensibility in terms of their relation to the 
illusory nature which is inherent in the law of montage. In this context, the problem of 
substantive experience and its relation to other definitions of aura in Benjamin’s works 
can be posited in terms of whether those forms of auratic perception relate to this 
illusory nature as an artifice mastered as an illusion of second-degree, or if it is 
fetishistically received as the presentation of a reality free from the operation of the 
apparatus. If the multiple genealogies of the concept of aura cannot be reduced to the 
presentation of aura in the discussion on play in the artwork essay, the perspective 
opened up by this question offers an alternative ground to relate the divergent 
formulations of aura in Benjamin’s writings.    
The definition of aura that Benjamin introduces in the essay on photography and which 
he later repeats in the work on reproducibility, according to which aura is a specific 
wave of space and time, concentrates the disjunction that he associates, first, with the 
transmissibility of tradition and the work of memory and, later, with the possibilities 
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opened up by the law of montage. Benjamin defines aura as ‘a strange wave of space 
and time: the unique appearance of a distance however near it may be’.16 On the axes of 
space and time, auratic perception interrupts the conditions of everyday experience by 
relating the ephemeral present to what is distant, both spatially and temporally. In the 
essay on photography, this definition serves to characterise ‘the spark of contingency’ 
concealed in the photographic image:  
Despite all the skill of the photographer and all the good planning in the pose of his 
model, the viewer feels irresistibly compelled to seek out the tiniest spark of 
concurrence, a here and now, in such an image, with which actuality has seared, so 
to speak, the characters in the image. We are compelled to find the inconspicuous 
place in which, in the essence of that moment, the future nestles still today, so 
eloquently that we, looking back, are able to discover it.17  
 
What Benjamin names as a strange wave of space and time which produces the 
appearance of a distance appears here as the object of a discovery which is possible to 
be realised only by a sensibility that seeks for the future nested in the past, seared in the 
photographic print. The spark of contingency that this perception produces undoes or 
suspends the illusory nature of the printing which endows its subjects with a magical 
character. In this sense, the essay on photography formulates two different concepts of 
aura. That which contributes towards the illusory character of photographic 
presentation (i.e. the aura of the bourgeoisie or the aura that Schiller’s coat acquires as 
an indexical mark of its owner), and that which is associated with the ‘beholder’ who 
searches for the contingent elements that suspends such an illusory presentation. Only if 
the illusory nature of photographic presentation is contested can the spark of 
contingency be produced, or may the image be othered —to borrow an expression 
formulated by Andrew Benjamin.
18
 What brings the two notions of aura together is the 
gesture that Benjamin attributes to the beholder of the image. As Benjamin explains in 
the exposé from 1939, investing the object with the ability to look back at us produces 
the experience of the aura of that object: ‘To experience the aura of a phenomenon we 
look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us’.19 The ability of the object 
to reveal the spark of contingency or to look back at us depends on the ability of the 
viewer to discover the future concealed in the image of the past or the ability of the 
                                                            
16 On Photography: 57.  
17 On Photography: 65-6. 
18 Andrew Benjamin, Working with Walter Benjamin, pp. 30–31, 37. 
19 OSMB: 136; GS1:646 
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observer to seek for the other’s gaze. In the exposé of the unfinished book on 
Baudelaire, the passer-by recognises in the other the loss of the ability to return the 
gaze, the loss of the conditions for inter-subjective relations. 
The gestures of investing the object with the ability to return the gaze and discovering 
the spark of contingency stand in a double relation to the characterisation of auratic 
perception in the Artwork essay. From the perspective of the distinction between auratic 
perception (auratische Wahrnehmung) and experience (Erfahrung), investing the image 
with contingency and discovering the other’s gaze are either auratic forms of sensibility 
or substantive (non-auratic) forms of perception which open the opportunity to ground 
experience. They are examples of the former if they are explained as fetishist gestures 
within the logic of reification, in which the object is endowed with magical attributes. 
They are examples of substantive, non-auratic perception if those gestures are 
understood as forms of contesting the illusory nature of the image: if the photographic 
image is viewed not as a mere presentation of the fixed past but as being embedded with 
multiple futures, the beholder’s perception is non-auratic and, consequently, opens up 
the opportunity to ground substantive experience. This comparison shows the affinities 
between the presentation of auratic experience in the essays on photography and 
Baudelaire, and the characterisation of experience in the Artwork essay (grounded in 
non-auratic perception): both forms of substantive experience illustrate the temporal 
disjunction that suspends the illusory nature which is inherent in technology and its 
effects. This disjunction opens up the technical image to multiple meanings that exceed 
the ephemeral present. In both cases, what determines the character of such experience 
as substantive experience is the attentiveness towards the discrete possibilities virtually 
embedded in the object.  
What the decline of aura implies is the unsettling of the conditions for the persistence of 
this form of attentiveness in light of the emergence of technical reproducibility. It is 
within this context that the Artwork essay emphasises the confrontation with the object 
as technically assembled or mounted and, consequently, as bearing an illusory nature of 
second degree. It is in this sense that the temporal disjunction firstly associated with 
tradition and memory is displaced, in light of the shattering of tradition, to technical 
reproducibility and the law of montage. Here, rather than staging a stark opposition 
between reproducibility and the work of tradition and memory, the Artwork essay may 
be read as ascribing to technical reproducibility the potentiality to produce substantive 
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experience by means of an alternative form of producing the temporal disjunction 
originally attributed to the work of tradition and memory. If reproducibility annihilates 
the conditions for the ‘unique appearance of a distance’, the law of montage produces 
such temporal disjunction or interruption by means of the juxtaposition of divergent 
elements whose temporal and spatial origins recast the dynamics of nearness and 
distance in the technical image. This is the contribution of montage as the law or general 
principle of construction of the work of art, further radicalised in its avant-garde 
expressions. The gesture of investing and discovering both the spark of contingency and 
the return of the gaze depend on a particular form of attentiveness, one which emerges 
on the basis of the dynamics of interruption and the mastering of the object in habitual 
long-term practice and play.  
Diarmuid Costello’s distinction between the specific and the general concepts of aura 
serves to stress this point, albeit in a negative form. Costello differentiates between the 
‘specific’ concept of aura associated with the reception of the work of art and the 
‘general’ concept of aura linked to our ability to relate to others. For him the 
annihilation of auratic perception in regard to works of art is the sign of the annihilation 
of our capacity to feel empathy. Regarding ‘aesthetic experience’ as a propaedeutic for 
moral feelings and action, the ‘celebration’ of the annihilation of aura ‘is tantamount to 
celebrating barbarism’.20 For Costello, the loss of the capacity for auratic experience is 
the loss of the capacity to respond to ‘the particularity of others’.21 If the relationship 
between the experience of art and action exists, it is reversed in Benjamin’s account of 
the politicisation of art: the work of art has a disruptive quality which breaks with 
inherited systems of perception, thereby expanding humanity’s space for action or play. 
Art is not a propaedeutic for moral feelings but rather the battlefield to contest illusory 
forms of presenting reality. It works negatively by producing or staging the conflict 
between the inherited regime of concepts and practices, and the concealed potentiality 
of the system of production subordinated to those same concepts and practices. Here, to 
politicise art means to liberate such a potentiality in forms that make those distinctions 
inoperable, if only in a momentary way. Borrowing from Adorno, ‘the difference of 
artworks from the empirical world, the semblance character, is constituted out of the 
                                                            
20 Diarmuid Costello, ‘Aura, Face, Photography: Re-Reading Benjamin Today’, Walter Benjamin and 
Art, ed. by Andrew Benjamin (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 179–80. 
21 Costello, ‘Aura, Face and Photography’: 179–80.  
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empirical world and in opposition to it’.22 If for Adorno this difference originates in the 
‘semblance character’ of the work, for Benjamin this difference is produced by practices 
which undo or suspend the system of production that makes them possible in the first 
place.  
 
III 
 
The argument pursued in this thesis with regard to the notion of experience is that both 
the work of tradition and memory on the one hand, and technically reproducible art, 
epic narration and theatre on the other, substantiate experience from different yet 
complementary standpoints. Here, different forms of repetition are opposed to the 
reflex, mechanical movement produced by the model of the conveyor belt. In this way, 
the potentiality associated with reproducibility and, more specifically, with the work of 
art that ‘emerges on the basis of montage’, cannot be merely opposed to the work of 
tradition and memory. If it operates in a different medium (other than tradition and 
memory), the assembled work bears the potentiality to produce both a temporal 
interruption and long-term practice, yet always on the basis of recognising the 
‘impossibility to reverse the decline of aura’, as Jay suggests.23 
These forms of repetition are associated with mimesis, which Benjamin regards to be 
the ‘Ur-phenomenon of all artistic activity’.24 With the potential liberation of play by 
technical reproducibility, mimesis is situated in the process of repetition that Benjamin 
associates with the equilibrium between humanity and technology. Such an equilibrium 
responds to the principle of ‘once is as good as never’, referring thereby to repetition, 
tests and experimentation. Play exploits, therefore, the experimental character that 
Benjamin attributes to mimesis. The ‘inexhaustible reservoir of all the experimental 
procedures’ on which the interplay between technology and sensibility is based offers 
the opportunity to ground experience in the absence of tradition. As Benjamin writes in 
‘Toys and Plays’: ‘the transformation of a shattering of experience into habit —that is 
                                                            
22 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 103. 
23 Martin Jay, ‘Taking On the Stigma of Inauthenticity: Adorno’s Critique of Genuineness’, New German 
Critique, 2006, 15–30 (p. 18).  
24 SW 3: 137, 127. 
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the essence of play’.25 The attentiveness delineated by the concepts of interruption, play, 
repetition and habit associated with the principle and method of montage contextualise 
the opposition between tradition and reproducibility which the Artwork essay stages 
within a broader understanding of their affinities, providing then elements for contesting 
the antinomic readings of Benjamin.  
The major affinity between the transmissibility of tradition, the work of memory and the 
law of montage on which the work of art emerges consists, therefore, of the double 
movement which suspends the lived moment or the ephemeral present while relating it 
to the past. What this affinity reveals is the way Benjamin conceives of the possibility of 
grounding substantive experience in different contexts and through different media. It is 
from this perspective that this work has examined the way in which experience is 
grounded as an open-ended form of sensibility in four different moments or contexts in 
Benjamin’s writings which, although related, serve to reveal divergent inflections in the 
notion of experience. The opposition between tradition and reproducibility staged in the 
Artwork essay and ‘The Storyteller’ may obscure these affinities which, I have argued, 
are illuminated if the law of montage organising the work of art is highlighted. On the 
one hand, although Benjamin recognises in the Artwork essay that tradition transmits its 
objects not without their further transformation, from the perspective of its shattering or 
loss, the essay does not explore the complexities associated with the process of 
transmissibility. Some of these are critical for the characterisation of the law of 
montage: interruption, suspension and repetition. On the other, ‘The Storyteller’ 
introduces the transmissibility of tradition in opposition to the technologies of 
reproduction and the amnestic character of information without exploring the mnemonic 
aspect that the new technologies may recast. In this way, the confrontation between 
tradition and reproducibility presented in the two essays comes at the cost of producing 
the ‘Janus-faced’ image of Benjamin’s understanding of reproducibility and tradition. 
The problem of this formulation is not that it gives the conditions for the so-called 
liquidationist or conservationist readings of Benjamin, or the ‘techno-utopian’ and 
‘media-pessimistic’ solutions to the questions posited by the crisis of tradition.26 The 
main problem of opposing tradition and reproducibility without looking at their 
affinities is that it eludes the inherent conflict that Benjamin identifies in the process of 
                                                            
25 SW 2: 120. 
26 Hansen, Cinema and Experience: 80-82, 204.  
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transmissibility by means of tradition, which is more clearly formulated in relation to 
the notion of immanent critique in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’. This analysis then 
aims to provide the conditions for understanding the crisis of tradition as a 
historiographic crisis to which Benjamin contests by means of his theory of experience 
formed according to the law of montage. 
From the perspective of its loss, tradition is explained both in the Artwork essay and in 
‘The Storyteller’ as the medium of transmissibility that gives the conditions for 
experience. In both essays, there is a recognition of the transformation of the objects 
delivered by tradition in the process of their transmission. Notwithstanding, both 
accounts lack a characterisation of that which is lost in the process of transformation, 
and, furthermore, of the divergent ways in which the process of transmission and 
transformation of those phenomena delivered by tradition is marked by irregular 
rhythms. From the perspective of its loss, tradition appears in the essays from the 1930s 
as an open-ended unity yet with a coherence or continuous structure that remains, in 
general terms, stable or unchanged. In the course of this thesis, the emphasis given to 
the process of transmissibility as it is formulated in the early essays on Kant, language, 
translation and, mainly, in the ‘Prologue’ to the Trauerspiel book, provides the 
conditions for the presentation of the inherent conflict of the transmissibility of tradition 
and, consequently, of its double relation to reproducibility. The shattering of tradition 
produces the crisis of the transmissibility of experience as historiographic crisis by 
dissolving the inherent tension in transmissibility.  
Benjamin’s dictum in thesis VII of the ‘Theses on the Concept of History’ that ‘there is 
no object of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism’27 might 
provide an ultimate attempt to grasp the tension internal to the transmissibility of 
tradition. At stake is the possibility of recasting the present as a moment of crisis open 
to multiple, unknown futures. With the shattering of tradition, experience is unsettled 
since it detaches cultural objects from the web of tradition, or from their embeddedness 
in any collective structure organised by the construction of inter-generational memory. 
This crisis produces the possibility of having reproducibility without transmissibility in 
opposition to storytelling, in which the conditions for reproducibility are the conditions 
for transmissibility. By dissociating reproducibility from transmissibility, phenomena 
                                                            
27 SW 4: 392. 
 
 
210 
also loss their ability to bear the historical testimony of their own process of emergence 
and the marks of their own origin. The dialectic of culture and barbarism becomes 
apparent in the origin of phenomena and in what Benjamin calls the objectivity with 
which history endows the names that have been used to present the idea of such 
phenomena. With the shattering of tradition, what is unsettled is the possibility of 
patterning the irregular rhythm which informs this process of transformation and the 
subsequent possibility of grasping the total yet incomplete history of phenomena (which 
ultimately opens this transformation to new futurities).  
Critical to this presentation of the relation between tradition and reproducibility is 
Benjamin’s understanding of language as the medium through which this irregular 
rhythm is articulated, and the emphasis on the subtle differences between the essays on 
language and translation from 1916 and 1921 and the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’. If 
Benjamin ‘advances’ a ‘shift’ ‘to the history of language and to history as language’ in 
the transition from ‘On Language as Such’ to ‘The Task of the Translator’,28 the latter 
still conceives of the transformation of language (and the unity of knowledge and 
experience embedded in it) as a process of unfolding or growth towards an unattainable 
higher realm of language. Although this process contemplates discontinuity and breaks, 
the emphasis that Benjamin puts in the process of becoming (Werden) of meaning and 
language directs the attention towards the process of completion of language.  
It is the concept of origin that brings such breaks to the fore of the transformation of 
language, in which the dynamics of continuity and ruptures which is inherent in history 
is explored in more radical ways. Reading the doctrine of ideas of the ‘Epistemo-
Critical Prologue’ and its concept of origin in terms of the transmissibility of tradition 
opens up an opportunity to understand the relationship between transmissibility from a 
different perspective than the one which the essay on translation offers. Here, 
transmissibility by means of tradition not only implies the transformation of what is 
delivered by tradition but also the betrayal that is inherent in its transformation, as 
Caygill argues;
29
 or the loss that marks the process of transmission, illustrated by the 
forgetting of the multiple elements of the Trauerspiel in its subsequent reception and 
subordination to different methodologies for genre definition. This dynamics of 
transformation and loss constitutes the historical testimony of the phenomena which is 
                                                            
28 Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 34. 
29 Caygill, ‘Benjamin, Heidegger, and the Destruction of Tradition’: 12-15, 20-21. 
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at risk of being lost with the emergence of technical reproducibility and its ability to 
detach the objects of culture from their embeddedness in the fabric of tradition. 
Therefore, the crisis of experience which Benjamin first identifies with the loss of the 
eschatological closure of the Trauerspiel is supplemented with the loss of the capacity 
of phenomena to carry with them the traces of their own origin.  
There is, however, a further point related to the concept of origin that will serve to 
establish both the problems that technical reproducibility brings for the transmissibility 
of tradition and the affinities between technical reproducibility and tradition. In tracing 
the origin of phenomena, the illusory appearance of phenomena as complete, enclosed 
unities is annihilated or temporarily suspended. Then, with the shattering of tradition 
this gesture of suspension is also affected and the objects (or their facsimiles-Abbild) 
that reproducibility brings closer are both detached from tradition and from the 
conditions for mastering or suspending their illusory nature. If reproducibility brings the 
object closer, however, the law of montage allows for conceiving of an alternative basis 
on which it is possible to suspend the illusory nature of the object. Here, tradition and 
technical reproducibility reveal their major affinity if the law of montage is emphasised: 
they are charged with the possibility of contesting the illusory nature of the unity of 
phenomena, whether those delivered by tradition or those produced in industrial 
capitalism. The suspension of such an appearance of unity is not able to ground 
substantive experience if the interruption which montage produces lacks in a mnemonic 
function. This, I argued, is grounded in divergent concepts of memory in the writings on 
epic narration (specifically in the sense of fragmentary reminiscence or Gedächtnis), 
and bodily associations linked to play, repetition and habit-formation in the essay on 
reproducibility, photography and epic theatre. It is in this sense that the destructive 
character associated with montage and other concepts in Benjamin’s writings (such as 
dialectical image and the now of cognisability) offer an entry to a new space for play or 
action but do not ground experience by themselves. Finally, a further element that 
contributes to understanding the different standpoints from which Benjamin looks at the 
possibility of grounding substantive experience is related to the openness to history that 
informs both the doctrine of ideas and the concept of origin on the one hand, and the 
dynamics established on the basis of reproducibility and montage on the other. With the 
deferral of the total or complete equilibrium between technology and sensibility 
Benjamin establishes the basis for the transformation of both the illusory nature that 
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emerges on the basis of montage and reproducibility, and the possibility of articulating 
or configuring new forms to contest its illusory nature. The deferral of this equilibrium 
ultimately contests the temporality apparently concentrated in the newness of 
reproducibility, opening the present up to the future. Just like origin does not forecloses 
the transformability of phenomena, the deferral of complete redemption or resolution in 
the essay on reproducibility creates opportunities for concrete practices that bring 
temporary solutions to humanity’s infinite task to emerge. In denying a fixed solution to 
the aestheticisation of politics, Benjamin thus makes room for the imperative character 
of the politicisation of art.  
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